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The authors of the works that are part of this collection can 
be divided into several groups. The first is a group of purely 
academic researchers. The second group includes academic 
researchers who also act as engaged intellectuals and publicly 
known analysts of social phenomena. The third group includes 
academic researchers with specific experience of serving within 
different political and economic institutions and who can 
therefore be seen as belonging to the two worlds - the world of 
scientific-academic research and the world of decision-making. 
The above-mentioned different groups co-authored some of 
the papers in this collection, whereby the papers that they have 
jointly contributed achieve a positive synergy of the different 
aspirations and activities of their authors, from the purely 
academic to practical and applied fields.
Just as with the authors, the reviewers of the texts in this 
collection belong to or have belonged to these two worlds - the 
world of scientific-academic research and the world of decision-
making - since they are not only regionally renowned and 
recognized professors and experts in the field of international 
relations, but also people who have held various senior 
positions in government, diplomacy and scientific institutions.
Finally, the editors of this collection, in aiming to achieve the 
difficult and demanding obligation to meet the standards 
achieved by authors and reviewers, have given their all in 
order to give this collection the best possible appearance and 
structure, not just because the collection is the first official 
publication of the Forum for Strategic Studies (FORST) of the 
Institute of Social Sciences. ST
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The Forum for Strategic Studies (FORST) is a research 
group established during the winter term of the 
2018/2019 academic year within the Institute of Social 
Sciences in Belgrade, with the intention of becoming 
a regional center for research in the fields of strategic 
studies, international relations, geopolitics, security 
and diplomacy. The Forum for Strategic Studies brings 
together scientists and researchers from the Institute 
of Social Sciences, as well as external associates from 
state institutions of the Republic of Serbia and other 
academic and scientific institutions from Europe and 
around the world, with the aim of scientifically antici-
pating future events and strategic streams, in order to 
form credible public policies based on science-based 
predictions within Serbia.
The Forum for Strategic Studies also represents a pub-
lic platform for dialogue on strategic issues within and 
between different aspects of Serbian society, as well 
as a platform for dialogue between science, diplomacy, 
public policies and decision making in the fields of stra-
tegic studies, geopolitics and international relations.
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Foreword
 This collection is the first official publication of the Forum for 
Strategic Studies (FORST), a research group established during the 
winter term of the 2018/2019 academic year within the Institute of 
Social Sciences in Belgrade, with the intention of becoming a re-
gional center for research in the fields of strategic studies, interna-
tional relations, geopolitics, security and diplomacy. The Forum for 
Strategic Studies brings together scientists and researchers from 
the Institute of Social Sciences, as well as external associates from 
state institutions of the Republic of Serbia and other academic and 
scientific institutions from Europe and around the world. What 
brings together researchers of different profiles, disciplines, insti-
tutions and countries to work together within the Forum for Stra-
tegic Studies is their passion for, above all, the fields of strategic 
studies and geopolitics - areas that, in recent years, have gained 
prominence due to a series of global events, from migrant crises to 
the crisis of the international liberal order, making them an indis-
pensable subject of research, placing them at the very peak of the 
social sciences corpus.
To date, in just over a year of its work, the Forum for Strate-
gic Studies has organized several major conferences, with guests, 
officials, analysts, scientists and professors of the highest rank 
(from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, through ambassadors of lead-
8ing nations, to renowned experts, scientists and professors from 
Europe and across the globe), as well as a number of smaller panels 
with equally distinguished guests. The conferences The World in 
Turmoil and the Future of Europe and the Balkans and Strategic 
Streams 2019: Elections for the European Parliament and the Future 
of Europe are of particular note, serving as a template for prepara-
tion of this collection of papers. This publication has collected the 
works of a number of participants in the aforementioned confer-
ences who discussed the future of Europe - the common topic of 
both conferences, this collection, and much of the research we un-
dertake within the Forum for Strategic Studies. The future of Eu-
rope in the context of the geopolitical dynamics of the 21st century 
is actually a major - umbrella topic, toward which the Forum for 
Strategic Studies intends to focus its efforts, with the plan being to 
organize an annual conference (followed by thematic collection of 
papers) called Strategic Streams, which would discuss a key strate-
gic event that affects the fate of Europe in a given year. The key 
event of the last year, 2019, in this respect, was undoubtedly the 
race for the European Parliament, that is, the pan-European elec-
tions that resulted in the formation of the current European Com-
mission, to which we specifically dedicated the conference, from 
whose conclusions we have now created this collection of papers. 
However, this collection is not exclusively dedicated to the confer-
ence, as it contains works by a number of authors from the area of 
European politics and research not in attendance, but who have 
much to say about the topic.
The authors of the works that are part of this collection can 
be divided into several groups. The first is a group of purely aca-
demic researchers, including Asia Jane Leigh, Marijana Maksimović, 
Nada Novaković and Mirjana Dokmanović. The second group in-
cludes academic researchers who also act as engaged intellectuals 
and publicly known analysts of social phenomena, such as Slobodan 
Zečević and Gordana Gasmi. The third group includes academic re-
searchers with specific experience of serving within different politi-
cal and economic institutions and who can therefore be seen as be-
longing to the two worlds - the world of scientific-academic 
research and the world of decision-making, such as Roberto Rampi 
(Member of the Italian Senate), Andrija Pejović (Former Ambassa-
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dor to the EU and Minister in the Government of Montenegro), An-
drei Radulescu (Chief Macroeconomist at the Romanian Bank of 
Transylvania) and Neven Cvetićanin (Former Member of the Serbian 
Parliament and current President of the Forum for Strategic Stud-
ies). The above-mentioned different groups co-authored some of 
the papers in this collection, whereby the papers that they have 
jointly contributed achieve a positive synergy of the different aspi-
rations and activities of their authors, from the purely academic to 
practical and applied fields.
Just as with the authors, the reviewers of the texts in this 
collection belong to or have belonged to these two worlds, since 
Dejan Jović, Duško Lopandić and Duško Dimitrijević are not only re-
gionally renowned and recognized professors and experts in the 
field of international relations, but also people who have held vari-
ous senior positions in government, diplomacy and scientific insti-
tutions.
Finally, the editors of this collection, in aiming to achieve the 
difficult and demanding obligation to meet the standards achieved 
by authors and reviewers, have given their all in order to give this 
collection the best possible appearance and structure, not just be-
cause the collection is the first official publication of the Forum for 
Strategic Studies (FORST) of the Institute of Social Sciences. This 
imposes before us an additional duty to thank everyone who has 
participated in the work of the Forum for Strategic Studies from its 
very beginnings and aided its formation and activities with their 
knowledge, energy and goodwill. 
Dr Neven Cvetićanin 
President of Forum for Strategic Studies 
of Institute of Social Sciences 
Zečević  
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“Unexpected” Results of the 
2019 European Parliamentary Elections
Abstract
The European Parliamentary elections were held in the context of 
the crisis of the European Union’s institutional system, which lacked 
the capacity to meet the challenges of the migrant crisis and the 
economic expectations of citizens. The pro-European ruling par-
ties have suppressed the progress of the Eurosceptics and nation-
al parties, but have lost an absolute majority in the European Par-
liament. For the first time since 1979, the EPP and Social Democrats 
do not have an absolute majority and was forced to form coalitions 
with other with liberals from “Renew Europe.” That created major 
consequences in the process of nomination of the President of Eu-
ropean Parliament and the European Commission. 
Keywords: Elections, European Parliament, European Political Par-
ties, President of the European Parliament, President of the Com-
mission, Spitzenkandidaten.
Introduction
 The European Parliamentary elections were held in the con-
text of the crisis of the European Union’s institutional system, 
which lacked the capacity to meet the challenges of the migrant 
crisis and the economic expectations of citizens. The European 
Union did not have an effective mechanism to protect the territory 
from immigration, nor an adequate federal budget and redistribu-
tion system from rich to poor Member States. In a crisis environ-
ment, a radical change in the Assembly majority have been expect-
ed by some press analysts.1 However, this did not happen but there 
was a redistribution of power between the European People’s Par-
ties, the Social Democrats and the Liberals assembled in the new 
Renew Europe parliamentary group. This tripartite division has an 
1   Vincent Georis, Une vague populiste menace l’Europe, https://www.lecho.
be, 17.05.2019.; Ollivier Talles, La vague nationale-populiste n’a pas eu lieu, 
https://www.lacroix.com, 27.05.2019.  
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impact on the appointments of senior EU officials and decision 
making. The radical right has strengthened its position in the Euro-
pean Parliament but without the possibility of assuming power.
How did the European Union react to the crisis? It could be 
said, first of all, by the mass going out of its citizens to the parlia-
mentary elections, which  show their interest in the European future. 
This denied the claim that the European Union was an alienated and 
bureaucratic creation without a stronghold in the people. However, 
citizens clearly want a different Union, which protects them more. 
More efficient Union how contributes to economic development 
and prosperity. The question remains whether the new European 
Union institutions in process of formation and governments of its 
Member States will find solutions to meet contemporary challenges?
High level of participation on  
European parliamentary elections 2019
Despite the rise of the European Parliament’s competences, 
especially in the legislative sphere, voter participation in the Euro-
pean Parliamentary elections since 1979, or since the first direct 
election of MPs, has been steadily declining reaching 42% in 2014.2 
Started on this fact, there were opinions that there is a democratic 
deficit in the European Union, and the last one have not democrat-
ic foundations. However, objectively, every EU institution partici-
pating in the decision-making process has democratic legitimacy. 
Namely, MEPs are elected directly by the citizens of the Member 
States. Ministers who are democratically elected to this function in 
their respective countries are meeting in the Council, as is the case 
with the Heads of State or Government of the Union member 
states assembled at the European Council. The European Union is 
governed by the highest standards in the world in terms of respect 
of Human rights and freedom of expression.
The teases about of deficiency of democracy have been re-
futed by the fact that turnout in the 2019 European Parliament 
elections was for the 27 Member States, with the exception of the 
2  01.08.2019., https://frstatista.com
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UK, around 51 per cent.3 This is the largest voter turnout in the Eu-
ropean elections in the last 20 years. In France, for example, partici-
pation was up about 9 points over 2014 and corresponded to turn-
out in the 2017 national parliamentary elections. In Germany, 61 
per cent of voters went to the polls, in Italy 54 per cent in Spain 64 
per cent, in Poland 46 per cent and in Romania 51 per cent.4
Political groups of the European People’s Parties and Socialists 
and Social Democrats lose an absolute majority in the 
European Parliament and that fact created tripartite power 
The pro-European ruling parties have suppressed the prog-
ress of the Eurosceptic and national parties, but have lost an abso-
lute majority in the European Parliament. The European People’s 
Party Group (EPP) won 182 seats, up from 216 in the 2014-2016 
election, while the Social Democrats dropped from 185 to 154 
seats. For the first time since 1979, these two political formations 
do not have an absolute majority and was forced to form coalitions 
with other parties, most likely with Renew Europe, the former Lib-
eral Alliance (108 seats) and eventually with the Greens MP (74). 
Thus, the election of the President of the European Parliament, the 
Commission and his important positions (the Vice-President of the 
Commission and the High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy) depended on the approval of 3 or 4 formations. On the oth-
er hand, even if the Social Democrats, the Liberals, the Greens and 
the left-wing caucuses united, they would lack a dozen seats for 
the absolute majority. Much more realistic was the coalition of Peo-
ple’s Parties, Social Democrats, and ”Renew Europe”.
In this regard, one should look at the stiff stance of French 
President Emanuel Macron, whose party the Republic on the move 
has strengthened the group of liberals in the European Parliament, 
in the context of choosing a candidate for the president of the 
Commission. Macron, refused to accept the election of German 
3   Elections europeennes 2019: taux de participation en hausse, a plus de 50%, 
www.lemonde.fr, 27.05.2019.
4   Europeennes 2019: Taux de participation par pays, www.touteleurope.eu, 
29.05.2019.
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Manfred Weber as the “spitzenkandidaten,’’the first on the list of 
European People’s Parties dominated by the German Christian Dem-
ocrats from the CDU and CSU. The rule on the election of the leader 
of coalition with absolute-majority in the European Parliament to 
the post of President of the Commission, imposed by the European 
Parliament in 2014, could not be implemented in this case.
Even after the formation of a new Commission, the consent of 
at least 3 parliamentary clubs will be required to majors appoint-
ments, for adopt legislative acts or resolutions in the European Parlia-
ment. Thus, the dispersion of votes will force MPs to delicate arrange-
ments and coalitions, and perhaps coalitions on a case-by-case basis.
The consequences of tripartite power    
The election of the president of European Parliament 
The election of the President of the European Parliament 
was the first test for the formation of future coalitions and the ap-
pointment of heads of other institutions of the European Union. 
The president is elected for 2.5 years, respectively for a half of leg-
islation.5 Since 1979, the representative of the European People’s 
Parties and the Social Democrats have been replaced for half a 
term in this position as two of the strongest political parties in Eu-
rope. Thus, on January 17, 2017, Antonio Tajani of the People’s Par-
ty replaced Social Democrat Martin Schulz. Considering that the 
two groups lost an absolute majority, the question was asked 
whether a third solution would be required, such as the election of 
a candidate belonging to the Renew Europe parliamentary group?  
The nomination requires the support of one parliamentary 
group or 38 MPs. Elections are held in four rounds until one candi-
date receives an absolute majority of MPs.6 In the fourth round there 
is a choice between two best placed candidates from the third round.
5   Guy Isaac, Marc Blanquet, Droit general de L’Union europeenne, Sirey, 10 
edition, Paris, 2012, p. 161.;  Denis Simon, Le systeme juridique communau-
taire, PUF, 3 edition , Paris, 2001., p. 223.
6   Guy Isaac, Marc Blanquet, Droit general de L’Union europeenne, Sirey, 10 
edition, Paris, 2012, p. 161.
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On 3 July 2019, David Sassoli was elected as the President of the 
European Parliament. Sassoli is a member of the Democratic Party, 
which is part of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Club in the Europe-
an Parliament. Sassoli, therefore, succeeded in this fiction also the Ital-
ian Antonio Tajani politician in close relations with Silvio Berlusconi of 
the group of the European People’s Party.7Sassoli was elected in the 
second ballot, receiving 345 votes from MEPs. The choice of Sassoli re-
flects the process of achieving the so-called European compromises on 
the appointment of the heads of the institutions of the European 
Union. It is a matter for Italy, as a large Member State, to retain one of 
its leading European functions, bearing in mind the departure of Mario 
Draghi as Governor of the European Central Bank and Federica Mogher-
ini as Vice-President of the Commission and High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and security policy. Sassoli is Italian, but does not belong 
to the Eurosceptic far-right MP of the former deputy prime minister and 
influential factor in the Italian political scene, Mateo Salvini. This avoids 
the danger of an adversary of European integration taking the lead of 
one of the important institutions of the Union. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, supporting Sassoli as a Social Democrat has virtually opened up 
the possibility for the European People’s Parties to obtain the position 
of the President of the European Commission.
By the way, political scientist Sassoli has been a MEP since 
2009, and before that he was the star of Italian state television RAI as 
head of the evening newspaper and co-chair of public service. After a 
brief trip to national politics in 2014 in an attempt to run for mayor of 
Rome, he returns to engagement in the European Parliament.
The election of the president of the Commission
The President of the Commission is elected by the European 
Parliament on the proposal of the European Council as a kind of col-
lective head of state. The European Council shall determine the candi-
date for President of the Commission by a qualified majority, taking 
into account the results of the elections for the European Parlia-
7   L’Italien David Sassoli elu president du Parlement europeen, www.lemonde.
fr, 01.08.2019.
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ment.8After the 2014 European Parliament elections, the deputies of 
the two strongest party groups, the European People’s Party and the 
Social Democrats, succeeded in imposing on the European Council the 
nomination of the head of list of the political party that received the 
most votes in parliamentary elections, or the highest number of seats 
in the European Parliament. Thus, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker was 
elected the President of the Commission as the head of the list of Eu-
ropean People’s Parties. The election of a candidate for president of 
the Commission was considered a democratic achievement, as par-
ty-list holders participated in the campaign by presenting political pro-
grams at public hearings and rallies and crossing their spears in televi-
sion debates. Overall, they were considered to have the democratic 
legitimacy of being nominated as Commission President.
* Abandoning the election of “Spitzenkandidaten” on the head of the 
Commission  
However, in the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, 
the European People’s Party’s and the Social Democrats did not get 
an absolute majority, so it was harder to them to impose to the Eu-
ropean Council theirs “Spitzenkandidaten” for the president of 
Commission. The two groups were forced to negotiate with the 
Liberals and the Greens on this issue. French President Emmanuel 
Macron as a member of the European Council was opponent of the 
initiative of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to make Manfred 
Weber the leader of the list of People’s Party who received the 
most seats, or a relative majority with the Social Democrats, as a 
natural candidate for the President of the Commission. The Macron 
party, the “Republic on the move,” has, with a very good election 
result in France, strengthened the “Alliance of Liberal Democrats” 
and even changed its name to “Renew Europe.” The French MEPs 
wanted to avoid using the word “liberalism” in the name of a parlia-
mentary club that they considered unpopular among European citi-
zens.9 Therefore, this caucus has played an important role in the 
election of the President of the Commission.
8   Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union.
9   Le groupe ALDE baptise “Renew Europe”, https:// www.auroactiv.fr, 
13.06.2019.
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Emanuel Macron was opposed of Manfred Weber’s election 
to the post of chairman of the Commission for several reasons. 
First, he felt that the latter have not sufficient political weight be-
cause he did not hold an important national or European function 
and hebelongsto a relatively small party such as the Bavarian 
branch of the German “Christian Democrats - CSU.” More impor-
tantly, Manfred Weber, advocating the views of the “CDU / CSU” 
German coalition, mined Macron’s initiative to elect one part of 
MEP in the European Union as one constituency on transnational 
lists. In technical terms, the French president wanted European citi-
zens to virtually vote on two ballots. One would reflect the election 
of a national contingent of MEPs. The second would be lists of Eu-
ropean parties with a prominent first in the list (spitzenkandidat-
en), which means that a part of MEPs would be elected on the basis 
of the order of transnational lists in the European Union as one 
constituency. Macron’s key argument for rejecting the nomination 
of a head of the lists for the presidency of the Commission was 
that they were not at the head of the transnational list, which was 
voted by the majority of all European citizens. In fact they got the 
confidence only by voters in their country.10 Thus, the “spitzenkan-
didaten” had only national and not pan-European legitimacy. The 
French president drew the conclusion that, due to the lack of dem-
ocratic legitimacy of the candidate, the authority to independently 
nominate a candidate for Commission President should go back to 
the European Council as otherwise provided for in the founding 
treaties, and it is up to the European Parliament to either confirm 
or reject this proposal.
Behind the return to classical institutionalism stood political 
interests. Macron was bothered by the dominance of the European 
People’s Parties in nominating the Commission presidential candi-
dates because they were virtually run by German Christian Demo-
crats as their strongest component. On the other hand, this is pre-
cisely the reason why German Chancellor Angela Merkel did not 
even accept Macron’s initiative on transnational lists. In the end, 
Weber’s flaw in the eyes of the French president was that he did 
not speak French.
10   Jean Quatremer, “Commission europeenne: Emmanuel Macron se debarasse 
des Spitzenkandidaten”, https://www.liberation.fr, 21.06.2019.
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Within the European Council, Macron succeeded to get con-
fidence of eight Liberal prime ministers and heads of state, lobby-
ing for another 5 Social Democratic leaders of member states, and 
especially advocate with Pedro Sanchez, the then prime minister of 
Spain, against Weber’s candidacy.11 Considering the candidate for 
President of the Commission is determined by a qualified majority, 
it is clear that Macron had a “blocking minority” in the European 
Council that would have prevented the decision to propose Weber 
to the post. 
The election of Ursula von der Leyen  
as candidate for President of the Commission
It was rumoured that Macron could endorse Margaret 
Margrethe Vestager as the first on the Liberal list, or Michel 
Barnier of France as a compromise solution. In the game for the 
President of the Commission was also the first on the list of the 
Social Democrats Dutch Frans Timmermans who achieved a sur-
prisingly good result in the elections for the European Parlia-
ment in his country. At one point, it seemed that in the name of 
peace in the European house, Angela Merkel had stepped down 
of the post of Commission President and that a compromise 
had been made with Macron to have Timmermans as Commis-
sion President. However, there was a rebellion within the Peo-
ple’s Party caucus against Angle Merkel and the intention to 
cede the seat of the Commission to the Social Democrats.12
The election of Social Democrat Sassoli as President of 
the European Parliament has opened the door for President 
Macron to realize his ideas about the profile of the candidate 
for President of the Commission. It was supposed it had to be 
someone from the People’s Parties because it won the most 
seats in the European Parliament, who is a moderate right-
11   Nominaton a la tete de l’UE: tactatiosn et lutte de pouvir au sommet, 
https://www.lepoint.fr, 28.05.2019.
12   Alexandra Brzozwski, Georgi Gotev, Jorge Valero, Les chefs d’Etat empe-
tres dans la nomination des postes cles de l’Europe,https://www.euroactiv.
fr, 01.07.2019.
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hander with pro-European orientation and who also speaks 
French. In order to calm German anger after rejecting Weber’s 
candidacy, it was desirable to have a German candidate, and 
even better, to be female in order to meet the criteria of gen-
der equality. Macron therefore suggested to Angela Merkel 
that the European Council propose Ursula von der Leyen the 
German Minister of defence, with whom he had close political 
views.13 Born and raised in Belgium, von der Lejen speaks 
French and is a moderate conservative of the pro-European ori-
entation. The former German defence minister, together with 
Macron, fought for a joint European weapons program, most 
notably the creation of a European fighter jet.14 Von der Leyen 
supports Macron’s environmental program for combating car-
bon emissions, as well as the request for redistribution of asy-
lum seekers by Member State. With regard to Britain’s exit from 
the European Union, von der Leyen believes, as does Macron, 
that the Brexit agreement reached is the best solution and 
there is no need for the new negotiations on the subject, but 
she was in for another postponement of the UK’s exit from the 
European Union.
At the beginning of July 2019, the European Council pro-
posed Ursula von der Leyen as a candidate for the Commission 
President.15 This decision has caused unease in the European 
Parliament because it’s abandoned the election of “spitzenkan-
didaten” on this post, and that was considered as a democratic 
achievement. Specifically, the question was how could some-
body who did not led a single electoral list or participate in the 
European Parliament elections be elected to the head of the 
Commission? For this reason, it was very important for von der 
Leyen to present his program to MEPs in order to gain the con-
fidence to form the Commission. In order to support the de-
mocratization process of the European Union institutions, Fon 
13   A la Commission europeenne Macron propose Ursula Von der Leyen la minis-
tre Allemande, https://www.huffingtonpost.fr, 02.07.2019.
14   Jean Baptiste Francois, Emmanule Macron et Ursula Von der Leyen un tan-
dem pour l’Europe?, https://www.la-croix.com,  23.07.2019.  
15   L’Allemande Ursula Fon der Leyen elu presidente de la Commission europ-
eenne, de justesse, https://www.lemonde.fr, 16.07.2019.
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der Leyen announced the improvement of the “spitzenkandi-
daten” system. In the program part of the presentation she em-
phasized the following.16
The new Commission’s program envisages that Europe 
should become the first continent with a carbon-neutral bal-
ance by 2050, which means reducing CO2 emissions by 55 per-
cent by 2030. In the area of  economic integration, von der Ley-
en intends to establish an embryo of the Eurozone budget, as 
advocated by President Macron, as well as to complete a pro-
gram of establishing a Banking Union to guarantee bank depos-
its to all European citizens. Von Der Leyen will initiate a plan un-
der which all European citizens would be entitled to a minimum 
wage on the basis of previous adopted European legal instru-
ment. The Commission Presidential candidate also advocates 
the introduction of gender quotas on the boards of directors of 
companies. In the area of  migration policy, the Commission 
would propose a “new immigration and asylum pact” to assist 
Italy and Spain, which are the first to be hit by immigration. In 
addition, von der Leyen envisages strengthening the Frontex 
agency tasked with protecting European borders, by employing 
10,000 more staff in 2024 instead of 2027. In the area of  the 
protection of democratic principles, the President-designate of 
the Commission supports a project that would link the disburse-
ment of financial assistance from European Union funds with 
respect of the principles of the rule of law and European Union 
principles and values. In this regard, the European Union would 
cut off assistance to members who threaten the independence 
of the judiciary, as in Poland and Hungary. Fon der Leyen also 
supports the introduction of the right to a legislative initiative 
of the European Parliament, which at this point is the exclusive 
responsibility of the Commission. As for Brexit, the future Presi-
dent of the Commission would accept the postponement of 
Brexit after October 31, 2019, if the British had given good rea-
sons. In addition, she advocates the opening of accession nego-
tiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia.
16   Six questions sur l’election incertaine de Ursula Von der Leyen a la tete de la 
Commission europeenne, https://www.franctvinfo.fr, 16.07.2019.
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Ursula von der Leyen did not have the easy task of re-
cruiting MEPs for her candidacy. This required the support of 
the absolute majority of the Members of the European Parlia-
ment, ie. 376 of them expressed by secret ballot. It has already 
been mentioned that her candidacy has not received a warm re-
ception in the European political parties, since it has called into 
question the democratization of the European Union’s institu-
tional system, or the “spitzenkandidaten” system. Still, von 
der-Leyen managed to get a tight 383 votes in favour of making 
her the first female presidential candidate in the history of the 
European Union.17
The political dispute about the election of Commission member’s
At the proposal of the Member States and in agreement 
with the previous elected President of the Commission, the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall determine the list 
of candidates for Commissioners.18 However, the expertise of 
candidates for Commissioners is checked before by the commit-
tees of the European Parliament.19 If some of them do not meet 
expectations, the President of the Commission must ask the 
Member State to nominate another candidate for the Commis-
sioner, otherwise the European Parliament will not vote confi-
dence to whole Commission.
The tripartite power and political fight could cause cer-
tain problems in the process of nomination of the Commission-
ers. Thus the European Parliament Legal Affairs Committee re-
jected the candidacy of Hungarian Laszlo Trocsanyi close to 
Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban for membership in the 
Commission.20 The official reason was the conflict of interest. 
17   L’Allemande Ursula Fon der Leyen elu presidente de la Commission europ-
eenne, de justesse, https://www.lemonde.fr, 16.07.2019.
18   Član 17 stav 7 ugovora o Evropskoj uniji
19   Slobodan Zečević, Institucionalni sistem i pravo Evropske unije,Institut za 
evropske studije, Beograd, 2015., str. 178 i dalje.
20   Carmen Paun, Von der Leyen seeks new recruits after Parliament totpedoes 
two, 10.01.2019,https://politico.eu
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There is a suspicious that behind that decision stand the politi-
cal opposition to the Orban’s immigration and judiciary politics 
by “Renew Europe” parliamentary group. In the same time Syl-
vie Goulard as candidate of French president Macron was also 
refused by the Parliament internal market and industry commit-
tees. Much of the criticism of Goulard was led by the European 
People’s Party (EPP), and some MEPs suspect the center-right 
bloc wanted to exact revenge on Macron after he torpedoed 
EPP group leader Manfred Weber’s campaign for the Commis-
sion presidency.21
Despite rising votes, Europe’s right-wing Eurosceptic and 
populist parties failed to realise the announced victory
The opponents of the European Union remain a minority 
in the European Parliament, despite the good results achieved 
in individual EU Member States. This primarily refers to the 
League of Mateo Salvini with 33 percent, Brexit Nigel Farage 
with 31.7 percent or Marin Le Pen National Rally 23.4 percent 
of the vote. The Freedom Party of Austria, on the other hand, 
failed with 17% of the votes cast. Spain’s Vox, with just over 6% 
of the votes cast, is entering the European Parliament for the 
first time. In the new European Parliament, the European Con-
servatives will have 62 seats and the Identity and Democracy 
group 73 seats.
Eurosceptics are convening 2014-2019 years were divid-
ed into three parliamentary groups and had different political 
views. The Conservative group where the Polish Party of Rights 
and Justice and the British Conservatives have settled are not 
for the close relations with Russia, which is what the Matteo 
Salvini group and Marine Le Pen stand for. Nigel Farage, as a 
major component of the former MEP’s parliamentary club, in-
tended to leave the European Union and therefore the Europe-
an Parliament. So the question is what would be the common 
denominator of these three MPs. In essence, they only agree in 
21   Maia de la Baume, Laura Kayali, France’s Commission pick Sylvie Goulard 
rejected by Parliament, 10.10.2019., https://politico.eu
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a critical attitude towards Brussels and the supranational insti-
tutions of the European Union. The principle of solidarity and 
the pursuit of common goals is alien to nationalists because 
their thinking is limited to national boundaries and interests. In 
fact, national selfishness prevents serious work on a common 
political program. After the 2019 parliamentary elections, the 
“Europe of Nations and Freedom” parliamentary group changed 
its name to “Identity and Democracy.” The basic components of 
this club remained the same. These include the Matteo Salvini 
League, the Marine Le Pen National Rally, the German AFD, the 
Austrian Freedom Party, the Belgian VlaamsBelang, the Right 
Finns, the Czech Freedom and Direct Democracy Party, the Dan-
ish People’s Party and the Estonian People’s Conservative Party. 
Substantial political differences remain within the new MP. Mat-
teo Salvini is in favor of redistributing migrants to member 
states, which is opposed by the French National Rally and the 
German AFD. In the economic sphere, the AFD is a supporter of 
the liberal market economy while the National Rally is opting 
for a kind of national economic protectionism. The common 
programmatic basis of these parties is opposition to immigra-
tion and Islamism, as well as euroscepticism.
For some time, the question was whether Victor Orban’s 
Fidesz, which received more than 50 percent of the vote in Hun-
gary, would remain in the European People’s Party parliamenta-
ry group or join in the future the Salvini and Marine Le Pen na-
tions in Europe? However, even in that case the far right would 
not have a decisive influence in the European Parliament.
Conclusion
The elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 
were marked by high turnout. This tendency is noticeable in al-
most all Member States, which speaks to the essential absence 
of a democratic deficit and to an increase in voters’ awareness 
of the importance of European elections. This trend was cer-
tainly influenced by developments around Brexit. Fearful of the 
European Union breaking at the seams and the traumatic con-
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sequences that such a process leaves on national societies, it 
has awakened public opinion throughout the Union. On the oth-
er hand, a significant number of voters who still remained in 
the minority wanted to protest about the current situation by 
voting for the Eurosceptic and far right parties, that is, for radi-
cal changes in the European Union or for its abolition. In this 
election, the European People’s Party and the Social Democrats 
lost an absolute majority in the European Parliament and failed 
to impose the head of the list of the leading party (spitzenkan-
didaten) for the President of the Commission.
The consent of at least 3 parliamentary clubs will be re-
quired to majors appointments, for adopt legislative acts or res-
olutions in the European Parliament. Thus, the dispersion of 
votes will force MPs to delicate arrangements and coalitions, 
and perhaps coalitions on a case-by-case basis.
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The Shadows of the National State 
and the European Identity
Abstract
What should we expect from the European Union in the next de-
cade? This is the question future elections have to answer, and 
the question all European citizens should ask themselves. After 
the Brexit crisis, rivers of insecurity have flown across the whole 
continent, flooding our minds with doubts and hesitancy. Is the 
European Union still the best answer to strengthen policies in-
side our continent? We think the answer is yes, but changes are 
needed. What we need is a new, different and much deeply root-
ed European Union. But before even coming up with the actions 
or the path that the EU needs to take there are two concepts 
that we need to tackle and analyze. First of all, the concept of 
the national state. If we agree on the fact that the future of the 
European Union lies on what we like to describe as an intertwin-
ing dialogue between cultures, what can we say about the na-
tional state? In our analysis, we wanted to underline the artifi-
cial essence of the national state, created by men to stabilize 
their power. The national state carries an internalized concept 
of violence within itself. By creating borders, raising walls, we 
pinpoint Us and Them, setting the foundation for contrast (ex-
amples are given us by the two world wars that have devastat-
ed Europe in the 20th century). For a strong Europe, we need to 
unmask the national state’s real destructive essence. Another 
fundamental concept is the identity, the concept that has to be 
adapted in accordance with nowadays cosmopolitanism, taking 
into account the fluidity of globalism. Only through this change 
of view, we can build a new face for our continent and the struc-
ture of a new European Union, according to the new needs of 
citizens.
Keywords: Future of Europe, National state, Perception of iden-
tity, Cosmopolitanism 
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We have lost our sense of community.
 With these few words we could perhaps sum up the vast prob-
lem and great absence in our, modern, European Union. Problem 
that irrigates and flows, or perhaps more correctly begins, in the 
smaller context: our communities and social framework. 
Our ways of acting and thinking in community have 
changed, we do no longer feel the place to take actions or even 
reactions, we do no longer perceive the social or community 
life as a duty. The political sphere is perceived as something out 
of our daily and common life, with way too high and too com-
plex ambitions. Politics has become a bureaucracy and no lon-
ger a community matter or functional to the citizen’s needs. 
This is where the change has to start.
In a decline of thought and political reason, we must find 
the strength to discover again the true meaning and aim of po-
litical philosophy and thought. We have the task of conceiving a 
new European polis. 
‘Philosophy is inspired by the polis and aspires to the po-
lis. The political vocation finds its inclination in the polis and re-
stores the community from its numbness.’ (Di Cesare 2018: 29)
It is our duty to wake Europe up from its philosophical 
and political slumber, giving it again a sense of community and 
social cooperation. ‘To hinder the annihilating trend of the night 
the philosopher denounces the night of politics and the sleep-
walking of those who do not want to participate in the common 
life as the threat they represent’ (Di Cesare 2018: 19-20) 
We must confront our contemporary uncertainty and 
face the great philosophical-political problems of our time from 
a new perspective. We need to unmask and adopt in our views 
the political role of philosophy, taking the needed steps to-
wards the creation of a new notion of our world, our sense of 
community and the role of political thought in it. Only through 
this passage can we tackle problems such as the current crisis 
of the European Union.
But what’s the future of Europe? This is the question fu-
ture elections will need to answer, and the question all Europe-
an citizens should ask themselves. 
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After the Brexit crisis, rivers of insecurity have flown 
across the whole continent, flooding our minds with doubts 
and hesitancy. Our concepts of community, identity, and form 
of identification seem to be at stake with Europe that many feel 
imposed from above, but is it really? 
What does it mean being European? When we speak 
about it, we often talk about states. 
Far from considering our European Union to be a real 
union, a clear and stable entity, we often take refuge in what 
appears to be a more daily, common and convenient form of 
identification: the national state. We are Italians, Germans, 
French, not Europeans. We see our Europe as a network of sub-
tle strings that connect one State to another, like the long 
roads and railways that ran all over it.
How do Europeans perceive Europe? 
There are many views and some of them have common 
roots, but others are rather opposite. The first, perhaps the 
most widespread opinion, is the one we have briefly men-
tioned: the European Union as a network, a system, a cold and 
resolute mechanism that sees in Brussels its only pulsing heart 
– more of a clockwork mechanism than a true soul. 
What we describe is a Europe of the Brain, not essentially 
a negative vision, like the nationalist one that we will soon ana-
lyze, but not even a positive one. Even before the birth of the 
European Union, before the European project had even taken 
shape or began, the ideals of unity and peace dwelling in the 
minds of those who would have later become the fathers of the 
European Union. They had very different plans for its creation. 
In a Europe destroyed by Nazism and Fascism, where every kind 
of humanity had seemed to disappear in a complete rejection 
of the Other, the European ideals spreading throughout all the 
continent, were not as cold and bleak as current perception of 
Europe. The Europe that had been dreamed by characters such 
as Altiero Spinelli and Jean Monnet, wasn’t merely a Europe of 
bureaucracy or a Europe of markets - although this was an im-
portant and essential part of it, especially in the vision of the 
French politician and thinker Monnet - but it was a value, a com-
mon feeling, a deep desire for peace and a common identity. 
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Something deeper and far more rooted then today’s view of 
the European Union. 
Where has the heart of Europe disappeared? What has 
happened to those commonly shared values? Lately, they have 
been ousted by something very different. In the absence of the 
European heart, something else has been planted, burying its 
roots deep into a fertile and abundant soil: nationalism. Where 
the warmth and nostalgic feeling of European values and com-
monly shared ideals used to be, anger, instinct and gut feelings 
have emerged. In a Europe of Brain, perceived by most as “cold 
and calculating” perhaps we should not have been surprised 
when the average citizen, feeling abandoned and perhaps even 
snubbed, sought for his identity. And find it in something much 
smaller, nearer and perhaps, I would dare to say, more archaic: 
nationalism. 
But where does nationalism come from? And if it prevails, 
will it mean, as many speculate – especially after the Brexit ref-
erendum - the end of the European project? To address this is-
sue, perhaps we need to start with a previous passage: the na-
tional state. 
This concept was born in Europe back in time when the 
idea of  a single great European empire, heir of the Roman Em-
pire started to be deemed impracticable. For centuries even a 
politically divided Europe had been a whole, let’s just think 
about the art, the culture, the communion of values and mar-
kets Europe had in the Middle Ages or even afterwards during 
the Renaissance. Even if divided in empires and states, Europe 
had shared common history and trends, just like an archaic form 
of the cosmopolitan Europe we live in today. Painters as Leon-
ardo Da Vinci worked in Italy as well as in France, poets and art-
ists crossed countries and were welcomed by kings and lords all 
over the continent. Even older and extraordinary example is the 
one of the Roman and later Byzantine Empires also followed by 
the Holy Roman Empire. Let’s just think about the extent and 
depth of the influence that different cultures had one on the 
other during this time, and how the perception of the Europe-
an, in this case Roman, identity has changed with the passing by 
of centuries and millennia. This lasted till the Industrial Revolu-
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
31
tion took place, when the national state started to impose itself 
as the building unity for a new face of Europe. 
From an extremely fragmented land, if not for the old and 
weakened empires, we arrive at the rise of the 18th century, fol-
lowing the great Restoration after the Napoleonic wars, in front 
of a map not so different from the one we look upon today. 
But what happened at this time? What pushed the Euro-
peans in the building of a new concept of Europe? Why people 
who shared common history and had been for centuries sub-
jected to the same empires and royal families parted their ways 
and raised borders? As we know today, national states were 
born with the intent of seeking the union in a single territory of 
common and homogeneous cultural and ethnic entities, where 
citizens would have shared language, culture and values. In the 
aftershock of the Napoleonic conquest, with fragile new bor-
ders, unstable ruling classes and the pressing shadows of revo-
lution, national states looked like the most logical and safest 
way to strengthen the ruling classes. But it is then, that the na-
tional state, born as an instrument of stabilization of Europe, 
began its journey towards destruction. Patriotism, which nour-
ished the European states into greatness for almost all the 17th 
and 18th century, often weaving its path with romantic culture 
and literature, slowly began, with the rise of the new century, 
to turn into something very different. While the national senti-
ment was firstly addressed only towards one’s motherland, in a 
sense of love, belonging and pride, “patriotism” was soon mis-
guided and overturned in an opposite sense: hatred for the 
Other “nationalism”. It was no longer what in Italy we know as 
Amor di Patria / Love of the motherland /, or about those vir-
tues and freedoms brought by the unification of people, the 
Italian Risorgimento as a clear example. The 19th century has not 
been only the era of the birth of the national state, but also an 
era of liberation. Till then the movement of patriotism had 
been seen as collective, as something that would have liberated 
all Europe. It wasn’t nation against nation or people against 
people, but the oppressed against the oppressor. It was deeply 
different from the national thought who would have soon 
brought Europe on its knees, but the seed was planted. 
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We all know what happened in the following century: a 
fratricidal war, which led not only to a severe loss of lives and 
wealth, but also to the destruction of the image that the rest of 
the world had of Europe. If Europe, the colonialist Europe, the 
Europe center of the world and pond of knowledge barely re-
covered from the First World War, it certainly didn’t survive the 
Second World War. Europe came out from the war with very se-
rious losses, but with an awareness: division and fragmentation 
could not function as political systems for our continent.
The nationalist thought, bitter offspring of the national 
state, but nevertheless contained in it, could not but bring Eu-
rope to its collapse. How and when does this change occur? 
When does nationalist thinking take that aggressive aftertaste 
and turn a political system into a radical way of thinking? It hap-
pens when the state does no longer identify itself with its in-
habitants. When Germans are no longer used to indicate the in-
habitants of Germany, but only the people of Germans origins. 
When the Jewish people, through this view, are no longer Ger-
mans, no longer part of Germany and become Others. This is 
the kind of violent ideology born within the concept of national 
state. When you draw a line, mark a border or raise a wall, de-
fine a here and a there you are essentially laying the founda-
tions for discrimination and even more fear. ‘Fear is in itself de-
grading, that easily becomes an obsession; it produces hatred 
for what is feared and pushes headlong into excesses of cruel-
ty’ as said philosopher Bertrand Russel (Padoan, 2018: 16). 
When you define an identity, who belongs to it and who 
doesn’t, who does not belong to it is in the best case driven 
out, but more probably eliminated.
This kind of ideology seems to be coming back in practice 
as a response to a European policy which is deemed as too 
weak and too distant. The lack of power and sovereignty of the 
European Union is a problem that perhaps has persisted since 
its foundation, but why has nationalism rose in response to it 
only now? The answer is to be found in the crisis that has struck 
the European growth and economy in the recent years, when 
the widespread discomfort grew into a reluctance towards the 
European Union. In this moment of discomfort, when citizen 
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perceives instability and therefore a sense of fear, it had been 
easy for them to point their finger against the weak and distant 
power of the EU for which they do not feel excessive attach-
ment. Instead the people of Europe have filled that lack of se-
curity, which the Union, due to its very structure has not been 
able to communicate, with nationalism.
Although this seems to be the easiest answer, as demon-
strated by the wars that preceded the creation of the European 
Union, it is not a real solution. Returning to the national state 
without the intermediation of the Union is today not only in-
convenient but perhaps even impossible. Those same problems 
which lead to the spreading of fear, and with that nationalism, 
and by whom we get bombarded every day through the media 
(global economic crisis, climate change, migrations, etc.) are ex-
tremely complex. These are problems with a wide and global 
reach - problems that Europe cannot address if not as a whole. 
This truth has been over and over demonstrated by what we 
nowadays call global risks. The consequences of climate 
change, catastrophes such as Chernobyl, new crimes regarding 
the use of networks and sale of information have more than 
once demonstrated that with globalization and technological 
evolution we have also globalized our problems and risks. 
Everything is cosmopolitan, everything is globalized, even 
nationalism itself if we think about it. We have American nation-
alists, English nationalist, Italian nationalists and so on - the an-
ti-globalization movement is itself globalized. We live in a world 
where any kind of regional doctrine needs to act on a global and 
cosmopolitan level to reach success. Even anti-Europeans have 
seats in the European parliament in effort to influence politics 
and decisions: this is the paradox of cosmopolitism. 
To tackle these new evolving problems, the European 
Union must change its ways - no longer acting as a network of 
different states but as an unified entity. Problems like climate 
change and migration as well as international politics decisions, 
need to be solid and unanimous, not fragmented or discordant. 
What difference can a decision for the environment taken in 
Germany make if it is not respected by the rest of Europe? How 
can we take concrete climate actions worldwide? What can a 
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statement of the President of the European Parliament to-
wards a state that doesn’t respect human rights weight, if his 
words are not followed by actions of the member states? These 
are questions only a new cosmopolitan and strong European 
Union can answer. 
We need a new way to tackle these risks. A new way of 
perceiving them and responding with everyday action to re-
solve them. ‘We can no longer limit ourselves to look at things 
from afar, shrugging our shoulders and pointing an accusing 
finger [in our case towards the European Union]. We are all in-
volved in this massive undertaking of destruction one way or 
another. The time has come to think again with our heads and 
make choices (Dion, 2011). All of these are tangible evidence of 
how the national state and the nationalist’s mindset have 
turned obsolete. 
At the time the national state was born to guarantee sta-
bility and power to the ruling classes: an artificial creation and 
solution for what at the time seemed to be the most urgent 
problem. It’s clear that this aim no longer subsists. If in the past 
centuries the passage to national state as a form of authority 
was essential for the maintenance of balance in the unstable re-
settlement following the collapse of empires, today division 
and fragmentation do not represent an answer for our future.
The invention of national state had always dangerously 
rested on the assumption and on the idea that there was a 
place in the world where we could have defined within borders 
a cohesive cultural, religious and genetic identity. This however, 
as we know, is not a real possibility and never was.
History gave us many examples. Too many were the wars 
fought by minorities seeking independence or states trying to 
push minorities away or directly eliminate them. Let’s just think 
about the Huguenots in France in the 16th century or the exam-
ple closer to us and our memories - the Jewish holocaust in Hit-
ler’s Germany. Violence has always been held within the con-
cept of the national state. By creating Us, raising borders, 
declaring restriction about who belongs and who doesn’t, we 
create Them, an unknown entity whom we identify as different, 
as Other, and this generates fear.
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Even nowadays many minorities are living inside national 
states, which they do not consider as their own. Let’s think of 
all the violence that bloomed in those hotspots -Catalonia as a 
modern and clear example even in our days. 
Violence has been embedded in the conception of the 
national state itself, since its very creation.
National states have brought Europe to a clash of identi-
ties, identities that for too long have acted as walls and bor-
ders, identifying Us and Them. Identities that have fragmented 
Europe and led towards a turmoil that not only brought us to 
the two wars, but that nowadays is putting at risk the European 
future, cooperation and growth. 
We have to get over our common idea of identity, to 
overcome what we have always superficially perceived and find 
a new meaning for it. As national state reaches its decline so 
does our erroneous conception of identity. Globalization, cos-
mopolitism and all their consequences brought us to a new 
world, a new Europe, and with new conceptions we couldn’t 
even phantom before. Let’s just think about the change the in-
ternet made in our lives, how connection and communication 
developed.
But it hasn’t only changed how we live and what we do, 
speeding our actions and shortening distances, but it has also 
changed how we perceived our world and ourselves. We have 
to deal with a new concept of humanity, a new concept of Us, 
and according to this, we have to find not only a “new identity”, 
but a new way of perceiving it. 
We no longer live in a changing world, but in a world in 
metamorphosis.  When we speak of change, we are describing a 
transition in an already existing scheme. What we are witness-
ing instead is a transition that evades any previous structure, 
undermining all our anchors. We live in a world where what yes-
terday was not only unrealizable, but not even imaginable, to-
day is a reality. Inventions like the web have completely 
changed our concepts of communication, world and distances.
In a cosmopolitan world, everything is in constant change 
and interaction, even identity. We must go beyond the concept 
of people as entities and adopt a new perception. We aren’t ob-
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jects or entities, but rather something in continuous and con-
stant development: a timed lap, measured in events, changes 
and variation. This is also visible in biological terms - let’s just 
think about the development of an individual. It is not an ob-
ject, but something constantly growing, developing and later 
ageing, a flow within which we nevertheless recognize the indi-
vidual: this is our identity. We were ourselves as babies as we 
are now and as we will be in twenty years: even if all my biology 
has change and will change, I would still be owning my identity 
even in flowing and constant motion of my growth and ageing. 
This concept goes also for religion, culture, gender, sexuality 
and all the great arguments that tend to separate and fragment 
our times. When we accept ourselves as beings in change rather 
than constrict ourselves in already structured and limited enti-
ties-identities there will be no longer exclusion and with that 
fragmentation or division.
But how will this influence the future of the European 
continent?
Once we unmask the violent nature of the national state, 
realizing its inner organic brutality, and we overcome the con-
cept of identity as a closed box, therefore leading to exclusion 
and further violence, we will have the chance for a new Europe. 
First of all, our change of view about the concept of our identi-
ty will change the concept of voters and politics from its base. 
‘People do not necessarily vote for their own interests. They 
vote according to their identity. They vote according to their 
values. They vote for the person they most identify with. It may 
happen that their values  coincide with certain personal interest. 
[...] But they vote before all according to their identity.’ (Lake-
off 2014: 56) 
The new Europe that we need to build will be neither 
State nor Nation, but something new. We do not specifically 
use these terms – State and Nation - for our new Europe. What 
we have to build is a European Union that will move along the 
new lines of cosmopolitanism and respond to this new concept 
of identity. The repercussions of this new approach to identity 
will not only develop a new perception of global issues; let’s 
just think about the application of flowing identity to the mi-
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gration problem - but will also bring us to the birth of a new dif-
ferent governance structure of the EU.
A structure that will meet the needs of the citizens, orga-
nizing itself into administrative units with the most suitable di-
mension in responding to the given needs. We need the Euro-
pean Union that is not made up of national states, but of 
functional structures. Each topic or problem has its size. It’s not 
possible to solve the problems of individual citizens of a region 
about infrastructures with a large-scale administration in the 
same way it isn’t possible to solve global crisis or tackle foreign 
policy issues on a limited national level.
Through this change of our concept of identity, we will 
have changes inherent to both; the psychological-personal 
sphere and the spiritual one. This will lead to consequences 
both within society and communities, creating new concepts of 
these same entities. We will also be faced with a new vision of 
modern and still opened debates regarding the rights concern-
ing the concept of personal identity from the spiritual, religious 
one to sexual or gender identity. 
The new image of the world and identity that we will 
build will also create a new way of perceiving violence towards 
these types of divisions. The new perception of identity will 
also change our relationship with the environment. Human 
identity as a transient event, like water that adapts to the 
shape of its container, will completely change our relationship 
with the environment in ways that would deserve deep reflec-
tion on topics such as sustainability. Ultimately this new vision 
will reflect on the structure and conception of state. 
We will have to overcome ‘politics anchored to tradition-
al boundaries, unable to turn our gaze to the scenery outside, 
beyond the barriers of sovereignty and instead find a political 
thought that is not satisfied with what exists [...] and is pushed 
to go beyond.’ (Di Cesare 2018: 82).
We will no longer talk about loss of identity deriving 
from globalization and cosmopolitanism, but a transformation 
that can have an extremely positive value for us. We have to see 
this new perception and fluidity of identity not as a decline of 
“western” identity – which as we previously analyzed is nothing 
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but an artificial structure imposed by the common thought - as 
painted by the nationalist’s mindset, but as a growth and culmi-
nation of our existence. 
As Europeans, we already have within us a fluidity and 
mixture of cultural and humanistic identities that are only wait-
ing to be freed out our modern misconception of identification.
This change of perception will be the pivotal cultural 
challenge of our time. Not only for the Europe and the future 
of the European project, but for all the western world. It will be 
a challenge that will mine our foundations, truly putting them 
in discussion and confronting them with the functional needs 
of our time. 
But it will also mean new powerful and innovative solu-
tions for the problems of modernity. This new perception of 
identity will lead us towards the rise of new values and percep-
tions, what will be the change that will further generate the 
base for a new face and structure of the European Union. Only 
above this new base of thought, we will be able to build a 
Union of community and identification, able to answer modern 
risks and social needs.
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EU Facing Challenges: Migrants and 
Relations with Superpowers – Quo Vadis
Europe after European Elections in 2019
Europeans, like most other inhabitants of the planet, 
are currently facing the crisis of ’politics as we know it’
 – a state of “interregnum”, as the Italian philosopher Antonio 
Gramsci described a time in which the old is already dead
 or dying, but the new has not yet been born.
Abstract
Analysis of the European Union’s (EU) future seems to get encour-
aging assessments despite Brexit and current challenges, such as 
migrants, terrorism, sustainable economic growth, relations with 
superpowers and climate change. Good news for decreasing the 
existing democratic deficit in the Union is the fact that the turn-
out of voters at European elections (2019) was over 50 percent for 
the first time in decades. Furthermore, the most recent polls show 
that 68% of Europeans deem that their country benefits from EU 
membership. It is the highest score seen since 1983. The outcome 
of those EU citizens’ positive sentiments is the fact that the Euro-
sceptics, nationalist right parties, divided into two groups, do not 
have great influence in the new Parliament. Why is it so important 
to analyze European elections for the future of the Union? The an-
swer lies in the significant role of the European Parliament in the 
overall institutional structure and in the decision-making process 
of the EU. However, citizens of the EU Member States have very 
high expectations related to more effective EU policies in the con-
trol of immigration. The complexity of the migrant crisis is also 
complemented by the mix of economic migrants with war refu-
gees. Is it on the international scene “Europe - Fortress” or Europe 
without borders, remains to be seen through the solution of the 
migrant crisis in the upcoming mid-term period. Another vital de-
terminant item for the future of the EU represents its relations 
with superpowers: USA, China and Russia. The vital question of the 
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future positive development of the Union depends on the EU’s ca-
pacity to make effective decisions, both on the external political 
agenda, and even more internally in terms of stimulating econom-
ic growth and sustainable development, as well as to build an ef-
fective migration and asylum policy.
Keywords: EU future, migrants, Parliament, European elections
Introductory note
 European Union (EU) is confronted with various contemporary 
challenges, such as Brexit, migrants, terrorism, sustainable eco-
nomic growth, relations with superpowers and climate change. 
However, discussion on the EU future seems to get encouraging as-
sessments, especially after European elections in 2019. 
Between the global powers and national politics, there is the 
European Union (EU). “Perhaps the idea of Europe was and remains 
a utopia... But it has been and remains an active utopia, struggling 
to coalesce and consolidate the otherwise disconnected, multidirec-
tional actions. How active that utopia will ultimately turn out to be, 
will depend ultimately on its actors”. (Bauman Z, 2019). “Many Euro-
sceptics have in vain predicted the near end of the European Union 
(EU), especially after the British Brexit referendum on the UK’s exit 
from the Union. Just as the Community existed before the annex-
ation of the United Kingdom in 1973, so does the Union, as its legal 
successor, exist after British withdrawal, announced by the result of 
the June referendum, 2016”. (Gasmi 2016: 271). 
According to recent opinion poll in Member States, only 8% 
of the EU population consider that they would lose nothing if the 
Union will collapse. With 427 million voters, across 28 EU countries, 
electing 751 MEPs, it’s the second-biggest democratic vote in the 
world. Anti-European parties have gained a substantial number of 
seats in the European Parliament elections of 2019. However, ma-
jor power shift did not happen within the EU. Marine Le Pen in 
France is calling for radical reform of the European Union, and Mat-
teo Salvini in Italy for a Europe of common sense. It means that 
main populist leaders have abandoned the concept of total weak-
ening of the Union. 
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Quo vadis Europe after European elections in 2019
Discussion on the European Union’s future seems to have 
moved beyond the existential. Good news for decreasing the exist-
ing democratic deficit in the Union is the fact that the turn-out of 
voters was over 50 percent for the first time in decades (for exam-
ple compared to 42.6 percent in 2014). Migration crisis of 2015, 
terrorist attacks, climate change, as well as rise of Eurosceptic forc-
es against the perceived ‘Brussels elite’ all contributed to the in-
creased interests of voters. This turnout rate has lent greater dem-
ocratic legitimacy to the European Parliament - EP (Joannin P, 
Maurice E, 2019: 1).
Greens and liberals have made gains, while the center-right 
suffered. European People’s party (EPP) lost more than 30 seats in 
May 2019 elections, but is still the strongest political force in the 
EP, while Social Democrats (S&D) have lost more than 40 seats. 
Nevertheless, coalition is necessary in order to foster institutional 
efficiency in the EP and to prevent blockages. Previous coalition of 
left and right lost its 40-year long majority in the EP. EPP and S&D 
will no longer be able to form an absolute majority alone as it has 
been the case since the first election of MEPs by direct universal 
suffrage. Together they only have 336 seats, i.e. 41 less than the re-
quired majority of 376 seats.
The Eurosceptic, nationalist right only have 135 seats, i.e. 
17.98% of the Members of Parliament (MEPs), divided into two 
groups and does not enjoy any real leverage for it to have any influ-
ence (Maurice E. et al. 2019). There is a great number of non-at-
tached members at the start of this legislature (57), mainly due to 
the number of MEPs in the Brexit Party (30). 
However, after the Brexit finalization there will be different 
composition of seats.1 EP still has 751 MEPs, instead of 705 as 
planned if Brexit had effectively taken place before the European 
election. Since 27 of the 73 British seats are due to be redistribut-
ed, there are MEPs from 13 countries waiting to take their place in 
the hemicycle. When Brexit takes place France and Spain will each 
have 5 extra MEPs; Italy and the Netherlands 3; Ireland, 2. Nine oth-
1   Brexit has not yet been finalized at the time of writing this paper.
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er Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden) will have an additional seat. 
Those facts bring a level of uncertainty for future activities of the 
European Parliament. Statistics shows that with future 705 MEPs, 
after Brexit and withdrawal of British MEPs, the majority will drop 
to 353 votes instead of the present 376 MEPs.
Since 2009, according to Parliament’s rules of procedure, a 
political group shall consist of at least 25 Members elected in at 
least seven Member States. Pro-European political forces are still in 
the majority in the Parliament, occupying 67.5% of the seats. Par-
liament is consisted of two other groups – the Liberals (ALDE) and 
the Greens (Greens/EFA) with whom EPP and S&D will, the most 
probably, join forces to form a new majority.
Negotiations started actively at the end of May 2019 among 
heads of State and governments of Member States to decide on 
the appointment of the executives to lead the EU institutions: Par-
liament, Commission, European Council and European Central 
Bank. Nominees have to both represent the results of European 
elections, the diversity of political and territorial origins and the 
balance between men and women. Parliament decides on the Pres-
ident of the Commission, proposed by European Council. 
President of the EP is David Sassoli (from S&D party, IT), who 
took over from another Italian Antonio Tajani (who is a member of 
EPP). In order to prevent nationalist’s presence in positions of re-
sponsibility in Parliament, none of the MEPs in the ECR and ID have 
been appointed as Vice-Presidents of Parliament (Maurice E. et al. 
2019). The appointment of Ursula von der Leyen by the European 
Council was followed by her election in the Parliament on 16th July 
2019 as President of the Commission with only a 9-vote majority 
(383 of the 747). After Donald Tusk, on 2nd July 2019, EU leaders 
elected Charles Michel (former Prime Minister of the Kingdom of 
Belgium since 11 October 2014) as President of the European 
Council. He will take office on 1st December 2019. 
The European Council appoints the European Central Bank 
(ECB) President for a period of eight years. It takes its (final) deci-
sion on the basis of a Council recommendation. It also consults the 
European Parliament and the ECB’s Governing Council (composed 
of the 6 members of the Executive Board, plus the governors of the 
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central banks of the 19 euro-area countries). The European Council 
then takes its decision through a qualified majority vote. This proce-
dure is set out in article 283 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU). In line with this nomination procedure, on 18 October 
2019, the European Council appointed Christine Lagarde to be the 
President of the European Central Bank for a non-renewable term 
of 8 years. She took office on 1 November 2019.
Political groups in the European Parliament
Number of seats
EPP - Group of the European People’s Party  
(Christian Democrats)
182
S&D - Group of the Progressive Alliance of  
Socialists and Democrats
154
Renew Europe RE - Group of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe + Renaissance + USR PLUS
108
Greens/EFA - Group of the Greens/ 
European Free Alliance
74
ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists Group 62
Identity and Democracy ID - new name of Europe of 
Nations and Freedom (ENF) group
73
GUE/NGL - Confederal Group of the European United 
Left - Nordic Green Left 41
NI - Non-attached Members 57
Historia magistra vitae est. This old Latin proverb is certainly ap-
plied in contemporary situation. More precisely, increasing the com-
petences of the Parliament through decades was seen as an effective 
instrument to combat democratic deficit. Existing democratic deficit 
is one of major challenges even in today’s functioning of the EU (Prof. 
Dr W. Kaiser in his speech in the European movement of Serbia on 
27th May 2019, Belgrade). The new EU legislature is characterized by 
absence of stable majority, which may lead to weakening of the Par-
liament’s position in the EU institutional structure. Furthermore, 
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some authors consider fragmentation of the political groups in the 
Parliament as even more problematic for its functioning (Maurice E. 
et al. 2019), but it remains to be seen whether those facts will im-
pede or not the decision-making process in the EU.
Why is it so important to analyze European elections for the 
future of the Union? The answer lies in the significant role of the 
European Parliament in the overall institutional structure and in 
the decision-making process of the EU. It was a very long battle for 
the Parliament ever since mid-80-ties to obtain equal status with 
Council in legislative procedure, since Spinelli announced the need 
to strengthen the institutional position of the Parliament, together 
with other federalists. 
Main features of the EP importance in the EU
Any forthcoming legal and institutional upgrading of the EU 
must begin with the need to apply the principle of subsidiarity in a 
flexible manner and with the necessity of continuously strengthening 
the decision-making efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the EU 
decision-making process. In this context, the European Parliament 
(EP) has a particularly prominent role as catalyst for integration pro-
cesses within the Union (Gasmi, 2016). 
In addition, the role of the Parliament is also a determinant 
factor of the achieved level of removal of the EU’s democratic deficit. 
Specifically, EU Member States are the main constituent entities of 
the Union and, as such, dictate the course and pace of institutional re-
form of the Union. Contemporary discussion whether the EU is the 
post-sovereign community or a kind of parliamentary model through 
the strengthening of the role of the European Parliament aims to em-
phasize the theory of implicit powers, which defines the jurisdiction 
of the Union in achieving its goals. We are witnesses of a kind of legal 
and institutional crisis in the EU (“Fatigue de l’Europe”, say the French) 
in the last decade.
The Lisbon Treaty (2009) grants an increase in Parliament’s 
powers through the right of the EP to elect the President of the Com-
mission, and not just the right to be consulted as in the previous peri-
od. The European Council proposes a candidate for the President of 
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the Commission, based on a decision made by a qualified majority 
and taking into account the results of European elections (Article 17, 
paragraph 7 of the Lisbon Treaty). If Parliament refuses to nominate a 
proposed candidate, the European Council must propose another 
candidate. The result of improving Parliament’s powers in this area is 
that the EP gained increased political influence in overall institutional 
system of the EU.
Furthermore, the Parliament developed a practice, which is 
not legally grounded in the EU Treaty, to hear each of the Commis-
sioners individually before deciding to approve the composition of 
the entire Commission. This led to the withdrawal of the initial pro-
posal of the composition of the Baroso Commission in September 
2004 in order to prevent the negative reaction of the Parliament. 
Namely, one of the EP committees expressed its concern in the pub-
lic listening procedure to the proposed Commissioner, which led Bar-
roso to rename the future composition of the Commission, in order 
to receive approval in November of the same year, and a similar situa-
tion was repeated in 2009/2010 year. The same situation has repeat-
ed in Autumn 2019, when the Parliament did not give consent to pro-
posed commissioner from Romania, Hungary and France and as a 
result, the three candidates had to be withdrawn and new candidates 
were proposed, which postponed entry into office of the new Com-
mission led by President, Ms. Ursula von der Leyen. This EP practice of 
public hearing of the Commissioners’ candidates speaks in favor of 
Parliament’s active role as promoter of strengthening its own politi-
cal authority (Gasmi, 2016).
The Lisbon Treaty introduces a new budgetary procedure, 
which leads to increased Parliamentary powers. It is about the fact 
that there are no longer so-called. compulsory expenditures, on 
which the Council of Ministers had a final decision, contrary to the 
so-called. non-compulsory budgetary costs, which were decided by 
the Parliament in the last instance. Compulsory expenditures ac-
counted for about 45% of the Union’s total budget and predomi-
nantly related to common agricultural policy and/or international 
agreements of the Union. After Lisbon Treaty, Parliament really be-
comes the second hand of the budgetary authority in the true 
sense of the word, because it shares its competence in this area 
equally with the Council of Ministers. Consequently, Parliament has 
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been placed in an equal position with the Council of Ministers to 
decide on all budgetary expenditures (Art. 314, Lisbon Treaty) in 
co-decision. With the acquisition of significant budgetary powers, 
Parliament has also received realistic options to directly influence 
the establishment and implementation of the EU policies (Gasmi, 
2016: 154-155).
The procedure for granting Parliament’s approval (assent 
procedure) refers to important EU decisions with international im-
plications, such as: accession of new member states, association 
agreements with third countries, non-members; organization and 
objectives of the Structural and Cohesion Fund; tasks and powers 
of the European Central Bank (ECB), etc. Within this procedure, 
Parliament is empowered to give or deny consent to the proposal 
of the submitted regulation for consideration. Within the frame-
work of the procedure, Parliament is not allowed to amend or sup-
plement the proposal of the EU regulation. The Treaty of Lisbon 
provides for the strengthening of Parliament’s powers in the areas 
of conclusion of international treaties (Article 218, paragraph 6). 
Moreover, the EU Treaty stipulates that Parliament must be imme-
diately and fully informed on all stages of the negotiation process 
of international agreements on behalf of the EU.
In the case of a Member State exit (as with Great Britain), 
the Treaty of Lisbon provides for mandatory Parliament’s con-
sent to conclude an agreement on exit, which defines the condi-
tions of membership exit and the future relations of that coun-
try with the EU.
In addition, in the sphere of amending the primary legisla-
tion, i.e. the founding Treaties, Parliament after Lisbon Treaty won 
the right to propose a revision of the EU Treaty. This has come af-
ter persistent Parliament’s demands in this area, which were reject-
ed by Member States until the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon.
The Treaty of Lisbon defined co-decision as a regular legisla-
tive procedure, which represents another significant field of 
strengthening of the Parliament position in the EU. Co-operation 
implies that the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, takes a common position after receiving the opinion of the EP. 
Then, its position is forwarded to the Parliament, which can or ap-
prove it (when the Council finally adopts it) or reject it (after the 
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application of the conciliation procedure) or amend it (by an abso-
lute majority of the members of the EP). The co-decision procedure 
provides for the establishment of the Conciliation Committee 
(composed of Council members together with an equal number of 
MPs, with a Commission representative). The Committee has the 
task of reaching an agreement on the joint text of the draft. The 
Conciliation Committee is convened when the Council does not ap-
prove the EP’s amendments to its common position. When an 
agreement is reached within the Committee, a qualified majority in 
the Council and an absolute majority in the EP are required to ap-
prove it. Subsequently, a harmonized proposal for the regulation is 
submitted to the Council and the EP for approval (also by a quali-
fied majority in the Council and an absolute majority in the EP). If 
any of the EU institutions rejects the proposal of regulations, it is 
considered that the proposal is rejected and the procedure is ter-
minated. Also, if the Committee fails to agree on the text of the 
proposal, it is considered that the act has not been adopted (Fair-
hurst, 2010: 125).
The significance of the role of the EP within the EU’s politi-
cal system is reflected in the fact that many statesmen, both from 
the EU members themselves, and outside the Union, use the Parlia-
ment as a platform for expressing their views on European integra-
tion and other important international issues. In this way Parlia-
ment acquires an international significance that goes beyond its 
normative competences and the basic characteristics of its position 
within the Union itself. This gives to the Parliament obvious inter-
national political importance.
The story about the future of the EU starts with the analysis 
of the European elections’ results (May 2019), showing that popu-
list parties have limited political influence in the future of the EU 
decision making. Light political change in the EU happened due to 
fact that two main parties, EPP and Social Democrats are on the 
decline, while ecologist and liberals increased their presence in the 
Parliament. Taking into account all competences of the Parliament 
that are analyzed, it is clear that formulation of the EU policies and 
legislation, as well as budget spending and international coopera-
tion will largely depend of functioning of coalition of European par-
ties in the EP for the next five years. 
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The future of the EU – turbulent story about migrant crisis  
and relations with major geopolitical players
Citizens of the EU Member States have very high expectations 
related to more effective EU policies in the control of immigration. 
The complexity of the migrant crisis is also complemented by the mix 
of economic migrants with war refugees. 
Very strong impact has blaming the Islamic religion with ter-
rorism in many EU countries, especially in France, as well as in Bel-
gium and Germany. In this way, the concept of multiculturalism, on 
which rests the EU is collapsing. In varietate concordia is the EU’s 
motto that protects the peculiarities of different national identities 
and cultures of EU Member States. In the situation of the migrant 
crisis, this idea is fundamentally shaken. The migrant crisis is the 
most significant problem facing the Union, according to the results 
of the Eurobarometer survey (White Paper by World Economic Fo-
rum, 2016, p. 3).
The overall support for EU involvement on the issue of migra-
tion remains very high according to a series of Eurobarometer sur-
veys. Therefore, more than ever, the Union is facing difficult decisions 
in near future, since it experienced the problems of solidarity in this 
domain.2 Is it on the international scene “Europe - Fortress” or Europe 
without borders, remains to be seen through the solution of the mi-
grant crisis in the upcoming mid-term period of time. 
2   “The 2015 crisis regarding the reception conditions of asylum seekers 
revealed both a lack of solidarity between Member States, with those in 
the East refusing the host refugee quotas requested by the President 
of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker – totaling 160,000 
people – in contrast to a million in Germany and 1.2 million across the EU 
as a whole, and a series of “solidarity crimes” on the part of some, who 
deemed it is contemptible to allow thousands of migrants to die at sea or 
in the street. Apart from the 34,000 deaths since the end of the 1990’s, 
migrants have often been received without an offer of housing, as in 
Calais, or in camps as in Lesbos and in urban peripheries, such as the Porte 
de la Chapelle in Paris.” Wihtol De Wenden C., 2019., p. 2. 
The problem of solidarity within the EU was pointed out also by Prof. Dr 
Katrougalos Georgios, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece at 
the Conference „Serbia’s security cooperation with Bulgaria, Greece and 
Romania in the European integration context“, held in Belgrade on 28th 
November 2019
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The Dublin asylum system has been the most criticized by A. 
Merkel, the German Chancellor, but also by other EU officials, as it 
provides the greatest pressure on the Member States that are on the 
frontline of the migrant flows. Article 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) binds the EU, as a non-state actor, to align itself with 
United Nations (UN) norms, as well as to the strict observance and 
the development of international law, including respect for the prin-
ciples of the UN Charter in its role in promoting and protecting hu-
man rights through all its actions.
Furthermore, freedom of movement is established as a basic 
human right, and at the same time it is one of the four freedoms on 
which the EU market is based (Fairhurst, 2010: 372-427). On the one 
hand, the protection of refugees and migrants is legally guaranteed, 
and, on the other hand, there is a justifiable fear of the Member 
States of the Union from the massive flooding of refugees and the 
accompanying inevitable security risks. Exempli causa, terrorist attacks 
in Paris (November 2015) and Brussels (March 2016) have increased 
the justified fear of compromising the security of EU Member States. 
In the absence of a comprehensive security and defense identity of 
the Union, the demands for enhanced EU external border control and 
for internal reform of the Union’s common migration policy are nec-
essary consequences (Gasmi , 2016: 232).
What are the legal and institutional frameworks in this con-
text? The EU has a shared competence for developing a common im-
migration policy. Under EU law, Article 67(2) of the Lisbon Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Union shall frame 
a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border con-
trol, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair to-
wards third-country nationals. Third-country nationals shall also in-
clude stateless persons. Article 78 TFEU provides for the EU to 
develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and tem-
porary protection. This provision also frames the role of the Europe-
an Parliament and the Council as co-legislators when adopting mea-
sures for a common European asylum system. 
In case of a sudden inflow of third-country nationals into one 
or more Member States, the Council can adopt temporary measures 
based on a Commission proposal and after consulting the European 
Parliament. Article 79 (1) provides for enhanced measures to combat 
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illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings, with the Parlia-
ment and the Council acting in accordance with ordinary legislative 
procedure (co-decision procedure), while Article 79(3) allows that the 
Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmis-
sion to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country na-
tionals who do not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, 
presence or residence in the territory of one of the Member States. 
Article 80 TFEU refers to the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between 
the Member States when they pursue policies on border checks, asy-
lum and immigration. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides 
for the right to asylum in Article 18 and the prohibition of re-
foulement in Article 19. Compliance with the Charter is a require-
ment for the validity and legality of the Union’s secondary legislation, 
including directives and regulations in the field of asylum. 
Furthermore, in the EU are operating relevant financial frame-
works, such as the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 
and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) with significant amounts for the 
period of 2014-2020.3 There are responsible EU agencies: Frontex, 
dealing with the external border management and control, then the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) that works with Member 
States on implementation of their obligations under the asylum sys-
tem and Europol, assisting police cooperation between Member 
States, including in the area of migrant smuggling. 
EU will no doubt continue to be attractive to migrants and asy-
lum-seekers, especially Germany, Sweden, Belgium and other Mem-
ber States. On 14 June 2018, the European Commission published a 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing the Neighborhood, Development and Interna-
3   According to the April 2018 data, the AMIF initial allocation for 2014-2020 
MFF increased from €3.8 billion to €6.6 billion, while the funds for ISF in-
creased slightly from €3.7 billion to €3.8 billion. According to the European 
Commission, the overall spending from the EU funds (AMIF and ISF), which 
represent the majority of the EU budget for migration-related activities, 
has proven mainly effective. The funds have improved asylum systems and 
strengthened reception capacity in the Member States and reinforced the 
border management capacity at the external borders of the Union. http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635542/EPRS_
BRI(2019)635542_EN.pdf, published in March 2019
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tional Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)4, with a proposed budget of 
€89.5 billion over the 2021-2027 period. 
However, it is noteworthy to stress that EU leaders have an-
nounced the need to step up cooperation with countries where mi-
grants originate or transit and agreed that migration issue can only 
be addressed at the EU level. Consequently, EU priority in a forthcom-
ing period is a significant strengthening of EU’s external borders.5
Due to political differences among Member States, radical re-
form of the EU Dublin asylum system remains to be agreed in near fu-
ture. Exempli causa, in August 2019 Spain called for legal action of the 
Commission against Italy for not allowing the disembarkation of 
Spanish rescue ship Open Arms and for breaking the EU norms. This 
situation illustrates political tensions among Member States. Spanish 
deputy prime minister Carmen Calvo also insisted on a coordinated 
European response for those rescued in the Mediterranean Sea, 
which should be taken through decisions of the EU Commission. 
However, there are opinions that „because of the largely heteroge-
neous positions within both populist and mainstream parties regard-
ing migration policy, substantial reforms and initiatives, whether they 
relate to restrictive or to liberal measures, might not abound during 
the new legislature“ (Ardittis, 2019). Migration issue is one of the 
most divisive in the EU. Consequently, prevalent assessment is that 
substantial reforms and relevant initiatives, whether they relate to re-
strictive or to liberal measures, might not be numerous during the 
new Legislature (Ardittis, 2019). 
The situation is furthermore aggravated by the recent suspen-
sion by Turkey of the EU deal on migrant readmissions. European 
Commission has taken action (July 2019) against Hungary, being 
„non-obedient“ Member State and reffered Hungary to the Court of 
Justice over national legislation that criminalises activities in support 
of asylum applications and that restricts the right to request asylum 
4  Ibidem
5   Strengthening of EU’s external borders - through the creation of a new 
Integrated Border Management Fund worth €9.3 billion and through a sig-
nificant increase of funding of €12 billion for the decentralized agencies 
supporting Member States protecting EU borders, notably the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). Ibid.
G
asm
i
54
(Ardittis, 2019). This is positive move, but still far enough from coordi-
nated European response to migration challenges. 
EU measures include the return and re-admission of irregular 
migrants who have no right to enter or stay in the EU, the fight 
against migrant smuggling, the protection of EU’s external borders, 
the creation of legal pathways for those who are in need of interna-
tional protection, the establishment of a solid EU asylum policy based 
on balance between solidarity and responsibility, and addressing mi-
gration in cooperation with third countries through political and fi-
nancial means. However, implementation of those measures is in the 
competence of Member States, but there is a strong disbalance 
among Member States on South EU (especially Italy, Spain and 
Greece, as well as Bulgaria), being at the forefront of migration pres-
sures and the other Member States.
The newly-elected Commission President Ursula von der Ley-
en, proposed a new pact on migration and asylum that would include 
the relaunch of the Dublin reform, a return to a fully functioning 
Schengen area and a new way of sharing responsibility among Mem-
ber States in the field of the EU migration and asylum policy. 
Under the existing system, asylum seekers are not treated uni-
formly and recognition rates in different EU countries vary. Moreover, 
only a very few countries, based on their geographical position, are 
responsible for essentially all asylum claims submitted within the EU. 
In order the legal framework to be more efficient, harmonised, fair 
and more resistant to future migratory pressures, it needs to be re-
formed. During Summer 2019, fourteen member countries of the EU 
have agreed to a new “solidarity mechanism” proposed by Germany 
and France to allocate migrants across the bloc, but the problem is 
that Italy’s Interior minister Matteo Salvini, whose country is at the 
forefront of the migrant influx in Europe, did not take part in the 
meeting. Italy took in almost all of the migrants rescued by humani-
tarian groups at sea until a populist coalition government took office 
in 2018 and immediately sought to close the nation’s ports to the 
charity ships. Therefore, it is high time to build a future valid migra-
tion and asylum policy of the EU (Wihtol De Wenden, 2019). Momen-
tum is optimal, bearing in mind that after the peak in migrants’ arriv-
als to the EU in 2015, data show that flows are below pre-crisis levels 
at the end of 2018 (Avramopoulos, 2018). 
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Another vital determinant item for the future of the EU rep-
resents its relations with USA, China and Russia, being the most im-
portant global players in contemporary international relations. 
European policy towards Russia is a divisive point. Some populist 
leaders, such as Orban in Hungary and Salvini in Italy have both been 
friendly towards V. Putin. At the same time, they have criticized the 
sanctions taken by the EU against Russia since the annexation of Crimea 
and conflict in Ukraine. However, although they criticize the EU policy, 
they have not used their veto (Kahn, 2019: 8). Relevant reason for this 
can be the energy dependence of the EU towards Russia. The dynamics 
of economic and political EU sanctions renewal each year, starting from 
2014, indicates the temporary character of it. It remains to be seen fur-
ther development of relations between EU and Russia, taking into ac-
count new events in relations with the USA and other factors.
With disappearance of bipolar world, new multipolar relations 
have developed, but very unstable. Precisely, current trade war be-
tween USA and China has colored the contemporary international re-
lations. Furthermore, USA has abandoned its previous position of 
strong Western ally of the EU, which was proved in many occasions 
(Vimont Pierre, 2019: 3). In the globalization era, the EU is left to find 
its own influence path. 
EU established common system for monitoring investments 
from China, but it represents simple information exchange among 
Member States. Bearing in mind considerable commercial dumping 
coming from China, as well as Chinese enormous investments in EU 
Member States, but not always transparent, the final result is great di-
vision among Member States in the battle for those investments, in-
stead of EU unity. In this manner, China is on the way of economic dom-
inance towards the EU with all parallel consequences for the EU future.
Concluding remarks
The vital question of the future positive development of 
the Union depends on the EU’s capacity to make effective deci-
sions, both on the external political agenda, and even more in-
ternally in terms of stimulating economic growth, employment 
and sustainable development. 
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The functioning of the European Parliament, more than that of 
the national parliaments, fosters majorities of ideas. History of the Euro-
pean integration is not a quick process nor easy. However, during syn-
chronization of the various economic and political interests of the Mem-
ber States and while establishing of common rules, the functionalist 
conception or sectoral unification prevailed, but preserving full sover-
eignty of the Member States. It is quite in the spirit of the ideas of Jean 
Monnet who had foreseen that the unification of Europe will be carried 
out step by step, creating de facto solidarity among its Member States.
The most recent polls show that 68% of Europeans deem that 
their country benefits from EU membership. It is the highest score 
seen since 1983, 49% say they are happy with the democratic function-
ing of the Union, 48% deem that their vote counts in the Union and 
48% want the European Parliament to play a greater role. (Joannin, 
2019: 2). Consequently, EP can rely on the expressed will of EU citizens 
to consolidate its institutional and political role, notably in the face of 
the Member States gathered in the Council and the European Council. 
The increase in voters’ turnout reflects the increased impor-
tance of European issues (Joannin, Maurice, 2019) and increasing Eu-
ropeanisation of politics in the Member States. Strategically seen, it is 
very positive that young people, citizens of member States have 
demonstrated record turnout at European elections.6
“The very significant boost in voter turn-out in May’s European 
elections shows that people, especially the younger generation, value 
their democratic rights and believe that the European Union is stronger 
when acting in unison to address their concerns,” commented David 
Sassoli (S&D, IT) , President of the newly elected Parliament in 2019.
State of the economy and the environment (climate change) 
were the two main priorities of voters, according to a Eurobarometer 
survey commissioned by the European Parliament in June 2019. Brex-
it played a role too, with 22% of respondents citing it as influencing 
their decision to vote, at least ‘to some extent”. Significant motiva-
tors for voters were also human rights and democracy - 37%, the way 
the EU should be working in the future - 36% and immigration - 34% 
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
6  Official data show high turnout of people under 25 and 25 – 39 years 
groups (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/2019092 
3IPR61602/2019).
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room/20190923IPR61602/2019).  Therefore the Union needs, more 
than ever, serious reforms in order to reply to contemporary chal-
lenges, internal and external. 
Institutional functioning of the EU is characterized by complex-
ity, but also by a certain level of alienation from its citizens, who con-
sider EU and its institutions as a tax burden. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that recent European elections, with positive turnout of 
voters, represent a chance for turning point towards institutional effi-
ciency of the EU and for its better influence in contemporary interna-
tional relations. The conclusion arises that the Union is a continuous 
negotiating system (Borzel, Risse, 2012) characterized by daily deci-
sion-making, but in parallel by a failed European Constitution, which 
was replaced by Lisbon reforms of Founding Treaties.
The French President Macron considers that the Union would 
reform before it enlarges (Mirel, 2019). It was the basis for French 
veto on launching membership negotiations of the EU with North 
Macedonia and Albania in 2019, which was slap in the face of those 
candidate countries. Denmark and Netherland also blocked the open-
ing of membership negotiations, the fact that confirmed the absence 
of internal political consensus within the Union, Even more, this situa-
tion clearly indicates the long-term weakness of strategic guidelines 
in the domain of common foreign and security policy of the EU. Many 
authors have warned that for the EU there is no time to lose (Avramo-
poulos, 2018, Mirel, 2019), However, the new President of the Euro-
pean Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has promoted the triptych 
of “security, sovereignty and influence” for the new Commission’s 
work in its mandate till the ned of october 2024, which gives hope to 
launch of strategic better future of the EU.
New European elections have certainly brought more demo-
cratic legitimacy to the Union and it remains to be seen how this dem-
ocratic potential for growth of the EU prosperity is going to be imple-
mented in near future. The pro-European parties might agree on 
projects and ideas that will foster deepening of European integra-
tion. This, however, should not happen at the expense of enlarge-
ment of the EU. Essential concepts in this context are: stability, credi-
bility and effectiveness of the functioning of EU institutions. To the 
extent that it is provided in the EU, it will be realistic to conclude that 
it is a democratic Union with optimal institutional architecture.
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Why CEE Countries Remain Strongly Pro-
European-Oriented? A Case Study - Romania
 and its Economic Benefits from the EU
Abstract
 
Romania was the leader of the economic growth and develop-
ment in Central and Eastern Europe over the past two decades, 
an evolution strongly influenced by the EU integration process. 
The GDP/capita at purchasing power parity as a weight of the 
Euro Area increased from around 20% in 2000 to above 60% in 
2018, while the nominal GDP/capita outpaced EUR 10,000 last 
year. There can be noticed important differences between the 
pre-crisis and the post-crisis cycle. However, at present the Ro-
manian economy is confronted again with the twin deficits chal-
lenge. On the other hand, the mid-run outlook maintains posi-
tive for Romania, an evolution supported by the recent 
contribution of the production factors to the dynamics of the 
potential GDP. In this paper we implement standard economet-
ric tools in order to analyze the macro-financial developments 
in Romania over the past decades and to calibrate a mid-run 
macroeconomic scenario. 
Keywords: EU integration, Romanian economy, production 
function
Introduction
 Located at the crossroads of the European Union, Middle 
East, Community of Independent States and the ambitious in-
vestment platform launched by China (“One Belt One Road”) 
Romania is an economy recommended for investments (sover-
eign rating “BBB-“) by the main rating agencies. 
 From the point of view of the dynamics of the GDP 
growth pace and GDP/capita evolution Romania was the leader 
of the EU member countries. For instance, GDP/capita at pur-
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chasing power standards (as percentage of the Euro Area) in-
creased from around 20% in 2000 (the year of opening negotia-
tions with EU) to above 60% in 2018, as can be noticed from the 
Figure 1. During the period this indicator climbed from around 
25% to 47% in Bulgaria and from 40% to 67% in Poland. 
This development process was mainly determined by the 
economic integration with the European Union, with positive 
impact for the dynamics of the investments, exports and pri-
vate consumption. The strong integration with the EU econom-
ic cycle and the absorption of the EU funds had a significant 
contribution to the development of the Romanian economy 
over the past decades.
As can be noticed from this Figure 1 the GDP/capita in-
creased by a higher pace from 2000 until 2009, the year Roma-
nia was strongly affected by the incidence of the Great Reces-
sion (the most severe economic and financial crisis since the 
end of the World War II). 
Figure 1. GDP/capita (purchasing power standards, % of the Euro Area)
Source: Eurostat, 2019
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Romania is not anymore a small economy, as nominal GDP 
outpaced EUR 200bn in 2018, turning the country the 15th largest 
of the European Union (the 46th place on the global economy). 
At the end of 2019 Romania is confronted with the widen-
ing of the twin deficits (public finance and current account). How-
ever, the mid-run prospects are positive, as reflected by the dynam-
ics of the total productivity factor, the strong development of the 
IT&C sector (the star of the post-crisis cycle) and the prospects for 
opening the negotiations to entry OECD (the league of the devel-
oped countries) in the following quarters. 
The rest of the paper has the following structure: chapter 
one presents the recent developments in the global economy, EU 
and CEE; the second chapter briefly describes the macro-financial 
dynamics in Romania; the methodology is presented in third chap-
ter; the mid-run outlook for Romanian economy is described in the 
fourth chapter; the conclusions are drawn in the last chapter.
Recent developments in global, EU and CEE economies
The economic year 2019 in the global economy was domi-
nated by the trade negotiations, the change of the trend in terms 
of monetary policy and the gap between the slowing-down of the 
growth pace and the strong climate on the financial markets.
From the nominal perspective 2019 was the year when the 
GDP of China outpaced the GDP of the Euroland (the core group of 
the European Union), the equilibrium point of the unbalanced glob-
al economy over the past four decades. 
This year the global economy continued to be confronted 
with the USA-China trade tensions, the largest economies of the 
world, with a cumulated contribution of over 40% to the world GDP. 
According to Bloomberg data the volume of the global 
trade contracted by 0.4% YoY during 9M2019, an evolution with 
spill-over impact for the industrial production (increase by only 1% 
YoY), as can be noticed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Global trade vs. industrial production
Source: Bloomberg, 2019
 
At the same time, the global services sector decelerated in 
2019, due to the deterioration of the investment climate, an evolu-
tion partially counterbalanced by the strong labor market climate 
(the unemployment rate down to the lowest level of the past de-
cades) and the implementation of the Digital Revolution. 
According to the Autumn macroeconomic outlook of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) the global GDP would increase in 
2019 by around 3% YoY, the slowest pace since 2009. 
Analyzing the dynamics of the GDP in US, China and Euro-
land (the main economic powers of the world, with a contribution 
of over 55% to the global GDP) there can be noticed a synchro-
nized deceleration process over the past quarters. 
For instance, during 3Q2019 the YoY growth pace decelerat-
ed to 2.1% in USA (the lowest since 2016), consolidated at 1.2% in 
Euroland (the minimum since 2013) and diminished to 6% in China 
(the lowest since 1992). 
At the same time, inflation rate persisted at a low level, be-
low the target of the central banks in US and Euro Area (2% YoY).
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The slowing-down of the growth pace and the low level of 
inflation determined the change of the trend for the monetary pol-
icy in US in 2019 (from normalization to expansionary): FED cut the 
reference rate three times by 25 bp and implemented “repo”s for 
the first time since the Great Recession.  
At the same time, the central banks in Euroland and China 
implemented expansionary measures in 2019. 
On the other hand, the climate on the global financial mar-
kets was positive in 2019, with the US stock market climbing to re-
cord high levels, an evolution influenced by several factors: the op-
timism induced by the US-China trade negotiations (these countries 
reached a partial agreement in December), the expansionary poli-
cy-mix in US, China and Euroland, the Digital Revolution and the 
quarterly financial reports of the companies.
In 2019 Euroland economy was confronted with the global 
trade tensions and the regional structural challenges (including the 
deterioration of the total productivity factor, due to the slow dy-
namics of the structural reforms and to the diminishing efficiency 
of the unprecedented expansionary monetary policy).
Figure 3. The contribution of the production factors to the YoY dynamics of 
the potential GDP in Euroland
Source: own estimates, based on the methodology and using Eurostat data
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The evolution of the economy by a slower pace com-
pared with potential (negative output gap) and the persistence 
of inflation at a low level (below the target of the central bank) 
determined the European Central Bank to implement additional 
expansionary measures starting September 2019. 
Last, but not least, 2019 was the year of changes at Euro-
pean Commission and European Central Bank from the institu-
tional point of view, the new leaders signaling an improvement 
of the policy-mix in the following quarters. 
The European economic convergence process dominated 
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe over the past de-
cades, being supported by the strong dynamics of the foreign 
direct investments, in the context of competitive and compara-
tive advantages. 
At present, the economic distance between CEE and the 
Euroland in terms of GDP/capita (at purchasing power parity) 
persists at high levels, especially in Romania and Bulgaria. Fur-
thermore, during the post-crisis cycle the speed of the conver-
gence process diminished.
Based on Eurostat data we can compute the speed of the 
European economic convergence process in these countries. 
For instance, GDP/capita (as % of Euro Area level) climbed by 
average annual paces of 2.2% in Bulgaria, 1.1% in Czech Repub-
lic, 1.5% in Hungary, 2.4% in Poland, 2.9% in Romania and 1.3% 
in Slovakia during 2009-2018, slowing-down from 5.5%, 2.7%, 
3%, 3.3%, 8.8% and 4.7%, respectively during 2000-2009.
This evolution was mainly determined by the deteriora-
tion of the flows of the foreign direct investments after the in-
cidence of the Great Recession (as can be noticed in the follow-
ing figure), the discontinuity of the structural reforms after the 
EU entry and the low level of the intra-regional economic inte-
gration.
At present the Central and Eastern Europe is confronted 
with several structural challenges:
1.  the slow dynamics of convergence in terms of the 
gross valued added;
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2.  the concentration of foreign direct investments in la-
bor intensive sectors (the region is the assembly plat-
form of the countries in Western Europe);
3.  the outflows of the profits generated by the multina-
tionals;
4.  the low and inefficient level of the research and devel-
opment;
5. the high fragmentation of the domestic companies.
Figure 4. Flows of foreign direct investments (% GDP) (MA10)
Source: Bloomberg, 2019
Romania – recent macroeconomic developments
The Romanian economy grew by 4.4% YoY in 2018, slow-
ing down from 7.1% YoY in 2017, due to the deceleration of the 
domestic demand and to the deterioration of the net foreign 
demand.
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The pace of the private consumption normalized (7.2% 
YoY in 2018 vs. 10% YoY in 2017), given the fading out of the 
Fiscal Act and the acceleration of inflation. 
On the other hand, the fixed investments contracted by 
1.2% YoY, due to the intensifying challenges in terms of macro-
economic equilibria and policy-mix.
However, the collective component of the public con-
sumption rose by 4.5% YoY, given the expansionary fiscal and 
income policies. 
The net foreign demand had a negative contribution to 
the GDP growth pace in 2018 as imports advanced by 9.1% YoY, 
while exports rose by 6.2% YoY.
The unemployment rate down to 4.2% in 2018 (the low-
est since 1991).
During 1H 2019 the Romanian GDP advanced by 4.7% 
YoY, an evolution determined by the contribution of the domes-
tic demand (6.7pp), supported by the expansionary policy-mix. 
There can be noticed the increase of the fixed invest-
ments by 12.4% YoY, given the improvement risk perception, 
the low level of the real interest rates and the slow dynamics 
during post-crisis cycle. 
At the same time, the household consumption climbed 
by 6.1% YoY. 
Furthermore, the public consumption contributed by 
0.3pp to the GDP growth given the expansionary fiscal and in-
come policies. 
On the other hand, the imports continued to increase by 
a higher pace compared with the exports (6.4% YoY vs. 2.7% 
YoY) during January-June, according to the Statistics Office. 
The agriculture and the industry stagnated YoY, while 
IT&C and the constructions rose by 9.9% YoY and 14.9% YoY, re-
spectively. 
We point out that the strong increase of the economy 
was accompanied by the widening twin deficits (towards the 
highest levels since 2012), as can be noticed in the following 
figure. 
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Figure 5. The dynamics of GDP and of the twin deficits in Romania
Source: based on data of the National Institute of Statistics and National Bank of Romania
Methodology
In this paper we employ several standard econometric tools in 
order to assess the recent macro-financial developments and to gen-
erate a core macroeconomic scenario for the Romanian economy. 
In order to estimate the dynamics of the potential GDP the 
production function Cobb-Douglas was applied, a method also used 
by the European Commission (D’Auria, et al. (2010); European Com-
mission (2012)):
  Y = Lα x K 1-α x PTF                                                  (1.1),
where Y, L, K, PTF and α represent the GDP, labor, capital stock and 
the multi-factor productivity. 
By applying the logarithms relation (1.1) transforms into: 
  Yt =  α x Lt + (1 - α) x Kt + PTFt                             (1.2), 
Yt, Lt, Kt și PTFt representing the dynamics of the GDP, labor, capital 
stock and the total productivity factor.
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Afterwards, the Hodrick-Prescott filter was employed in or-
der to estimate the trend component for the labor and multi-fac-
tor productivity. 
The dynamics of the potential GDP can be expressed in the 
following relation:
Yt* =  α x Lt* + (1 - α) x Kt + PTFt*,                                         (1.3),
where Yt*, Lt* and PTFt* represent the structural component for 
the GDP, labor and multi-factor productivity. 
The labor factor (L) can be expressed:
 L = active population x employment rate x  
(1-unemployment rate) x average number  
of effective working hours                                               (1.4)  
As regards the capital stock the perpetuity method was ap-
plied:
Kt = Kt-1 x (1-d) +GFCFt,                                                               (1.5)
where Kt represent the capital stock of the year t, d – the de-
preciation rate, GFCFt – gross fixed capital formation of the 
year t.
In this paper we started from the capital stock of 1995 as es-
timated by AMECO (as from Derbyshire, et al. (2010)) and a differ-
ent depreciation rate, depending on the position of the economy 
on the cycle. 
The dynamics of the multi-factor productivity was estimated 
by applying the Hodrick-Prescot for the PTFt, determined by the 
following relation: 
 PTFt = Yt - α x Lt – (1- α) x Kt                                                    (1.6)
In this paper α  = 0.65, a level also used in the paper of D’Au-
ria, et al. (2010)). In a paper of 2012 the European Commission con-
siders α as the weight of the wages in GDP in the EU (15) countries 
between 1960-2000 (a level of 0.63).
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The macroeconomic variables can be expressed as a sum be-
tween a structural component (Yt
*) (which depends on structural 
factors) and a cyclical one (Yt
c).
The econometric filter Hodrick-Prescott is one of the most 
used methods to distinguish between the structural and cyclical 
components of the macroeconomic variables, based on the follow-
ing relation: 
             
(1.7)
where Yt, Yt
* and λ represent the GDP, the potential GDP and the 
smoothness parameter.
 At the same time, this paper applied regressions and ARI-
MA models in order to calibrate a core macroeconomic scenario for 
the Romanian economy. 
Mid-run outlook and challenges for Romania
According to the results of the econometric analysis the 
growth pace of the Romanian economy would decelerate in the 
following quarters and return to negative output gap in 2020, due 
to the rebalancing of the policy-mix and to the end of the global 
post-crisis cycle 
However, the convergence process towards the EU average 
would continue in the mid-run (Romanian GDP to increase by a 
higher pace compared with the EU), as the main/strategic investors 
are expected to consolidate the presence in Romania.
Furthermore, the levels of the deficits and the dependence 
on foreign financing are low compared to the pre-crisis  period.
For the average annual inflation we forecast a gradual con-
vergence of inflation towards the NBR target – average YoY dy-
namics of 3.9% in 2019, 2.9% in 2020 and 3.3% in 2021 (HICP).
However, the inflationary pressures to remain high in the 
short-run, given the labor market tensions and the depreciation of 
the RON.
In this context, the central bank is expected to tighten con-
trol over money market liquidity in the short-run.
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Furthermore, the forecasts show an increase of the financ-
ing costs and the depreciation of the RON in the following quar-
ters, given the dynamics of inflation and the challenges in terms of 
macroeconomic equilibria and policy-mix (including the fragile 
stance of the public finance).
Among the main risk factors for the evolution of the Roma-
nian economy in the short-run we mention: the global and Euro-
pean macro-financial climate, with impact for the capital flows di-
rected to the emerging markets; the economic policy-mix and the 
public tensions in Romania; the regional geo-political climate.
Conclusions
Romanian economy is expected to continue the EU eco-
nomic convergence process in the following years, a scenario 
strongly supported by the improvement trend for the contribu-
tion of the production factors to the dynamics of the potential 
output. 
Figure 6. the contribution of the production factors to the YoY dynamics of 
the potential output (percentage points) in Romania
Source: own estimates, based on the methodology and using Eurostat data
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However, an acceleration of the process is dependent on the 
implementation of a balanced policy-mix, more focused on struc-
tural reforms implemented on a continuous basis, instead of 
pro-cyclical policies. 
At the same time, the economic policy lacks maneuver room 
in the case of incidence of shocks, in a period dominated by the ac-
cumulation of maturity signs for the global post-crisis cycle.
Last, but not least, there can be mentioned several poli-
cy-mix uncertainties in Romania: the discontinuity of reforms, the 
fragile stance of the public finance, the increase of the state inter-
vention in the economy counterbalanced by the excess liquidity.
Overall, despite the recent increase of the wages the labor 
force continues to be cheap compared with the EU countries.
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Western Balkans, Reforms  
and Eurointegrations1
Abstract
The subject of this research is the processes of transition and reform in 
the Balkans and integration into the European Union (EU). These proce-
sses have their historical, political, economic, social causes and con-
sequences. The efforts and efforts to integrate the countries of the We-
stern Balkans (WB) into the European space are emphasized. The 
question is: can the Western Balkan countries help each other in further 
regional and European integration? The assumption is that the knowled-
ge and experience gained so far about the aforementioned integrations 
is poorly used, but that there are realistic social and economic assumpti-
ons to accelerate the reforms of these societies. The countries of the 
Western Balkans should learn from the positive experiences of EU mem-
ber states, but also adapt normative and other solutions to their own 
social circumstances.
Furthermore, the authors refer to the emergence and meaning of the 
term Western Balkans, which came to the limelight from the beginning 
of the 20th century, and revived in the last decade of the same century, 
when it is most commonly used to denote an atmosphere of intoleran-
ce, hatred, conflict, war and division. Such an atmosphere dominated 
the breakup of Yugoslavia and resulted in the warlike dissolution of so-
ciety and the common state. These processes are an obstacle to the re-
forms, democratization, economic progress and European integration 
of the Western Balkan countries. However, the intense work and desire 
for EU integration in recent years, in these countries, have contributed 
to making conflicts in the past a barrier to further development.
Keywords: European Union, Balkans, integration, peace, transition, rule 
of law
1    This work was supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Tech-
nological Development of the Republic of Serbia [projects number 179038 
and 179039]. The projects were implemented by the Institute of Social Sci-
ences,Belgrade.
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Introduction
 The beginning of the transition of the Balkan countries, in lit-
erature, began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. From an economic 
and sociological point of view, major changes in the economic and 
social structure of the Balkan countries began before 1990, but 
have accelerated and deepened over the last three decades. 
During this time, both the international environment and the Euro-
pean Union itself were changing. Overall, the transition direction of 
these societies marks the transition from a self-governing / state 
socialist system to capitalism. The manner, pace, characteristics of 
the main entities that governed the society are different, but their 
strategic goals were as follows: to create a market economy, a 
multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law. For most of 
them, the strategic goal was to join the EU, but the pace of achiev-
ing this is different from country to country.
 How did Serbia move forward? The key point was that as 
“the country of the heavenly people finally descended to earth” 
and began to solve real problems. To look at the domestic and in-
ternational situation and position, which she began to work on her-
self, on her own changes, while recognizing weaknesses, ignorance 
and her own shortcomings. Then it was revealed how great the job 
was, and that it would not be done quickly or easily. In addition, the 
issue of inter-regional relations in the region has been raised, but 
also closer ties with all EU countries as well as non-EU countries 
such as the USA, China, Russia, Turkey, Israel, BRIXA countries and 
many Arabian countries. It was her own firm determination to de-
velop the country economically and for its citizens to live “like all 
the normal world”? She realized that no country can develop eco-
nomically with human resources that do not want to work and de-
velop, with young people being allowed to live in illusions, and 
youth is prone to it. When events are thus viewed, what does glo-
balization and the fall of the Berlin Wall have to do with it? Enough 
of this is the country itself, in ourselves. But it cannot be over-
looked that there have been various international pressures, for 
which there are many facts and evidence, about which much has 
been written. Wise Japanese once said, “50% are guilty of our own 
fault, and 50% of our own fault” (Shinici, 2013).
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The countries created by the breakup of the second SFR 
Yugoslavia are Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro (without Croatia because it is already in the EU, Slo-
venia although the former SFRY country is also in the EU, but it 
does not belong to this name because it is a country of central Eu-
rope) and Albania, today politically referred to as the Western 
Balkans.2 Albania belonged to a different type of real-socialism 
than the SFRY and was one of the least developed countries. De-
picting privatization of social / state property, de-industrializa-
tion, old and new economic and social inequalities and poverty of 
employees and other citizens, as well as lack of rule of law, along 
with old and new conflicts, are considered as the most important 
structural obstacles to the development and acceleration of Euro-
pean integration. In addition, the existence of corruption is an in-
direct indicator of the absence of the rule of law. However, re-
spect for rights and human freedoms are some of the most 
fundamental values  that the EU requires from future members. 
These are some of the factors that are essential for regional co-
operation and integration, without which the economic and social 
progress of these societies is difficult. However, the term “Bal-
kanization” is multi-layered and has different dimensions (eco-
nomic, historical, political, cultural). Mary Todorova wrote more 
about this and pointed to numerous stereotypes about the Bal-
kans. She also emphasized that since the 1990s it has gained pejo-
rative and ideological significance (Todorova, 2015: 22). The name 
was created after the Balkan wars at the beginning of the XX cen-
tury, and with the wars of the 1990s in this area it gained new 
content and importance. Its essence concerns the fragmentation 
of societies, separatism, division, aggravation of conflicts, the rise 
of nationalism, local and civil conflicts and wars, after which 
non-volatile societies and states emerge. This has led some au-
thors to point to disintegration processes in the EU (Brexit, for 
example), as a danger of the “Balkanization” syndrome of that 
community (Dedovic, 2017; Srncevic, 2012).
2   These countries and the people who live in them have much in common, 
though there is no talk of creating something that was the former SFR 
Yugoslavia. The name Western Balkans itself is more of a political name.
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The European Union and the Western Balkan countries
However, just after World War I, someone noticed that the 
“Eastern Question” was in fact a “Western Question”, so now the 
“Balkan Question” is more than ever a “European Question”. Since 
Thessaloniki in June 2003, the accession of the Western Balkan 
countries to the European Union has become a formal political 
commitment, although the EU itself has wanted enlargement to 
the east. However, it turns out that the big difference between 
Central Europe and the Western Balkans is that the WB lost ten 
years in the wars of the 1990s. However, with the end of the con-
flict and regime change in Serbia, the EU has become a key interna-
tional player in the Balkans. However, it must be noted that there is 
disagreement on the views of EU Member States with regard to re-
solving the Kosovo issue and recognizing Kosovo. In the Western 
Balkans, the Europeanization of society has been under way in the 
last two decades, though in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
the US continues to enjoy greater credibility than the EU. Also, Pu-
tin’s Russia, relying on Orthodox Serbs, tried to gain a major role in 
the Balkans in those same years. Putin’s visits to Serbia reinforce 
co-operation but also strengthen bilateral relations in the energy 
sector. Also, the factor of influence is Turkey, which wants to 
strengthen its influence in the Balkans again, working together 
with Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia to overcome old animosities. Tur-
key’s policy cannot weaken the EU’s influence in the Balkans, as the 
EU helps countries in the region consolidate and tackle trade and 
communication issues. International relations are renewed, trade 
and links between companies also. When looking at Serbia, Mace-
donia and Montenegro, progress has been noted in economic re-
form and regional co-operation, although there are still “concerns” 
about the rule of law. However, the difference between the coun-
tries of Central Europe and the Western Balkans, apart from the 
time lag, is the issue of state building, defining borders, democratic 
consolidation, which will make it a sovereign state. Thus, the EU 
emerges as an effective factor in integration, a factor of restoring 
stabilization, as a factor of regaining the capacity for co-operation 
(which entails the question of building institutions and state capac-
ities to exercise the rule of law of all citizens of a country). The 
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proximity and involvement of EU Member States is useful as they 
can help mediate the Europeanization of the Western Balkan coun-
tries, thereby mediating the enlargement process automatically. 
However, the issue of the “Cypriot lesson” implies that the EU does 
not want to transmit state conflicts to its territory, but wants bilat-
eral conflicts resolved before integrating into the European space. 
Subsequently, other issues, such as the rule of law issues such as 
corruption and nepotism, are the focus. The main sources of these 
phenomena are the “legacy of socialism” - social capital in this case 
means corrupt networks to circumvent the law; “War economy” - 
bypassing the embargo on cooperation with organized crime; ‘Mar-
ket transitions - which are non-transparent and highly corrupt; and 
“the use of political employment” - to impose party goals as nation-
al (Rupnik, 2011: 19 - 27).
Nevertheless, the Western Balkan countries are connected 
by a long shared history and the organization of life in the same 
area. What these countries need now is integration of their neigh-
bors into a broader, European context. The countries of the West-
ern Balkans have a burdensome relationship with the problems 
that arose during the war of the 1990s, and especially with regard 
to the succession issues of displaced persons, although pressured 
by internal economic and political problems. However, regardless 
of the EU, Serbia had to embark on processes of reforming society 
and embracing European values. The EU’s role would only be to 
support these processes and to consolidate them. The will, the de-
cision, the reform must be the decision of Serbia, for its own sake. 
The countries of the Western Balkans, as well as the entire Balkan 
region, have one common dominant political goal, which is to be-
come part of the EU. This idea has brought progress in relations 
with one another, leaving conflicts behind, and showing a strong 
desire to normalize relations and life between WB countries. They 
should not miss this last chance (Kovacevic, 2010: 49–51).
However, the world is in deep change, the EU is changing, 
the US is changing, and Russia is changing, China is changing, other 
countries are changing, for example, Turkey, but also Serbia. What 
is the path to creative renewal and flourishing of Serbia? Does the 
US-Russia bidding for Serbia contribute to leaving the EU? Or per-
haps the most significant is that Serbia has taken a route with Paris 
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and Berlin and is moving at the speed of “modern trains”.3 (Pantel-
ic, 2010:73-75). “One world is disappearing, edited from one cen-
ter. A polycentric structure of the world is being born, instead of 
the clash of civilizations - the cooperation of civilizations, new rela-
tionships are emerging between globalism and the national struc-
ture of the world ”(Markovic, 2010: 13).
The European Union and its foreign policy in the process of 
its own transformation and/or evolution, must face two of the 
most important challenges, namely security and energy. Namely, 
the risk of production and use of weapons of mass destruction has 
become greater due to the efforts of individual countries to pro-
duce nuclear weapons. Thus, the EU conducted negotiations be-
tween Iran and North Korea at two levels, levels of dialogue and 
levels of pressure. In addition, the issue of energy security indicates 
that the EU does not want its citizens to pay for the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian dispute or for them to suffer gas shortages. Climate 
change, increasing natural disasters, and environmental degrada-
tion and conflicts over natural resources and warming the earth, on 
average, are 1.5% significant. For these reasons, the European 
Union is today a powerful global player in all fields of international 
politics, from economy, energy, diplomacy and defense. Because of 
its magnetic and soft power, it is today a civilian superpower with-
out which the United States can hardly meet key global challenges 
(Ejdus, 2010: 39 - 41). Many countries, such as the US, Japan, China, 
and the EU, have offered a reduction of around 25% of uncon-
trolled planet pollution. Countries also agreed that the participants 
in the Copenhagen summit, seeking to reduce their emissions by 
50% by 2050, from the 1999 level. The issue of protecting forests 
in Brazil that absorb 20% of carbon dioxide was also a particular is-
sue. The EU’s active work on protecting the environment from 
emissions of fossil fuels, protecting fossil fuel consumption, sug-
gests that it is “the only one with the rules, commitment and realis-
tic mechanisms to achieve those goals” (Ilić, 2010: 41–44 ).
The EU itself has had its crises. Specifically, the economic cri-
sis in the EU member states was caused by maladaptation to glo-
balization, and was further exacerbated by the 2008 global finan-
3   The two strongest EU countries are Germany and France (author’s re-
mark).
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cial crisis. Another type of crisis was the institutional crisis of EU 
identity in the adjustment process. So the political crisis. However, 
what is important for Serbia, and for all Western Balkan countries, 
which is seemingly unfavorable, has been the tightening of the cri-
teria for EU accession. The WB countries have problems of eco-
nomic underdevelopment, lack of rule of law, high corruption, or-
ganized crime, and a particularly critical issue for Serbia is the issue 
of Kosovo and Metohija. All these countries are undergoing a tran-
sition “from real Soviet-type socialism to Eurocapitalism” 
(Teokarovic, 2010: 53-55, 59).
The parties in power in Serbia, the SNS, the SPS and those of 
the opposition (DS) have united on the pro-European issue. Thus 
began the consolidation of democracy in Serbia. But one key issue 
that hampered Serbia’s economy was de-industrialization, massive 
job losses, declining foreign direct investment, long-standing inter-
est from the rich and influential, a phenomenon known as the “cap-
tive state”, the removal of regulations that hamper private busi-
ness development and prevent corruption and one general inability 
to respond to the situation and the demands of the times. It is only 
in the last year that some elements of improving the standard of 
living of the population can be seen, the unemployment rate is be-
low 10%, bad coordination within the government has been elimi-
nated, and the process of Serbia’s EU integration is accelerated. 
Thus, Serbia has taken a leading role in the region on many issues, 
such as the construction of the IT sector, the growth of FDI, and 
the rate of economic development. Military neutrality was pro-
claimed, the development of bilateral cooperation with China, Rus-
sia, Turkey, the development of regional relations with Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Albania. Today, Serbia has sixteen recognitions of Koso-
vo’s independence withdrawn and is actively working to make the 
world aware of Kosovo’s unjust secession, which was also illegal 
and which sets a precedent in international law (Teokarovic, 2011: 
61-62). Serbia faces many illogicalities, but it can be said that it has 
overcome many problems and is taking major steps forward. WB 
countries have small economies, and as Prof. dr. Domazet 4, they 
4   Oral presentation at the Conference “Peace and Democratic Multilateral-
ism”, 2019 ECPD, Belgrade.
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need a new model of economy, new development, new social reali-
ty, new democratic politics, new institutions and new ideas.
Today, the governments of the Western Balkan countries 
are led mainly by “moderate nationalists” whose task should be a 
reform process that will overcome the issues at stake in order to 
complete the process of joining the EU region. Thus, European re-
form is not viewed as something external, but as the homework of 
every 19th-century European democratic society. Furthermore, 
“the EU is committed to transposing its model of peace through in-
stitutionalized interdependence in the Balkans,” though in real 
terms, the delayed process of nation-building in these areas. These 
items are an obstacle to the development of these countries them-
selves. The development of national policies in the Western Balkan 
countries, which are territorially small, is important for themselves 
and for the EU (Rupnik, 2011: 28).
The people of the Balkans do not want to jeopardize their 
progress, they do not want to return to the old days of hatred and 
evil. The only way out of the crisis is that violence must be replaced 
by diplomacy, that is, negotiations that must be pragmatic and 
guarantee peace, in order to change the Balkans’ outlook. An era 
of mutual co-operation, but also co-operation with EU-led Western 
policies, is desirable. Serbia is today a major factor in stability in the 
Balkans, precisely because of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo.5 The EU is leading the final stages of transition in the 
Balkans, and Belgrade is particularly praised for having contributed 
to the rise of democracy, although the focus remains on practical 
economic and legal issues (Abramowitz, 2014: 174 - 177).
Nevertheless, the European Union is entering a new 
phase of political development, and should increasingly be 
viewed as a whole (Radovic, 2010: 61). To this end, the EU has 
developed a new European security strategy. “From a common 
vision to a joint action: implementing the EU’s global strategy” is 
in fact the catchphrase the EU launched when defining its “EU 
Foreign and Security Policy” (EUGS). It actually served as a 
springboard for the EU to raise the issue of further European in-
5   For example, Albania and Kosovo have the highest share of households 
in which one family member is employed in one of the EU Member States 
(Manchin, 2011: 165).
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tegration and the survival of its member states after the UK ref-
erendum. Many doubted that the EU would survive after Brexit. 
However, the EU was consolidating very quickly and rapidly mov-
ing towards security and defense changes, with the creation of a 
new EU Military Training Command Center. In addition, the EU 
seeks to remain a global power and become a security zone for 
its citizens, and is committed to peace and development world-
wide. Cooperation with the United Nations is very important be-
cause of climate change and sustainable development. Because 
in a world of great powers and constant global challenges, the 
EU can only survive as a community, because the largest markets 
in the world, its member states individually and collectively, in-
vest the most in development cooperation and only in that way 
can they effect change. The emphasis is also on preventing new 
wars, humanitarian disasters, refugee crises and seeking a new 
approach to crises. The constant conflicts in the world, the 
threat of terrorism affect the everyday life of ordinary citizens. 
What the EU insists on is cooperation with countries of origin 
and transit to better manage migratory flows, and a proposal to 
draw up a global treaty on refugees and migrants. The “whole of 
the EU” is that it is “global”, “security”, using other foreign poli-
cies such as enlargement, development and trade, migration, 
energy, climate, environment, culture. The implementation of 
the EUGS objectives entails a strong and united Union, with re-
spect for regional and geographical priorities. The EU has placed 
a particular focus on developing peace and respect for neigh-
borhood relations in the WB so that these societies can recover, 
adapt and respond to development and crisis challenges. The re-
silience of these countries strengthens EU financial support for 
their reforms, the fight against corruption, the improvement of 
public administration, the judiciary and support for civil society 
(www.eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/49750/eu-glob-
al-strategy---- year-1_en, date).
For these reasons, it is not surprising that when seeking sup-
port for a fresh start to the EU, Ursula von der Lajen took the West-
ern Balkans as her first point of presentation (www.telegraph,en/
news//politics/3126334-door-eu-open-to-west-balkan-fon-der-la-
jen-seeking-support-for-a-new-start-europe).
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Transition Characteristics: The Path from the Socialist  
to the Capitalist System and the Rule of Law
With the disintegration and disintegration of the SFRY and 
the Eastern bloc of the re-socialist countries, in the specific geopo-
litical international circumstances, each of the newly created states 
embarked on their own path of changing society. The processes of 
changing economic and social structure are marked by the term 
transition (Novakovic, 2017: 48-52). Controversies over its content 
do not end to this day, but the fact is that these changes have 
changed the entire social structure.
Tranzition of society
It was based on changes in ownership of the means of pro-
duction and then on the existing political, educational, health, so-
cial and cultural subsystems. This meant creating a new class and 
new layers of the structure of society, whose interests were woven 
into the concept of transition and privatization. The basis of the le-
gitimacy of government was also changing, and the old ideology 
gave way to (neo) liberal ideology. Instead of the ruling working 
class, the capitalist class is in the forefront with the transition. Also, 
work as an important social value is viewed in the context of profit, 
and resources are used purposefully. The one-party system was 
abandoned, in the name of the multi-party system, and state gov-
ernance of the economy and society was pushed to the sidelines. 
The state was given a new role, determined largely by the ideology 
of neoliberalism. The consequence of these phenomena is the dis-
solution and disappearance of the welfare state system, ie. materi-
al and social security of citizens based on socialist distribution. Ac-
cording to Branko Horvat, the average social standard of citizens of 
socialist Yugoslavia was above the level of some Western European 
countries6 (Horvat, 2002). The dynamics, manner and success of 
the transition of society were determined by the way in which the 
new states emerged and the earlier achieved level of social and 
6   Hence understanding why regrets of past times in certain sections of the 
population.
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economic development. The international factor became more and 
more important during and after the conflicts in the Balkans.
 A positive example of transition is Slovenia, which has eco-
nomic independence even though it is a small country. Slovenia has 
successfully transformed its economy. In the first years of market 
transition, there was a gap because there was a surplus of employ-
ees and the need for them was reduced (Maksimović, 2004: 143). 
Namely, Slovenia has a small domestic market, and it cannot 
achieve economic development without active foreign trade. The 
economy is open-ended, it has managed to retain the core sectors 
of business companies, the R&D sector, the banking sector. Until 
the global financial crisis of 2008, the country managed to keep fi-
nances well balanced, with a smaller deficit, external debt was low, 
and so were public debt. Its good economic results are supported 
by the international competitiveness that the Slovenians are partic-
ularly committed to. An additional strength is the application of de-
sign in industry (Yama, 2019: 135). Before 1990, Slovenia was the 
most developed republic of Yugoslavia in terms of GDP, and Mace-
donia belonged to the underdeveloped (Mihailović, 1993: 35). The 
former had a “small war” with the JNA, gained independence and 
reached the GDP level most rapidly since before the transition be-
gan (Torkar et al. 2018: 174-198). In 2004, she joined the EU. Mace-
donia avoided the Balkan wars of the 1990s, but not the processes 
of national conflicts and disintegration and instability. In Albania, 
there was no civil war, but the change of political elites in power 
was a relatively successful transition, so much so that they consid-
ered it to be the “leader of the Balkans”. It is well known that Alba-
nia has a number of customs barriers that it manages to protect its 
market. (Teleskovic, 2018). This is what it looked like at one point 
because Albania has had more successful economic development 
throughout the transition, which is only partly explained by the low 
starting base.
Furthermore, the transition concepts of the Balkan societies 
differed, but were dominated by two. The first is a “gradual or 
gradual” and the second a “fast or shock” transition. Slovenia (and 
Hungary) applied the former, and the above mentioned WB coun-
tries the second. Slovenia gradually implemented the reforms, re-
tained more elements of the old system and cautiously opened and 
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liberalized itself from the outside (Mencinger, 2002). Other coun-
tries practiced “shock” or rapid transition. At the core of this con-
cept is the so-called. Washington Consensus, the embodiment of 
the essence of neoliberal capitalist development (Bukvic, 2011). 
Thus, the dominant influence of the international financial institu-
tions that imposed it on the indebted Balkan countries was real-
ized. With all the danger of a simplified interpretation of the Wash-
ington Consensus, the following processes can be cited: rapid and 
universal privatization, liberalization of foreign trade and reduction 
of customs duties, and withdrawal of the state (deregulation) from 
the economy and the most important spheres of society. For politi-
cally deprived and economically impoverished countries of the WB, 
this has proven to be a pernicious model.
However, the views of researchers and others on the success 
of the transition of WB countries are different. As a rule, interna-
tional creditors consider it necessary, not fast enough, relatively 
successful, and most WB citizens are disappointed with the inci-
dence of mass poverty and unemployment (Sadiku, 2013; Šućur, 
2006: 237). There are other indicators of transition, such as the 
growth of public debt, the demographic breakdown of their societ-
ies, and the economic and other dependence of citizens and soci-
ety on foreign factors. Unfortunately, the lower classes and strata 
appeared, unjustifiably, and in recent times encouraged by new op-
portunities, ie. community life that threatens the security of em-
ployment, treatment, education and, in general, the safety of the 
individual and his or her family. The capitalist class and parts of the 
middle classes consider it successful, not slow enough, and would 
prefer, on behalf of European values  and at any cost, sometimes 
brutally to protect their interests by law. In practice, this is often 
far from the rule of law, which, among other things, implies the 
equality of all before the law. The EU institutions’ assessments of 
the reforms in the WB are particularly negative in the area of  the 
rule of law.
Unlike the mentioned countries, Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina had a civil war during the first five years of transition. BiH 
is still under international protectorate and is far from EU member-
ship. Serbia and Montenegro officially split in 2006. In the first de-
cade of transition, Serbia had UN sanctions and war events in its 
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territory, especially in 1999. Strategic decisions on how to move so-
ciety played the largest role in the ruling classes and their elites, 
which were intimately linked to international centers of economic, 
military and political power. It also defined the concept of transi-
tion of society as a whole.
Corruption as an indicator of the absence of the rule of law
Ever since Welstaff Peace and Sovereignty of States, the 
rule of law and developed rule of law have been achievements 
that characterize developed societies and one of the most import-
ant conditions to be fulfilled by countries seeking to join the EU 
(Maksimovic, Petrovic, 2017: 216). Looking at the transition and 
privatization flows in WB companies, it can be concluded that they 
have not yet reached this level of development. This is evidenced 
by numerous examples of violations of existing laws, the absence 
of institutions that protect the interests of all citizens, or the fre-
quent pressures and influences of the executive on the legislative 
and judicial branches. Building a rule of law in developed capitalist 
societies has been a long-term and decades-long process. In this, 
they are prevented not only by the historical, political and cultural 
heritage, but also by the relation of the basic classes in society. 
There was no social consensus among them about the form, pace 
and goals of society’s transition, or even the rule of law. The soci-
ety was changing rapidly, and the issues of reform and relations 
between the executive, judicial and legislative branches were de-
layed and slowly resolved. At the core of this are different class in-
terests, to which external pressure from EU institutions could ac-
celerate these processes. While the processes of the so-called the 
initial accumulation of capital and the creation of a new capitalist 
class were of no interest in passing firm and clear legislation that 
would treat all citizens equally. Advocates for such legislation, for 
example, come after the end of privatization and transition. The 
goal of the capitalist class is to protect acquired capital and 
wealth. By then, civic and business morale had already been seri-
ously impaired, and corruption had become widespread and al-
most systemic.
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According to Slobodan Vukovic, corruption is “a forced mar-
ket transaction in which, by violating the principle of impartiality, 
the unlawful use of social position and power for the sake of self, 
family and group power comes to the full” (Vuković, 2003: 10). It 
has become a widespread and common occurrence in Serbia. In our 
society, but also in the environment, it is present in almost all areas 
of society. Due to the underdeveloped rule of law, it was further 
encouraged. Studies on privatization have shown that state institu-
tions are susceptible to corruption, as well as to breaking the law 
(Maksimovic, 2013). They did this before, during and after the pri-
vatization of enterprises and institutions. Control by international 
institutions was absent or delayed and was detrimental to the in-
terests of workers (in assessing the value of the company, con-
trolling the implementation of the sales contract, disbursement of 
funds for the social program, continuation of production) (Nova-
kovic, 2013). Opinion polls show that citizens are among the most 
corrupt in labeling health, public administration, education, the ju-
diciary and healthcare. Healthcare bribe legalized in Serbia (Jer-
emic, 2019). Confidence in these systems is low and information 
from the media confirms that corruption is widespread in other so-
cieties in the region.
The poor legal order of society is also evidenced by the nu-
merous procedures initiated by citizens before international insti-
tutions and courts. Even court judgments in favor of citizens can-
not be enforced because they are the responsibility of the 
domestic authorities. On the other hand, a number of system laws 
have been adopted, which are formally in line with European stan-
dards, but are rarely rarely implemented or interpreted differently. 
The practice of passing such laws quickly, by urgent procedure and 
without a public hearing, has also become anomalous. Weak and 
conflicting unions and citizens’ representatives are powerless to 
withstand it. This was extensively reported by the media in the re-
form of labor and social legislation (labor law, pension system law). 
Failure to follow the legal procedure is just one example of the ab-
sence of the rule of law. Much more severe are the cases and the 
influence of the executive on the judicial authorities, when dis-
putes are delayed for years or end to the detriment of the citizens 
who initiated them. The deeper causes of such phenomena are the 
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“reforms” of the judiciary and the judiciary, carried out to the tune 
of the ruling or dominant coalition parties in power. The rule of law 
would benefit all citizens. Public and public administration would 
be more efficient, cheaper and more responsible. Each individual 
would be protected in the same way by the law and before the 
courts. Confidence in these institutions would increase, and the 
need for myth and corruption would be reduced to a tolerable 
measure. WB companies are still far from it, ie. the rule of law and 
the developed rule of law.
Privatization of social / state property
The privatization of social / state ownership of the means of 
production is simplified in the division between winners (new 
elites, owners of capital) and losers (working class, recipients of so-
cial assistance). Fundamentally, property relations are paramount 
to the character of the economic and social system, and any funda-
mental change in that essentially means a change in the nature of 
society. It depends on the character of the class in power and the 
place of subordinate classes and classes in the social division of la-
bor and in the creation and distribution of social power. During the 
transition, property relations were changing, and with them the 
class structure of society. Before the transition began, the views of 
Serbian citizens were divided between the western, market econo-
my and the self-governing Yugoslav economy. For the former, al-
most half of the respondents were 49.6% and for the latter 47%. 
This attitude was expressed by two-thirds of political and economic 
leaders (Mrksic, 1990: 14). Of course, at the beginning of the transi-
tion, the essence of privatization was not openly discussed, and so 
often the emergence of capitalist social relations was masked by 
the euphemism of “open society”, “entrepreneurial society” (Bolčić, 
1994). Privatization was practically completed in WB companies, 
and a new class structure was consolidated. “In short, some of the 
pipes of privatization are declaratively prominent, and in reality 
they have been achieved quite differently. The end result was the 
creation of a new capitalist class. The working class is systematical-
ly and permanently dispossessed, crushed, thrown into the poverty 
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zone and into the margins of society ” (Novakovic, 2017: 135). The 
ruling class and dominant political parties rarely publicly acknowl-
edge that there are relations between working class exploitation, 
the dominance of the interests of owners and representatives of 
capital, and the emergence of a new owner of capital-state. She is 
still the largest employer in these societies, but also the legislator. 
The interests of capital, including the state, are woven into both 
the concept of privatization and the basic systemic laws (on labor, 
employment, companies, for example). This is a characteristic of all 
WB countries. They are often brought under pressure from centers 
of financial power, on the pretext that it is in the name of Eurointe-
gration (IMF, World Bank, WTO). There was no serious and greater 
resistance from the citizens. They did not follow the experiences of 
the citizens of Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, for example regard-
ing liberalization, rapid privatization and borrowing from the IMF. 
Light borrowing and poor investment in development have 
brought most ZB companies into a group that is indebted and in-
creasingly dependent on global power centers.
Privatization in the former republics of Yugoslavia was con-
ducted from the change of laws, federal and individual republics, 
to the change of ownership of the means of production, and then 
it was regulated by new and often amended laws (Novakovic, 2017: 
103-107; Lojpur, 2018; Horvat, 2002; Čengić, 2000; Čučković, 2000). 
The result of the overall changes is that a market economy domi-
nated by the private sector has been created. The tertiary or 
growth of the services sector has also been carried out, with the 
secondary sector experiencing the greatest changes. Namely, be-
fore the transition he dominated, both in the creation of the GDB 
and in the overall employment. After the privatization, there was a 
massive de-industrialization, the disappearance of large develop-
ment companies and large industrial cities. The working class is 
therefore disintegrated. The massive job loss has further increased 
officially registered unemployment. “In a nutshell, deindustrializa-
tion led to the decay of most of the working class, as workers were 
left without jobs. Poverty, mass unemployment, greater exploita-
tion and social inequalities have arrived ”(Novakovic, 2016: 750). 
This is only partially mitigated by activities in the illegal or gray 
economy, which is relatively high in the Balkans after 2008 and is 
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persistently represented (Vujović et al, 2013). One of the import-
ant roles of the informal economy is the amelioration of social ten-
sions, greater social conflicts and the ability of the poorest citizens 
to mitigate their low material standard of living. Every country that 
joined the EU had to reduce this area to a tolerable level and re-
strict it by law.
Rapid privatization has created an economy in which most of 
the companies are privately owned, in which there is little and no 
legal restriction on monopolies, and foreign investors are favored 
over domestic ones. This is especially characteristic of Serbia. In ad-
dition to the sale of socially-owned enterprises, sales of public-
ly-owned enterprises, which are important for the quality of life of 
other citizens, have also come into play. In the final stage of privat-
ization, national resources (water sources, mines, etc.) were also 
sold, which seemingly additionally leads to the creation of a subsid-
iary. Privatization funds went mostly to the state budget and then 
to spending, not investment for job creation. State institutions that 
led and controlled privatization at the WB, such as agencies, were 
strongly influenced by the executive and foreign institutions (Be-
govic, 2005: 224; Obradovic, 2005: 534). The legal restrictions on 
their operation were relatively weak, which went to the detriment 
of employees of privatized companies. This is especially character-
istic in the final stages of privatization.
The goals and results of privatization at the WB are not sig-
nificantly different. In these countries, there is a lack of a single hu-
man resource management model. The fact is that transition coun-
tries and their economies have moved from a central 
administrative system to reforming countries with basic market 
principles. Realistically, it was also a way of transforming large and 
outdated industrial sectors (Maksimovic, 2004: 140). A market 
economy has been created, in which there are monopolies, unfair 
competition, state interventionism for the benefit of the capital-
ists, and it is far more developed than the EU. No new jobs have 
been created to alleviate high unemployment and stimulate eco-
nomic development. The proceeds from privatization are very 
small, sometimes below the level of annual remittances of citizens 
from abroad. There was also a lack of investment in innovation, re-
search and education in general. WB countries invest little in inno-
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vation, which indirectly contributes to the low competitiveness of 
the economy relative to others. (Krstic et al. 2016: 1035). The new 
private sector is fragmented, not sufficiently independent of the 
state, without the ability to accelerate faster development of the 
economy and society. Government subsidies are most often target-
ed at privileged domestic entrepreneurs and foreign multination-
als. A consequence of the neoliberal concept of transition is the ab-
sence of an independent economic and monetary policy. 
Democracy is not yet consolidated, and for it the presumption is 
the existence of a state (Linz et al. 1998: 35). This is increasingly be-
ing pointed out by EU representatives.
 The new capitalist class  
and the introduction of parliamentarism 
The new capitalist class in countries in transition is by its ori-
gin, education and the power of heterogeneous composition. It 
arose largely from the nomenclature (economic, military, intellec-
tual) of the former ruling and sole parties. Other sources of emer-
gence are the remnants of the former civic class, followed by pri-
vate and private sector entrepreneurs, people who made a fortune 
through the privatization process, but unfortunately war profiteers 
and speculators (Bolcic, 2006: 42; Bolcic, 2008: 82; Obradović, 
2017: 90; Novaković 2006: 129-152; Lazić 2014: 69-98; Sekulic et al, 
2000: 1; Cengic, 2000). Their primary interest is the creation and 
appropriation of profits, as quickly as possible enrichment and its 
legal protection. Opposite this capitalist class was the mass of la-
bor, dispossessed of means of production, peasantry, and middle 
classes. Their material and overall social position is significantly dif-
ferent, and conflicts between and within them are open and co-
vert, of lesser or greater intensity, depending on specific social and 
political circumstances. It is also a means of controlling the citizens 
who are the biggest losers in the transition, and who often vote in 
political elections for the parties who encourage it.
Changes in the political system boil down to the introduc-
tion of parliamentarism, in which the proportional system of elec-
tions is dominant (Djukanovic, 2006: 529). Political parties are 
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
95
weakly socially entrenched and the state “weak” (Stojiljković, 2013: 
135). The findings of relevant research in this area lead to the con-
clusion that it is a weak democracy and an unstable system, in 
which political corruption is also present (Goati, 2016: 4-10; Stojil-
jković, 2013: 135). This is far from the set ideal and goal of the par-
liamentary system in developed EU societies. Indirect evidence is 
the occasional public outcry of citizens in the WB (some examples 
are BiH 2014, Albania 2018, Macedonia 2017 and 2018). Citizens 
have little confidence in the ruling elites. They are disappointed 
with their actions, political and civil liberties achieved, and especial-
ly the quality of life achieved. This can be a factor in the coming to 
power of parties that are against regional and wider integration of 
society, or an important brake on those who are able to get in and 
out more quickly and effectively in EU. Therefore, the incentives 
that the EU encourages economic and other societal reforms are 
important as a prerequisite for joining this community.
Poverty, economic and social inequalities
 Economic and social inequalities and poverty have become 
limiting factors in regional and European integration. The achieved 
level of development of WB countries during the transition is evi-
denced by inequalities in wages, distribution of total income, pov-
erty of citizens, as well as data on GDP growth, share of industry in 
its creation, amount of investments, indebtedness abroad, open 
and hidden unemployment and demographic structure of the pop-
ulation. GDP growth was slowed down at the beginning of the 
transition, ie. in the tenth decade of the twentieth century because 
of the so-called transition recessions (Marjanovic et al, 2019: 52-
56). The more successful countries outperformed it faster, while 
Serbia only began to recover after 2000. Of all WB countries, this 
recovery was the slowest in it (Begović, et al, 2005: 41 - 46). The 
2008 world economic crisis has further hampered the development 
of these societies. Unemployment in the region was high due to 
the completion of privatization, and in 2008 it increased further. 
Changes in the labor market should be such as to accompany the 
creation of occupations in line with market needs. Thus, investing 
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in on-the-job training is the greatest competitiveness and opportu-
nity for innovation. Modern societies are based on the “knowledge 
economy” (Maksimović, 2014: 167). Furthermore, the debts of the 
citizens and the state increased, so that the former republics of Yu-
goslavia had long exceeded the public debt of the country before 
its dissolution. Inequality in the distribution of income and in the 
size and patterns of household consumption has increased rapidly 
and strongly. The Gini coefficient has increased in all WB countries 
(Arandarenko et al, 2017). The income inequality measured by this 
coefficient has grown the fastest in Serbia. Layering has taken on a 
large scale, a relatively small elite of 5-10% of the richest citizens 
stands out, and the majority of the population is poor (Lazić, Cvejić, 
2014). In that sense, the situation in Macedonia and BiH is some-
what worse.
 Relatively low population activity and employment charac-
terize WB countries. It is far from the EU average. Mass unemploy-
ment is structural and is only partly mitigated by the mass depar-
ture of citizens from outside the country. In particular, there is a 
high unemployment rate for young people and those seeking long-
term employment. The problem of low activity of older working 
age persons is becoming more and more pronounced, which is be-
hind the EU member states (Eurostat, Unemployement statistics). 
Finally, each WB country has its own specificities, regional, political, 
cultural, religious and confessional particularities. They are often 
the cause of social tensions and conflicts, which is a disruptive fac-
tor in the development of both regional and wider integrations of 
society.
 Poverty in WB societies has become structural, as a normal 
and logical consequence of the emergence and functioning of capi-
talism (Wallerstein, 2016). One of the most important causes of 
poverty growth was the clumsily implemented privatization of so-
cial / state property. The second, no doubt, is an attempt to quickly 
realize the neoliberal concept of society transition. The third con-
cerns inherited problems, and only in the fourth place are the im-
pacts of the global economic crisis. The situation of poor citizens, 
for example, has not improved much during the transition of Serbia 
in the last ten years. Official statistics also testify to this (Mlade-
novic, 2017: 12-13). Many of them lost their jobs during privatiza-
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tion, or could not find regular employment for years. Otherwise, in 
times of economic growth and prosperity, the interests of the em-
ployer, employees and governments differ, and this is especially 
pronounced in times of crisis (Maksimović, 2014: 166). A significant 
category of “new poor” were also employed workers who did not 
receive rent or were occasional and insufficient for a decent life. 
They are often voters for political parties that use populist rhetoric 
(xenophobia, nationalism), and which is often directed against the 
European integration of society. This further slows down the stabi-
lization of the democratic order while fostering internal and exter-
nal tensions and social conflicts.
Instead of a conclusion 
The paper outlines the most important processes occurring 
in the EU and the WB. They highlighted current problems in the 
functioning of the EU and new initiatives in this regard. The EU has a 
special place in the changed world of political, economic and mili-
tary circumstances. New opportunities for EU functioning and its 
potential to encourage other countries to join it were also highlight-
ed. First and foremost, these are the Western Balkan countries.
The term Western Balkans came into being on specific social 
and historical occasions after the Balkan wars. It was later used less 
often to bring the wars back to political and other public attention 
with the wars during the breakup of the SFRY in the 1990s. Its es-
sence is to strengthen the nationalist and separatist movements, 
which led to the dissolution of the larger social and state communi-
ty. The breakup was not peaceful but through war conflicts, mass 
destruction and material and human loss. Subsequently, small, not 
sufficiently independent states emerged, highly conflict-ridden, 
burdened with the same problems, without greater potential to 
tolerate others, especially those with which wars were waged. The 
burden of the “past” bothers them to accelerate economic and so-
cial development in general, making it difficult for them to inte-
grate into the regional and wider environment.
The Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia) have so far completed 
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the transition of society. They also ended the privatization of social 
/ state property over the means of production. Each of them had 
specific problems, which through the transition were solved or 
complicated (debts, unemployment, inequalities). They all accept-
ed the neoliberal concept of transition (Serbia after 2000), and the 
results are similar. This is exemplified in building a market econo-
my, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A capitalist class 
was created, linked to the global capitalist class and the world cen-
ters of economic, political and military power. The once nominally 
ruling working class was set apart. At the forefront is the interests 
of the capitalist class, which defends itself by all means, from law, 
corruption and bribery to open social conflicts and war events. Pri-
vatization was the material basis of this. The concept of transition 
and privatization were adopted under the pressure and control of 
foreign institutions. Its implementation has led to rapid and wide-
spread privatization of enterprises, massive job losses, reduced 
rents and socio-economic rights of employees, increased official 
unemployment, poverty, the informal economy, and a deteriora-
tion of the morale of individuals and social groups. Fragmentation 
and inequalities in the position of employees and other citizens in-
tensified during the transition of society. They have also become 
obstacles to the further progress of society, which through the 
transition has been de-industrialized, economically declining and fi-
nancially indebted. Inequalities in citizens’ political power are even 
greater than in the EU and in the pre-transition period.
The regional cooperation of the Western Balkan countries is 
a necessary prerequisite for their progress and integration into the 
EU. The changes taking place in the EU will largely determine the 
pace, manner, conditions and time of integration of these societies 
into the EU community of countries.
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Neoliberalism, Inequalities and Social 
Movements in the European Union1
Abstract
The paper discusses the growing literature on the interrelations 
between neoliberal policy and rising inequalities in the Europe-
an Union, and their impact to the growing social movements.  
The analysis shows that inequalities within the EU member sta-
tes and between them are the results of the current EU policy 
due to fostering marketization, trade liberalization, privatizati-
on and financialization at the expense of social, economic and 
political rights of the majority. This trend has induced social mo-
vements to campaign and advocate for social changes. These ci-
vil society networks share same position in demanding transfor-
mation of the current ‘market Europe’ into ‘social Europe’. Their 
proposals to counter economic difficulties are based on intro-
ducing transformative economies that ‘works for people’. They 
advocate for alternative economic models, prioritizing socioe-
conomic justice, gender justice, tax justice, food justice and en-
vironmental justice. Thus, their position is far from populist ‘ra-
dical right’. The analysis also shows that these social movement 
networks may constitute corrective to democracy.
Keywords: neoliberal policy, European inequalities, social Euro-
pe, social justice, European social  movements
Introduction
 On 17 November 2019, it was two years that the European 
Pillar of Social Rights was proclaimed by EU institutions and 
leaders in Gothenburg, Sweden (European Commission, 2019, 
15 November). Delivering on the Pillar was a shared political 
1   This work was supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Tech-
nological Development of the Republic of Serbia [projects number 179023 
and 47010]. The projects were implemented by the Institute of Social Sci-
ences, Belgrade. 
D
okm
anović / C
vetićanin
106
commitment reiterated by EU Heads of State and Government 
in their New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024. In her political guide-
lines, the new Commission President-elect Ursula von den Ley-
en committed to putting forward an action plan to fully imple-
ment the European Pillar on Social Rights as a part of the 
broader initiatives for an economy that works for the people. 
The 2019 European Semester focuses on the three areas of the 
Pillar: equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair 
working conditions, and social protection and inclusion. In its 
resolution of 16 November 20172, the European Parliament 
considered combating inequalities as a lever to boost job cre-
ation and growth and affirmed that inequalities threaten the 
future of the European project and can damage trust the EU as 
an engine of social progress. In response to the demands of 
leftist parties, trade unions and social movements, the discus-
sion on the social dimension of Europe became the part of the 
broader debated around the Commission’s White Paper on the 
Future of Europe. The European Pillar of Social Rights has been 
proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Eu-
ropean Commission in 2017, at the Social Summit for Fair Jobs 
and Growth. 
On the other side, statistics and data report on rising in-
equalities within the member states and between them (Eu-
rostat, January 2019). The economic and social situation, and 
prospects for economic development are unequal. Several 
counties, mainly at the North, develop well, and other coun-
tries, mainly at the South, are countering economic difficulties, 
unemployment, debts and weak outlooks for economic and sta-
ble growth. In addition, the current trend of mass migration 
brings a lot of issues that the countries have to deal with. The 
Brexit has fuelled a wide debate about the future of the Euro-
pean Union. As a consequence of all these tendencies, a general 
sentiment of insecurity is shared by the people (Villain-Gandos-
si, 2017: 74). Recent years witness rising citizens’ discontent, 
Euroscepticism, the radical right and populism in many member 
2   European Parliament resolution resolution of 16 November 2017 on 
combating inequalities as a lever to boost job creation and growth 
(2016/2269(INI)) 
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states. The analysis of the result of the recent elections to the 
European Parliament in May 2019 indicates that large part of 
the vulnerable in society, those who have strong concerns 
about relative deprivation, and feel uncomfortable about the 
erosion of the welfare state and increased inequality, “are cast-
ing their votes in favour of Populist on the left (with their eco-
nomic perspective) and in particular on the right (with their 
more socio-cultural perspective” (Jun, 2019: 55). The causes of 
the rising Euroscepticism, populism and the radical right may be 
found in increasing discontent of the many with the EU policies, 
which also fuels social mobilization in the rise in different coun-
tries. 
This paper examines two hypotheses. The first one is that 
the increasing inequalities in the European Union, caused by the 
prevailing neoliberal policy, contributed to the growth of social 
movements across Europe. The second hypothesis examined is 
that these social movements, fuelled by the rising discontent of 
citizens, contributed to increasing Euroscepticism and the radi-
cal right. The applied methodology is based on the desk re-
search, review of the collected data, statistics, surveys, research, 
literature and reports, and the qualitative analysis of the collect-
ed information. In this paper, neoliberalism is considered as a 
state strategy / policy, in order to distinguish this term as an ide-
ology and as a process. The objective of this paper is to point 
out the main findings of the analysis.
European inequalities
Over the last decade, inequality within member states has 
become much researched issue (Dauderstäd, 2017, 17 May). Its 
reducing is a target the European Union has set itself in its trea-
ties and monitors through its cohesion reports (European Com-
mission). In 2017, median equivalized net income varied consid-
erably across the EU member states, ranging from purchasing 
power standards (PPS) 5.239 in Romania to PPS 28.820 in Lux-
embourg. The EU-28 average was PPS 16.748 (Eurostat, January 
2019). Median equivalized net income fell, in real terms, in 2 out 
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of the 28 EU member states in 2017 — they were Sweden and 
Belgium. 
Official statistics show that no substantial worsening 
have been observed; however, this applies only to relative in-
equality, which indicates the income of richer people, regions 
and countries as a multiple of that of poorer ones (Dauderstädt 
& Keltek, 2017). In their comprehensive study on inequality in 
Europe, Dauderstädt & Keltek (2017: 2) have concluded that it 
was relatively stable, and absolutely alarming: “If one looks at 
the absolute differences between the higher and the lowest in-
comes, an alarming increase in inequality is to be observed in 
Europe”. This increasing trend of the European inequality is the 
result of changes in income distribution within and between 
the countries; inequality between member states is higher than 
inequality within them (Dauderstädt and Keltek, 2017: 3). Even 
in traditionally egalitarian countries – such as Germany, Den-
mark and Sweden – the income gap between rich and poor is 
expanding – from 5 to 1 in the 1980s to 6 to 1 today (OECD, 
2011: 1). Dauderstädt (2017, 19 April) further explains that Eu-
ropean inequality has not two, but three dimensions: within 
member states, between member states, and in the European 
Union altogether. 
Statistics on living conditions show growing income in-
equality. Across all 28 EU Member States, the top 20 % of the 
population with the highest national net disposable incomes 
(the top quintile) accounted for at least one third of total in-
come, a share that rose highest to 46.0 % in Bulgaria in 2017. 
By contrast, the bottom 20 % of the population with the lowest 
incomes together accounted for less than one tenth of all in-
come, except in Czechia (10.3 %) and Finland (10.0 %). Luxem-
bourg recorded the biggest fall in income share (-1.4 %) (Eu-
rostat, January 2019). Statistics indicate that social transfers, 
the main instrument for the realization of welfare policies, 
played a major role by helping to reduce income inequalities. In 
2017, social transfers reduced income inequality among the EU-
28 population: the Gini coefficient for income (including pen-
sions) was 51.7 % before social transfers and fell to 30.7 % af-
ter taking account of these transfers (Eurostat, January 2019). 
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The impact of pensions and other social transfers on income in-
equality was particularly large in Portugal, Greece, Germany and 
Sweden.
The comprehensive study of Blanchet, Chancel and Geth-
in (2019: 58)  also shows that as a result of a limited conver-
gence process and rising inequality within countries, Europeans 
are more unequal today than four decades ago. Between 1980 
and 2017, per adult average annual pre-tax income growth was 
below 1% for bottom 50% earners, while the top 0.1% grew at a 
rate higher than 2% per year. The top 1% captured about as 
much growth as the bottom 50% of the population. 
Social networks (ATTAC) claim that the European ‘debt’ 
crisis is basically not the result of government spendthrifts, inef-
ficient bureaucracy or whatever else is produced as an explana-
tion but is the result of an extreme disparity of existing wealth, 
and of a system that continuously intensifies these disparities. 
While public indebtedness is increasing, the private wealth con-
tinues to grow in value.
The figures indicate that private wealth grows faster than 
workers’ income. According to the data of the European ATTAC 
Network (2013, 22 March), in 2011 the private wealth in the Eu-
ropean Union amounted to 69.5 trillion euros. The private 
wealth is highly concentrated. The richest 1% of European soci-
ety hold more than 30% of it, while the poorer half of the soci-
ety has more or less nothing. Almost 142 million Europeans (out 
of around 500 million) are at risk of poverty (Dauderstädt, 2019, 
15 January). National poverty rates vary between over 25% in 
Romania and less than 10% in the Czech Republic. The official 
Eurostat figure for the EU as a whole is 17.3%. However, if a 
proper poverty threshold is calculated, the figure comes out sig-
nificantly higher, at 28.2 %. 
Intra-country inequality is increased by welfare cuts, la-
bour market deregulation and globalization. Inter-country in-
equality is rooted in complex causes with historical, social, po-
litical and economic dimensions. And inter-country inequality is 
higher than inequality within them. Compared at exchange 
rates, the average per capita income of the richest countries is 
10 times as high as in the poorest. And even more dramatic pic-
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ture of absolute inequality emerges if ones compares the aver-
age per capita income of the richest national quintile and the 
poorest national quintile. As data indicates, the richest nation-
al quintile is that of Luxembourg, with an annual income of al-
most 74.000 euros at exchange rates. The poorest quintile is 
that of Romania with an annual income of only 685 euros. The 
ration is more than 1 to 100 at exchange rates. Probably the 
most important consequence is the high emigration from the 
poorer EU member states to the richer ones. Countries such as 
Romania, Lithuania and Latvia have lost about 10 % of their 
population. In the receiving countries, immigration has bol-
stered national- populist tendencies. Many researchers warn 
that the dynamics of inequality gives little prospect of reduc-
ing absolute inequality in the future. The recent drop in Eu-
rope’s poverty and inequality rates is a welcome break from 
the stagnation of the preceding years. But, given the vast scale 
of the problem, which is underestimated in official figures, 
Dauderstädt and Keltek (2018: 4) estimates that it represents 
far too small a step in the right direction, and that “more deci-
sive policies will be needed if the disintegration of Europe is to 
be prevented”.
Inequality is particularly present in the peasant agricul-
ture. In agricultural work small farmers are the majority. Only 
2.7% of the total farms are large ones of more than 100 ha. 
They control 50% of the total agricultural land in the European 
Union, but Eurostat data show that they produce only 11% of 
total agricultural outputs. The remaining half amount of land is 
shared among 97% of farmers (almost 12 million farms) (Euro-
pean Coordination Via Campesina, 2017, 19 July). Data show in-
equality regarding the distribution of the aid, as the main bene-
ficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are large 
farms and big agrobusinesses. About 80% of the CAP aid goes 
to about 20% of EU farmers, those with the largest holdings 
(European Coordination Via Campesina, 2017, 19 July). As a 
consequence, small farmers’ income decreases, and one third 
of small farms have disappeared in the last decade because un-
able to survive. Meanwhile, land in the hands of large farms is 
increasing. Rural waged workers, women, migrants and youth 
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are among the most negatively affected by current adverse ag-
ricultural policies. 
The comprehensive study published in 2013 (Franco and 
Borras, 2013) shows that Europe is experiencing tremendous 
and rapid land concentration, adversely affecting the livelihoods 
of millions of small-scale farmers and agricultural workers. 
Against these trends and in favour of alternatives, cross-class 
people’s movement is growing. On the basis of the case studies 
in the Member States, the authors of the study conclude that 
there is a need for an agrarian reform in Europe, as well as to re-
vise and reform the CAP due to the role it plays in fostering land 
concentration and an unsustainable agricultural model (Franco 
and Borras, 2013: 233). Civil society calls for real alternatives to 
the current model based on sustainable production of food 
through peasant agriculture, equitable access to land, with a 
particular focus on marginalised groups, and the sustainable use 
of natural resources. 
The researchers for the EU-funded GINI project also say 
that growing inequality in Europe is a problem (European Com-
mission, 2014, 2 June). The researchers have also found that in 
countries with higher income inequality, the poor tend to be 
less politically involved – meaning their interests are not well 
represented in democratic decision making. “The research 
shows that the best performers among rich countries in terms 
of employment, economic and social cohesion have in common 
a large welfare state that invests in people,” says GINI project 
coordinator Wiemer Salverda (European Commission, 2014, 2 
June). On the other hand, increasing income for a few and 
greater concentration of wealth in their hands means more po-
litical influence for the rich. This is a danger to democracy and a 
major concern. The conclusion of the GINI project is that as in-
equality increases, political participation tends to fall among 
those who are at the bottom in terms of earnings, while the rich 
tend to have a bigger influence on policy. 
Despite the number of projects and papers relevant to di-
versifying inequality (European Commission), and despite eco-
nomic recovery and decreasing unemployment, this issue is still 
at stake. At the thematic plenary debate in the European Parlia-
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ment about socio-economic inequalities on 6 February 2018, it 
was highlighted that “clearly, the neoliberal myth of trick-
le-down economics is not going to sort out the situation, […] 
The growing gap between the rich and the poor is undermining 
the social and democratic fabric of our societies. It is high time 
to act now” (EAPN, 2018, 7 February).
Neoliberal policy and the European Union
Many scholars (Milanovic, 2016; Milanovic, 2017, 1 De-
cember; Varoufakis, 2016; Dauderstädt and Keltek, 2017; Don-
ald & Martens, 2018) argue that the accelerated accumulation of 
private assets and the associated rise in wealth inequality is a 
major determinant of the global and EU crisis, and it is also con-
tinuing in the midst of the crisis. 
The inequalities accelerated aftermath the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis in 2008. Social movements and net-
works (ATTAC, 2013, 22 March) indicate that it is completely un-
acceptable for the costs of the crisis to be imposed mainly on 
those who had nothing to do with creating it. While banks are 
being saved with trillions of euros, and private wealth remains 
untouched, large sections of the population are confronted with 
massive decreases of living standards. The policy of cuts and 
austerities makes matters even worse. ATTAC warned that no-
body ever succeeded in getting out of a debt crisis by cutting 
spending. It will not work this time, either, since the spending 
cuts are causing a deep recession and intensifying the crisis. The 
economies of Portugal and Spain have both shrunk by 6.5% 
since 2007. The Greek economy has shrunk by more than 20%, 
and the outlook is even worse. The study on the national re-
sponses to the financial crisis in 2008 in the Central European 
Countries (Dokmanovic, 2017: 89) shows that they were “fo-
cused on saving the banking system and the big capital, socializ-
ing the risks for the wealthy, while privatizing the risks for the 
majority”. 
The trend of increasing inequalities has not emerged acci-
dentally, ‘but is the result of deliberately policy choices’ (Donald 
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& Martens, 2018: 41). The policy choices that have produced 
these inequalities in the EU are the same that have produced 
emerging inequalities at the global scale; namely, market con-
centration, corporate concentration, and financial capital con-
centration. Moreover, these choices have been rooted in and 
bolstered by the prevailing neoliberal policy. 
The key pillars of the neoliberal agenda are free trade and 
free unrestricted capital mobility, monetary restraint, and bud-
getary austerity; the ‘flexibilization’ of labour markets, the free 
movement of labour and the repression of wage demands; the 
privatization of public companies and services, as well as the re-
structuring of welfare states. These principles have been quite 
central to the idea of the European Union. The major policy is-
sues, such as the Single Market Strategy, European competition 
policy, Economic and Monetary Integration, and even the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy, have enhanced free trade and free 
capital mobility, monetary restraint and budgetary austerity, the 
flexibilization of labour markets, and the erosion of employment 
security. 
In his paper “Neoliberalism in the European Union”, Her-
mann (2007) demonstrates that the European integration pro-
cess was used to adopt mainstream neoliberal policies. The 
Schuman Plan and the foundation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) were initially inspired by the notion of 
coordination and cooperation, rather than market-mediated 
competition. The EU has been created by the interest of the big 
businesses, and in fact, it is still managed by the interest of the 
big businesses. The Treaty of Rome created an institutional 
framework and laid the foundation for the establishment of the 
Single European Market and the adoption of the Single Europe-
an Act in 1986. The single European market was a response to 
the economic crisis after national therapies had largely failed. 
The unification of European markets was a demand from the Eu-
ropean Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) — an organization 
that assembles and represents Europe’s most powerful corpora-
tions. The common market has thus become a neoliberal market 
characterized by weak regulations or even deregulation. With 
the weakening of national regulations, barriers to entry for 
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non-European corporations were also minimized. Since 1990, ‘in-
dividual EU member states have unilaterally abolished over six-
ty-three hundred quantitative restrictions against imports from 
third countries’ (Hanson, according Hermann, 2007: 72).   
Hermann explains that the creation of the Single Market 
advanced intra-European competition, which, according to liber-
alization advocates, would strengthen European businesses and 
benefit consumers, because monopolistic firms or oligopolistic 
cartels can no longer use their economic dominance to distort 
market pricing. In the period of good time, until the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the wealth and the profit have been distributed less 
or more on the fairer basis, securing social welfare for the ma-
jority. However, the costs of the 2008 crisis have been imposed 
on the majority. The implemented policies delivered austerity 
for many and socialism for the few. 
 Besides, the most important factor in driving the con-
centration of wealth has been the adoption of more regressive 
tax policies, with increased reliance on indirect taxes, declining 
corporate and personal income rates on the highest earners. 
Meanwhile, expenditures on public services and social protec-
tion have been cut back. These policies have always fallen dis-
proportionately on those who can least afford to pay. The gen-
der impact of the austerity measures is well-documented 
(Karamessini & Rubery, 2014; Durbin, Page & Walby, 2017; Con-
ley, 2012; Dokmanovic, 2017: 81-88; Dokmanovic, 2017a: 48-57). 
The liberalization of public services gained momentum in 
the early 1990s, demanding the liberalization of telecommunica-
tions, electricity, postal services and gas. The EU Member States 
have created large public sectors in the post-war years to 
achieve a broader influence in the economy beyond monetary 
and tax policies (Hermann, 2007: 74). The expansion of public 
services played a special role in the post-war expansion of Euro-
pean welfare states. It created not only employment opportuni-
ties for women, but also aided them to combine paid work with 
care duties and family responsibilities. 
There was a fundamental belief running through all these 
provisions that the liberalisation of these sectors will create 
competition, and that that would benefit consumers. However, 
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it showed that this consumer-oriented action presented a lucra-
tive business opportunity for private capital. Whereas the EU 
countries previously had publicly owned monopolies, now they 
have “politically created multinational private oligopolies.” (Hall, 
according Hermann, 2007: 76).
The employment has become a major policy issue with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. The first set of employment policies 
adopted in 1997 specified employability, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability, and equal opportunity as the four main pillars of 
the European employment strategy. It now constitutes the part 
of the Europe 2020 Growth Strategy. While the European Em-
ployment Strategy is of great importance to maintain sufficient 
support for market and monetary integration, job outcomes 
have been moderate at best. Employment guidelines have been 
used to decrease employment protection and standards, and to 
flexibilize labour markets and labour regulation (Hermann, 2007: 
83). The integration process allowed policymakers, backed by 
the leading players of European capital, to erode the social 
rights that were achieved in the post-war decades. The integra-
tion has given the priority to competition and monetary issues 
at the expense of social demands. The structural imbalance has 
been created, which gives priority to economic over social and 
other issues. 
Macartney (2011) in his book Variegated Neoliberalism de-
mystifies the process of neoliberalisation focusing on the Euro-
pean case study and on EU financial market integration in the 
post-2000 era. He noticed that that period witnessed a new de-
gree of impetus in neoliberal reform, with over forty directives 
aimed at integrating financial markets, as it is based on a fi-
nance-led mode of accumulation. Macartney explains the EU in-
tegration as driven by capitalism’s accumulation imperative. The 
neoliberal shift which occurred after the financial crisis was an 
attempt to restore the class power of sections of the capitalist 
class over European working classes (Harvey, according Macart-
ney, 2011: 11). The neoliberal policy is based on economic 
growth as an ultimate goal. Economic development is measured 
by the level of the economic growth and the GDP, but monetary 
incomes do not constitute the wholeness of the human liveli-
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hood. The real purpose of economic development, improving 
the livelihoods of the people, is neglected. As a result, “in many 
countries, economic growth has not been translated into human 
development” (Dokmanovic, 2017a: 24). Under these circum-
stances, many are losing opportunity to participate in deci-
sion-making and to control their own space and resources, that 
contributes to rising economic, social and political insecurities 
(Op. cit., : 26).
Notwithstanding, in contrast to the widespread percep-
tion of European distinctiveness, Europe shares with other re-
gions of the world the same outcome where neoliberal restruc-
turing has been put into effect: “there has been a major 
redistribution of wealth from work contingent income to owner-
ship-contingent income” (Hermann, 2007: 86).
Despite extensive academic scholarship about the neolib-
eral nature of the process of the European integration, there is 
still a debate about the nature of the European neoliberalism. 
Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) do not assume that neoliberal inte-
gration has homogenization effects. They rather argue that neo-
liberalisation as a process has produced varieties of neoliberal-
ism across the European regions and not one hegemonic form 
of capitalism. On the other hand, Abrahamson (2010) argues 
that neoliberalism in the form of the so-called Washington con-
sensus is no longer promoted from the perspective of the late 
2000s, and that we are now beyond neoliberalism. This author 
considers that social policies are no longer regarded as a burden 
on economies, but rather as an investment in human capital.
Social Movements: Eurosceptics or Alter-Europeanists
Rising inequalities and decreasing the social welfare state 
have fuelled discontent of many citizens, as well as their fall of 
trust in the EU. Factors such as support for austerity and the mi-
gration issue have caused growing Euroscepticism, mistrust to-
wards the EU institutions, and thinking about alternative, visions 
of Europe “from below”. Due to the lack of space, this paper 
analysis the activities and policy demands solely those social 
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movements which are grass-rooted, have established network 
based on associated members in at least ten EU member states, 
have established institutional structure and are active in the de-
bate on the EU policies and future at regional and European lev-
el. Under these criteria, the following European networks atti-
tudes towards the European Union have been examined: 
ATTAC3, the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN)4, the So-
cial Platform5, the Tax Justice Europe6, the European Network 
on Debt and Development (Eurodad)7, the European Coordina-
3   ATTAC, the ‘Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et 
l’Aide aux Citoyens’ (Association for the Taxation of financial Transac-
tions and Aid to Citizens) was founded in France in December 1998 af-
ter the publication in the Monde Diplomatique of an editorial entitled 
‘Désarmer les marchés’ (Disarm the markets) that launched the notion 
of creating an association to promote the Tobin tax. The organization 
expanded rapidly into the Europe and the rest of the world with an 
ATTAC network that is today active in some 40 countries with numer-
ous local groups and organizations supporting the network. IN Europe, 
ATTAC network is active in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK. See: ATTAC, 
ATTAC in Europe, https://www.attac.org/en/attac-europe (accessed 20 
May 2019). 
4    The largest European network of national, regional and local networks, 
involving anti-poverty NGOs and grassroot groups as well as European 
organizations, active in the fight against poverty and social exclusion. It 
was established in 1990. EAPN has consultative status with the Council 
of Europe. https://www.eapn.eu (Accessed 19 May 2019).
5   The largest network of European rights- and value-based civil society orga-
nization’s working in the social sector. Its areas of focus include building So-
cial Europe and advocating for a comprehensive implementation approach 
to the European Pillar of Social Rights. https://www.socialplatform.org (Ac-
cessed 19 May 2019).
6   European network, part of the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, a grow-
ing movement of civil society organizations and activists, including trade 
unions, united in campaigning for greater transparency, democratic over-
sight and redistribution of wealth in national and global tax systems. 
https://www.globaltaxjustice.org (Accessed 20 May 2019).
7   A network of 50 civil society organizations  from 20 European countries 
existing since 1990. Eurodad works for transformative yet specific changes 
to global and European policies, institutions, rules and structures to ensure 
a democratically controlled, environmentally sustainable financial and eco-
nomic system that works to eradicate poverty and ensure human rights for 
all. https://eurodad.org (Accessed 20 May 2019).
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tion Via Campesina8, Friends of the Earth Europe9, Alter Sum-
mit10 and Women in Development Europe+ (WIDE+)11. 
The hypothesis that these social movements contributed 
to increasing Euroscepticism and radical right is examined by the 
following methods: desk research and collecting data, informa-
tion, publications, reports and research available on their web-
sites, and a qualitative analysis of the collected information. The 
research was focused on identifying their mission, core values, 
areas of work, themes in the focus of work and research, and ad-
vocacy activities at the level of the European Union.
The social movements include the labour movement, re-
gional movements, the environmental movement, feminist 
movement, and the anti-nuclear movement. There are many of 
them being active at European, national and local level in bring-
ing citizens’ voices at the public and political fora. 
The key finding of the research is that, despite differenc-
es regarding the main topic they are dealing with (labour rights, 
social security, gender in development, peasants’ rights, eradica-
tion of poverty, economic development, environmental protec-
tion, food sovereignty, etc.), they share many same characteris-
tics, such as: 
·  All these networks share similar mission in opposing neo-
liberal policy.
8   The network is a part of the international peasants’ movement La Via Cam-
pesina fighting for food sovereignty, peasants’ rights, agroecology, dignity 
for migrants and waged workers in rural areas, environmental justice and 
international solidarity. https://viacampesina.org/en/ (Accessed 10 May 
2019).
9   The largest grassroots environmental network in Europe, uniting more 
than 30 national organisations with thousands of local groups. http://www.
foeeurope.org (Accessed 20 May 2019).
10   A network made up of feminist, antiracist and citizens’ movements as well 
as trade unions and campaign groups from over twenty European coun-
tries, opposing austerity policies implemented by EU Institutions. http://
www.altersummit.eu (Accessed 20 May 2019).
11   A European network of associations and activists that fights for women’s 
rights, as part of a larger struggle for social justice, sustainable livelihoods 
and human rights. https://wideplus.org (Accessed 10 May 2019).
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·  Their demands are focusing on social and economic 
changes.
·  They are active in searching, formulating and proposing 
social and policy interventions that may produce desired 
social and economic changes.
·  They share same values that are in the core of their work 
and advocacy efforts, and they are: protection and fulfil-
ment of economic, social, political, civil and cultural 
rights, equity, equality, gender equality, protection of 
vulnerable groups, labour rights, fair distribution of in-
come and profit, social security, North-South solidarity, 
international solidarity, people’s sovereignty, democrati-
zation of decision-making processes at all level, just 
trade, fair production, fair wages, protection of environ-
ment and natural resources, sustainable livelihoods, reg-
ulated markets and supply, corporate responsibility.
·  Their approach to the current economic, financial, social 
and environmental crisis is based on demanding justice 
(social justice, food justice, gender justice, tax justice 
and environmental justice).
·  They have developed and are working to develop further 
alternative models to the neoliberal policies that would 
put people and the environment at the centre of the 
economy and contribute social justice and sustainable 
livelihoods. 
·  They are active in advocacy for their demands before the 
EU institutions.
·  They have developed a valuable and vast source of 
knowledge through research, including participatory, 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research. 
·  They address the EU’s democratic deficit demanding civil 
dialogue. 
·  They are active in the debate on the future of the Euro-
pean Union and Europe. 
Majority of these European movements are members of a 
global network and/or have taken active role in the global al-
ter-globalization movement, the World Social Forum and the Eu-
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ropean Social Forum. They colaborate with each other and sup-
port each other in campaigning, advocacy and research. They 
also cooperate with similar civil society organizations and net-
works in coutries outside the European Union. A number of their 
projects and activities has received the support of the European 
Commission. 
These above-mentioned findings support the conclusions 
of the Donatella Della Porta that contemporary European social 
movement organisations are to be defining as “critical Europe-
anists” instead of Eurosceptics (Della Porta, 2006). They are dis-
satisfied with the current economic policy and criticise neoliber-
alisation, marketization and privatization, but they seek for and 
offer alternatives based on research and empirical information. 
Their solutions are based on transformative economies, such as 
social economy, solidarity economy, feminist economy, and 
transformative practices, such as food sovereignty, agroecology, 
fair trade, financial transaction tax, regulation of financial mar-
kets, gender just trade policy, entitlement of communities and 
local producers, debts cancelling, and redistributive land reform. 
These models are based on new collective rights promoted from 
grassroots such as right to seed, right to food sovereignty, right 
to culturally appropriate food, and right to maintain, control and 
protect traditional knowledge. 
Social movement advocacy for transformative policies of 
the European Commission that would enhance economies and 
eliminate inequalities. These demands have been introduced to 
the forthcoming European Parliament elections in May 2019 as a 
‘Manifesto for a Sustainable Europe for its Citizens’ (Friends of 
the Earth Europe, 2018, 25 September).12 Similarly, the Alter 
Summit network has called for establishing a political, social and 
democratic Europe, building on the basis of equality, solidarity 
and genuine democracy (Alter Summit, 2019). For example, af-
termath the EU elections in May 2019, 37 social movement orga-
nizations called for EU food policy and European Commission 
12   On this occasion, Jagoda Munic, director of Friends of the Earth Europe, 
said: “At the moment too much of the debate about the future of Europe 
is stuck in the question of ‘more or less EU?’. We need to move the conver-
sation on to ‘what kind of Europe do we want?’. 
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Vice-President for Food for ensuring the sustainability of the Eu-
ropean food systems (Friends of the Earth Europe, 2019, 17 
July). These networks are also united in insisting the implemen-
tation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Agenda 
2030.  At the 2nd Social Platform Flagship Conference in Helsinki, 
in September 2019, the recommendations have been developed 
for an economy of wellbeing approach that leaves no one be-
hind. The economy of wellbeing encompasses a long-term ap-
proach ‘that looks at the impact of decisions and policies on 
people’s lives, is based on a participatory governance structure, 
and ensures socioeconomic and environmental justice for all’ 
(Social Platform, 2019, 24 September). 
They also call for involvement of civil society organisa-
tions in all stages of the EU decision-making process to ensure 
decision are based on the impact they have on people’s lives. Re-
cently, the 2nd Social Platform Flagship Conference has called 
the future Executive Vice-President of the European Commis-
sion for ‘An Economy that Works for People’ to go beyond en-
gaging only in social dialogue and to establish a structured rela-
tionship with civil society organisations (Social Platform, 2019, 
24 September).
Conclusions
The findings of this paper confirm the first hypothesis ex-
amined, that the increasing inequalities in the European Union, 
caused by the prevailing neoliberal policy, contributed to the 
rise of social movements across Europe. The hypothesis that 
these social movements contributed to increasing Euroscepti-
cism and radical right has been refuted. The demands of these 
civil society networks, as well as their advocacy efforts, are ori-
ented to transform current ‘market Europe’ into ‘social Europe’. 
They use social pressure for system change. They insist in having 
a permanent dialogue and a structured relationship with the EU 
institutions, but they do not tend to transform themselves insti-
tutionally in a form of a political party. They stay focused on ex-
amining and proposing alternatives to counter current economic 
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and social difficulties, calling for social justice. Thus, their posi-
tion is more on the ‘left’ side than the ‘right’. Instead of being 
Eurosceptics, members of social movements are rather Eurocriti-
cals and Alter-Europeanists demanding for a more sustainable, 
inclusive and democratic Europe. Although there is still a schol-
arly debate about the European dimension of these movements 
and the nature of contemporary collective action (Mathers, 
2016), apparently, they may constitute corrective to strengthen-
ing democracy.
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The Development of the Left Transnational 
Political Associations in Europe
Abstract
This article explains the wider background of the forms of tran-
snational political organisations on the political left that have pa-
ssed a long way since the 19th century Socialist International and 
the first tries to gather various leftist political organisations in 
order to foster cooperation and communication at an internati-
onal level. In recent years, we are seeing three divergent proce-
sses influencing primarily leftist parties’ associations. First, on 
the global level, the split within the Socialist International and 
the creation of the Progressive Alliance. Second, the functioning 
of the European Parliament and its impact on the work of par-
ties in Europe and their cooperation in the European context. Fi-
nally, the crisis situation in Europe where a visible change of 
approach of the electorate towards the mainstream political par-
ties is having a heavy toll on the functioning of a number of tra-
ditional parties and their positioning in the European and inter-
national scene. This creates a very interesting political situation 
which transforms the way how the international political asso-
ciations are perceived in their form and content.
Key words: International political associations – Socialist Inter-
national – European Parliament – Progressive Alliance – Regio-
nalism
Introductory notes
 International and regional forms of political organisations and 
associations have been present in the international relations for 
the two last centuries. In their nature, these non-governmental or-
ganisations interact and work together transcending state borders 
and cover diverse political families in their scope. From the begin-
ning, the internationalisation of ideology and political beliefs lead 
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the forms of cooperation towards the level of international politi-
cal movements, whose organisational basis is made of organised 
political forces in the form of political parties on the national level 
(Dimitrijević et al, 2011). They can be classified as a form of trans-
national entities, i. e. non-state, non-governmental, non-sovereign, 
and non-territorial participants whose deliberate activity crosses 
state borders relatively freely and exerts an influence on intrastate 
and international relations (Witkowska, 2013; Dumala,1995). 
Moreover, these forms of associations also function in a spe-
cific environment. As one can talk about transnational party system 
where parties interact with each other, in a competitive manner 
and in a defined arena, one can note that it presents a sort of a 
“system of interaction” (Sartori, 2005). The developments on the 
European scene over the last few decades have produced a very 
fertile arena for significant changes with regard to the internation-
al or regional association of various political parties into move-
ments, associations, transnational party groups or political families. 
In contrast to the earlier period, when during the nineteenth cen-
tury and up to the 1990s we could speak only about the dominant 
political movement of the Socialist International (SI), as well as con-
sistent attempts to bring together communist parties under the 
umbrella of Moscow through various forms of interventions of the 
Soviet Union, today we are witnessing the political associations on 
the European continent going through an opulent process of 
changes both in their form and content. This is especially true of 
the forms of association on the political left.
In the last two decades, there have been significant changes 
in the way and nature of association, especially of the left parties, 
into international forms of cooperation of various party subjects. 
First of all, the Progressive Alliance was formed as a SI complement 
or equivalent (depending on the point of view), which significantly 
shook the previously monolithic leftist mechanism of cooperation 
at the global level, which was in force since the 1950s when the So-
cialist International was founded in its present form. This provided 
an alternative to the ways in which channels of communication, the 
exchange of ideas and the setting of goals for political action 
among social-democratic parties could be established. But, more 
importantly, and even principally, the European Parliament and the 
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need to act within it, led to the creation of transnational political 
associations, such as the Euro-parties of the Socialist and Demo-
crats Group and the Party of European Socialists. Article 10 (4) of 
the Treaty on the European Union lays ground for their operation 
by stating that: “Political parties at European level contribute to form-
ing European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens 
of the Union.” These new associations improved the communication 
and working methods between the parties for the purpose of act-
ing together to achieve convergent goals, but also had an impact 
on the practical level of activity within the bodies of the European 
Union (especially the European Parliament and the European Coun-
cil). Finally, the crises that Europe has been going through in recent 
years and the loss of confidence in traditional parties have also led 
to the weakening of left parties in Europe and the need to find a 
way to include and find a new space for new left parties and associ-
ations that in some countries have completely replaced the tradi-
tional ones or enfeebled the left significantly.
The international framework for  
the European parties of the Left
International political forms of association in their present 
form emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. They found their 
roots, ideas and ideology in leftist ideas. They have been develop-
ing in this framework for over a century and a half. Accordingly, the 
Socialist International was the first association, the first real inter-
national political organisation, which is still alive today through a 
series of its own embodiments. It was born in 19th century amidst 
the development of the left through the logic of action, as a force 
fighting for revolutionary goals, in contrast to the right which asso-
ciated itself with the logic of reaction or the force of status quo 
(Cvetićanin, 2016).  At the time of its emergence the socialist par-
ties were unanimous in their goal - working together in order to in-
volve the working class as much as possible in the representative-
ness of government, to give them the right to vote, and to help 
them lead a dialogue with other political organisations (Della Por-
ta, 2013). In this context, this first global idea of  uniting political 
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forces in an international, transnational and supranational format, 
from the standpoint of present-day perspectives on the opportuni-
ties offered by the nineteenth century, indeed looks extremely 
progressive for its time. The proclaimed goal of the First Interna-
tional Congress at The Hague made it clear: “The organisation of 
the proletariat into a political party is necessary to achieve the vic-
tory of the social revolution and its ultimate goal - the abolition of 
classes”, (Przeworski, 1986). Working-class champions, therefore, 
shared a unique understanding that it was necessary to act on an 
international basis to allow the ideas of the social revolution not to 
remain tied to a single state or nation. The problems of the prole-
tariat were the same, and in this the leaders of the Socialist Inter-
national found the common ground to fight together. 
Even then, at the very beginning, the First International and 
the idea of  internationalism had to contend with divisions and dif-
ferent perceptions of the scope and future of the movement. At 
the time, they “all had a common tactical-strategic principle: no coop-
eration with bourgeois parties. They all had a common expectation: 
the inevitable collapse of capitalism… They all had a common ‘foreign 
policy’ based on a vague concept of internationalism, anti-colonialism 
and pacifism“ (Day, 2013, Sassoon, 1998). They primarily fell victim 
to the clash of anarchists and Marxists and the strong influence of 
the national views on the work of the International. Already in 
1889, the Second International had been founded, but it did not 
manage to survive World War I or to recuperate after it.  The 
schism that the Soviet Union caused by trying to exercise control 
over leftist movements in the world was insurmountable. With the 
founding of the Communist International, or the so-called Third In-
ternational, Moscow prevented the potential worldwide unifica-
tion of the left or the later global character of the organisation un-
til the 1990s. The Second World War and the establishment of the 
Cominform, i. e. the division in understanding the role of the left in 
terms of ideological goals, delayed future unification until the 
1950s. The two world wars did influence the international nature 
of socialism, but the ambition of one such idea that the left could 
join into a united political organisation at a time when the League 
of Nations was barely able to survive as a forum for the dialogue of 
states, went beyond the realities and possibilities of political ac-
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tion. The post-World War II period and the founding of the United 
Nations, as well as increasingly discernible and superior interna-
tional cooperation, also provided new chances to building a new in-
ternational political association modelled on the earlier Socialist In-
ternationals. The Cold War, which between the West and the Soviet 
Union also dashed all hopes that an agreement could be reached 
with the Communist countries, so that the leftist parties of the 
democratic states went their own way. Finally, one of the main rea-
sons why the formation of the new Socialist International was pos-
sible was the fact that post-war social democratic parties chose to 
exercise their rights for the working class through existing political 
electoral systems (Bonoli et al. 2004). This deepened the division 
with the Soviet model of cooperation, but it also facilitated the 
possibility for the socialists and social democrats of democratic 
states to finally create a new mechanism for international coopera-
tion, carried on by tradition and also by the spirit of the original 
success of the United Nations.
Born in 1951 in Frankfurt, the Socialist International today 
brings together more than 150 members on an equal international 
basis, as outlined in its founding Declaration. During the Cold War 
this organisation brought together socialist and social-democratic 
parties which1, in addition to imperialism, also fought against com-
munism as a “twisted socialist tradition.” The declaration thus un-
ambiguously indicates who is on which side and who is in fact the 
successor of the nineteenth-century tradition of internationalism. 
As the inspiration for the new IS originated in Europe, much of the 
activities of the SI were characterised by the support for political 
actors in the fight against colonialism and finding solutions on how 
to transfer the ideas of social democracy to the newly created 
states outside the European continent. This activity would strongly 
mark the first decades of the SI and the work of the leaders of the 
organisation Olof Palme, Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a number of changes hap-
pened in the understanding of the role of not only the left with all 
its institutional emanations from the left-centre to extreme com-
munists, but also a different view of the role of the Socialist Inter-
1   Website of the Socialist International: http://www.socialistinternational.org/
viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=39, (accessed 2 December 2019)
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national. Primarily, the fall of the communist regimes in the Soviet 
world had a devastating effect on the radical left parties in western 
Europe, where they either disappeared from the political scene, or 
they had to alter their approach to the core issues of the left in or-
der to survive. For the following almost two decades they would 
have to wait for the crisis period that hit Europe in order to come 
back to the scene in a different form of far-left political option. On 
the other hand, the traditional left and centre-left parties, after the 
initial shock, turned to the third way or new middle of social de-
mocracy promoting free market, balance budgets, protection of 
the environment and social liberalism (Giddens, 1998), which led to 
their recovery in the polls by the end of the century. Furthermore, 
in addition to the traditional parties of democratic societies, the SI 
then began to gather new leftist parties of the young democracies. 
All this has caused changes within the organisation along with dif-
ferent types and directions of action. The fact is, however, that the 
SI continues to exist today as a global political association, demon-
strating that the idea of  working together through the struggle or 
promotion of leftist ideas has succeeded in overcoming many chal-
lenges. It has, at least, remained the centre point around which po-
litical parties manage to rally on the global plane either by inertia 
or by will to contribute to the world socialist ideas.
Moreover, more than twenty years after the tectonic politi-
cal changes in Europe, the Left has recently spawned a new inter-
national political organisation alongside the Socialist International. 
The new Progressive Alliance was created in 2013 in Leipzig on the 
initiative and under the leadership of the German Social Democrat-
ic Party (SPD). After the Second World War, this German party was 
also crucial for the formation of the SI itself, which is why Frankfurt 
was the place where today’s International was formed (Padget et 
al. 1991). It is no wonder then, that the SPD initiated the need to 
create a new framework of global cooperation apart from the So-
cialist International after they became aware that it was heading in 
a direction that did not fulfil their expectations. This rift between 
left-wing transnational political organisations is not new. As early 
as the nineteenth century, there was a division between the Social-
ist International and the then Alliance of the Social Democrats. Ba-
kunin wrote in his manuscript Aux citoyens rédacteurs du Réveil (Eck-
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hardt, 2016) about how the then Alliance of the Social Democrats 
was then formed precisely with the intention of harming the Inter-
national. The Progressive Alliance, in its founding documents, 
claims to offer an alternative to what it sees as an outdated ap-
proach to the SI, that is, “the time is ripe for a progressive, global po-
litical and economic system which places humans at the centre of at-
tention again”2 which will be at the same time “parallel and 
complementary to other associations operating at an international 
level, the Progressive Alliance builds on existing and evolving networks 
and forums“.3 This ceremonial vocabulary finely shows the frustra-
tion that exists mainly in leftist parties in Europe over the activities 
of the SI as well as an attempt to find a solution to further develop 
relations and connect what is already a well-built structure of the 
social democratic cooperation network on the European continent 
with other social democratic parties in the world. At the same time, 
the critics of the Progressive Alliance and supporters of the Social-
ist International have argued that the Alliance has turned towards 
liberalism, severed ties with unions, and lost its traditional leftist 
character. Today, as a consequence of this, we again have two dom-
inant social democratic international organisations in the world. It 
is difficult to expect that they could be consolidated in a common 
framework in the coming period. Progressive Alliance has practical-
ly just started its work and is indubitable that it will work on build-
ing its image and expanding it, while the SI believes that it remains 
the undisputed and the only framework for global action among 
the socialist parties.
The changes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall made it 
possible to change the concept of international cooperation 
among the Social Democratic parties primarily by the understand-
ing that the socialist forces of the democratic states had won the 
long-awaited victory over the Soviet model of association and co-
operation. In his famous speech in Stockholm in July 1989 at the SI 
meeting marking the centenary of the Second International, which 
took place just a few months before the fall of the wall in Berlin, 
2   Website of the Progressive Alliance: http://progressive-alliance.info/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/150930-Draft-Progressive-Alliance-Basic-Doc-
ument-1.pdf, (accessed 2 December 2019)
3   ibid
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Willy Brandt made it clear that “socialism cannot function without 
democracy” (Vivekanandan, 2016). At the same time, Brandt also 
announced the change that the new political phase of the fall of 
European Communism would bring, and that it would have a signif-
icant impact on overall developments in party life, or as he put it 
“The next decade will be marked by attempts to bridge the gap be-
tween different political and economic problems because all of hu-
manity shares these challenges” (Vivekanandan, 2016). It is precisely 
Europe and the European Union, as the frame for the work of di-
verse political entities, with an ever-stronger European Parliament, 
that will form the most fertile ground for this kind of new political 
experiment.
Impact of the European Parliament on the changes in the 
International Association of the parties of the Left
Another dominant change that has occurred in international 
political associations is grounded on the strengthening of regional 
character and the stronger institutional work of these associations. 
It should be remembered that today we have a whole range of re-
gional political organisations, which, although not global in nature, 
are very vibrant and energetic associations and groups that allow 
political entities to unite on the basis of: a) not exclusively leftist 
and b) not exclusively based on ideological plane. Thus, on the Eu-
ropean continent, we have a number of regional party associations 
that have emerged over the last forty years in order to facilitate 
the joining of different political parties into alliances through which 
both common and individual goals can be more easily and success-
fully pursued. They can be discerned into two mechanisms – Euro-
pean Parliament party (Euro-party) and transnational party federa-
tions (Pridham et al, 2016). These associations cover the entire 
political spectrum, so that today in the European Union we have 
the socialist and democrats, the far left, the liberal democratic as-
sociations, the greens, the right united in the nationalist federa-
tion, but also in the right-wing of conservatives and reformists, 
right up to the association of populist and neo-fascist associations. 
All of them are characterised by the fact that they operate in a spe-
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cial environment of the European Union, which, with the establish-
ment of the European Parliament, has strongly influenced the pro-
cess where representatives – Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) in the European Parliament are not classified only by their 
national or state affiliation, but rather on the creation of suprana-
tional political associations that pursue their common goals.
Historically, the creation of the European Parliament started 
modestly and went on to develop through into an increasingly ac-
tive House of Representatives through the later versions of the 
founding treaties. The need to connect the European left parties 
and the SI was immediately set in motion, as the International es-
tablished a liaison office with the EC parties in 1957, after which 
the Confederation of Socialist Parties was established in The Hague 
in 1974. The first common political party structures (the nucleus of 
the today’s Euro-parties) participated already at the 1979 election 
for the first European Parliament. Twenty years on the Confedera-
tion grew into a now well-known Party of European Socialists (PES), 
established in November 1992 in response to Article 138a of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Ovey, 2002). Today, PES brings together 33 
members, 13 associate members and 12 observers and is the most 
active framework for left-wing parties in Europe. The structure, the 
number of bodies and the frequency of meetings provides a frame-
work for the left-wing parties to continually co-ordinate their work, 
which in turn has affected their increasing cohesiveness and speak-
ing more and more in one voice not only within the European Par-
liament but also within the global Socialist International.
All of this has led to the need for alliances within parliament 
to facilitate the distribution of functions and positions in various 
bodies, the election of leadership and more effective action within 
the assembly to promote certain policies. Finally, the European po-
litical associations started to initiate cooperation outside of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, so that there are regular meetings of these as-
sociations before major EU summits, independent of the European 
Parliament itself. In addition, the experience in working within PES 
has certainly assisted the German SPD to entertain the idea and to 
build up the know-how for the creation of a new global association 
- the Progressive Alliance. A noteworthy feature of all groups or Eu-
ro-parties in the European Parliament is the significant level of co-
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hesion that the sister parties achieve within their groups. Socialists 
are certainly at the top of this cohesion, which is achieved through 
a full range of working bodies up to the vote in plenary (Ripoll Ser-
vent, 2015).  A Euro-party has “a statute, a common programme, a 
secretariat, an executive body, a party assembly, a hierarchical lead-
ership structure, the ability to make decisions binding on member 
parties, and the aspiration to become a fully-fledged European po-
litical party” (Hix, 1996).
The European Parliament also encourages linkages and 
grouping in order to reduce parliamentary diversity and to achieve 
greater efficiency, because it is not the same to do and vote if 
there are five or six groups or dozens and dozens of parties all vot-
ing differently. To this end, the European Parliament has intro-
duced various benefits that allow groups to better monitor com-
mittee work or have specialised working groups that can prepare 
better positions, hold meetings within groups to share views and 
become more informed, while the opportunity to get through the 
groups important leading posts in the EP bodies are certainly much 
more easily achieved through group action than individually (Hei-
dar, 2000).
It should also be borne in mind that the PES, like the Europe-
an People’s Party (EPP), has used its organisation and contacts to 
help new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Through the 
mode of the observer membership it has managed to involve left-
wing representatives not only in the work of the PES, but also to 
provide training and seminars, material and technical assistance, 
and political mentoring in the new democracies (Grugel, 1999). This 
process has also contributed to the strengthening of unity within 
the PES the same way it has helped the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats (ALDE) and the EPP. Constant admission of new mem-
bers and the work on networking among the parties spilled over 
into joint work within the group, and later their to wider forms of 
international cooperation, primarily within the SI and the Progres-
sive Alliance. The work of the European Parliament has primarily 
created the need and the ability to bind parties to achieve a whole 
range of goals, so the Estonian left not only shares the same social 
democratic ideas with the Spanish sister party, but also uses this in-
terconnection to present itself in a more important light and larger 
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size than the country and the number of MEPs are. Thus, an Esto-
nian MEP has the chance to become one of the Vice-Presidents of 
the EP or chair some important committee if properly positioned 
within the PES.
Over the last four decades, the cooperation within the EP 
and the formation of political party groups have shown that associ-
ation and cooperation are not based only on a territorial principle 
and national priorities, but rather on an ideological consolidation 
into alliances that enable the achievement of common goals. Si-
mon Hix points out that this is not only a feature of the European 
Parliament, but that it is also the case with large and diverse coun-
tries such as India and the US where significant differences be-
tween the parts did not prevent coherence within the traditional 
large parties (Hix, 2007). Nevertheless, the development of cooper-
ation in the European Parliament is a unique experiment in the 
world, which has its own laws and timeline. One of the indicators of 
this uniqueness are the so-called “spizenkandidaten” in the 2014 
and 2019 European Parliament election. In 2014 the European 
elections had the groups that have presented their priority candi-
dates for President of the European Commission for the first time. 
In the early stages of the European Union’s development, it was al-
most inconceivable that during the elections for the European Par-
liament the candidate for the next President of the European Com-
mission would be presented to the public as the one leading a 
political party group. This exclusive right was left exclusively to the 
European Council i. e. the gathering of the Heads of State or Gov-
ernment of the EU Member States. This new approach, in which 
the two most powerful groups, the EPP and the PES, certainly had 
an upper hand and it was only a question of whether the EU would 
get the EC president from the right or the left, certainly did not fa-
vour smaller parliamentary groups, which is why ALDE, as the third 
strongest grouping, opposed the proposal in the beginning. In 
2014 for the first time, the EU had something similar to national 
elections, that is a system in which the election campaign was con-
ducted by common leaders. This changed somewhat the way the 
electorate views this European Parliament and also brought a 
sense of greater weight and involvement to the Parliament itself. 
Although the European Council after the election had the opportu-
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nity to elect any new Commission President4, the heads of state or 
government still had to consider the fact that the EPP had gath-
ered the largest number of seats in the Parliament and the spitzen-
kandidat - former Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker 
was proposed as a president elect of the European Commission 
and later approved into the EP. What followed in 2019 EP election 
was again a spitzenkandidaten led framework of electoral cam-
paigning, but the European Council came up with not the proposed 
spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber from the German CDU, instead 
proposing Ursula Van der Leyen from the same party. This dilution 
of the system introduced only five years ago showed that the frag-
ile structure and framework of the European electoral landscape. 
The heads of state or government did not breach any rule or article 
of the Lisbon Treaty, but they exercised their right to pick up the 
proposal for who is to lead the next European Commission thus 
showing the strength of political forces at work in its best.
Therefore, it should not be expected that the parties that 
make up the Socialist and Democrat group will completely re-
nounce their national character or assume a European one if the 
national position is threatened. Although Simon Hix, as one of the 
most well-known experts in the work of the European Parliament 
and the political party, argues that we are moving towards increas-
ing cohesion and association within political groups in the Parlia-
ment and that the changes that have taken place in recent years, 
especially in the current European Parliament, should be consid-
ered (Hix, 1997). The EPP, for example, failed to achieve cohesion 
to allow us to talk about monolithic political blocs. The conserva-
4   Paragraph 7 in Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union states the 
following: ,,Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament 
and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a 
candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elect-
ed by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. 
If he does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting 
by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate 
who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same pro-
cedure. The Lisbon Treaty, Treaty on European Union & comments, Title 
3 - Provisions on the institutions (Articles 13-19) Official Journal of the 
European Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2b-
f140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (ac-
cessed 2 December 2019)
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tives and reformists split from the EPP and formed their own 
grouping (ECR), the far right succeeded in creating their first blocs 
within the EP, while the shifts on the far left have also been notice-
able. The fact is that in recent years, one can note transnational po-
litical associations within the EU whose constituent members do 
not share the same ideological commitment, are not bound by the 
same or very similar agenda, and that enter this type of association 
either to achieve short-term goals in a particular policy or purely to 
fortify their position within the European Parliament. So naturally 
there are defections and changes that cause parties to choose 
which transnational political association they belong to, and in the 
process abandon their earlier alliances to join new ones.
The basis for the formation of a particular international po-
litical association is no longer purely ideological in nature, since it 
can be noted that within the coalition of European Conservatives 
and Reformists or the EUL-NGL there are parties that by no means 
could be considered allied. In terms of ideology, the British Conser-
vatives are much closer to the related parties of the European Peo-
ple’s Party than they are to being a member of the European Con-
servatives and Reformists, where they share their membership 
with the Polish PiS. If, ten years ago, it seemed that we were mov-
ing towards the consolidation of party groups in the EP and the 
creation of a left and right bipolar system, today we can observe 
the enfeeblement and reversibility of the process. The effort to 
unite the Conservatives and the European Democratic Union in the 
1990s was therefore undermined later on by the fact that the 
right-wing parties seceded from the EPP and formed the European 
Conservatives and Reformists because they no longer felt that they 
shared the same goals and modes of political action as the sister 
parties within the European People’s Party. 
Perhaps the most famous recent example is the Five Star 
Movement, which tried to exit the Europe of Freedom and Immedi-
ate Democracy group and join the Coalition of Liberals and Demo-
crats (ALDE) in early 2017 and voted on it, then was rejected by 
ALDE. If this transition had taken place, not only would have ALDE 
become a significantly more powerful institution within the EP, but 
the then Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy would have dis-
appeared as a political party group in the European Parliament. The 
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fact that the Five Stars tried to move from the ultimate Eurosceptic 
coalition to the so-called Euro-fanatic coalition suggests that po-
tential political gain outweighed ideology. In this way, new groups 
in the European Parliament are positioned less and less as ideologi-
cally assembled representatives of their nations - EU Member 
States, and increasingly as a kind of political amalgam whose be-
haviour corresponds to the need to achieve goals in the European 
Parliament.
The European Crisis and the consequences  
for the traditional parties of the Left
Finally, the third dominant feature that undermines the usu-
al association and cooperation of parties through international po-
litical associations has to do with changes in the traditional under-
standing of the left and the right, and the increasingly frequent 
establishment of national movements that destroy the traditional 
bipolar party fabric. The reality brought about by the post-crisis era 
in Europe should be considered when looking at the future func-
tioning of parties within international political framework. This re-
ality is characterised by the weakening of traditional left, centre 
and right parties, and the emergence of a whole new set of nation-
al movements that do not have such a strong left-centre-right de-
termination. This allows them to exercise greater freedom of 
choice i. e. become less constrained by their party’s programme in 
joining a transnational political association.
UKIP is a good example of a one-goal party, but the fact that 
Five Stars or Syriza are wandering around in this mix of European 
movements is indicative of Europe undergoing creative chaos on 
the political spectrum that may bring new surprises in the coming 
years. The victory of the Emmanuel Macron, who does not come 
from traditional parties and who initiated a completely new move-
ment that subsequently became a party not easy to position within 
the traditional party spectrum was accompanied by a defeat that 
occurred with the Socialist Party of France in the parliamentary 
elections where it fell to ten percent of support, less than the Com-
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munist Party. Most of the 350 ex Socialist MPs have been overtak-
en by the new Macron party. 
Stuart Thomson argues that the new social-democrat parties 
simply failed to find a way to present the way they fight for the 
classic goals of social democracy, such as equality or collective ac-
tion, that would allow them to arouse hope for the future or to 
form credible electoral coalitions. Thomson also argues that most 
social-democratic parties in European countries have become 
neo-liberal and thus have lost their touch with the principles. This 
has consequently influenced the events and situation in PES, the 
Socialists and Democrats in the EP, and of course the SI and the 
Progressive Alliance itself (Thomson, 2000). The conflict that re-
sulted, as we have said, with the formation not only of the new 
Progressive Alliance, but also the emergence of Syriza in Greece or 
Podemos in Spain. 
As we live in the moment when all these changes are hap-
pening, it is not easy to talk about the concrete consequences that 
fractures on the political scene may bring. It takes time to see how 
things will develop. Prior to the 2019 European Parliament elec-
tion, many argued that extremist political parties would prevail, 
and that the series of wins starting with the vote on Britain’s exit 
from the EU, Trump’s victory or the almost equal result of the far 
right and the liberal-green coalition in the Austrian presidential 
election would translate into a serious disbalance of forces in the 
European Parliament. Although this has not happened, the Europe-
an Parliament is more fragmented than ever before. Today, one 
can note that Identity and Democracy, a far-right political group in 
the EP holds 73 seats, while the European United Left-Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL), a far-left grouping has 41 MEPs, with ECR at 
62 additional seats. EPP and Socialist and Democrats have lost their 
majority and have to make coalitions with the Liberals (now Renew 
Europe) and the Greens (Greens-European Free Alliance). Further 
to this, the idea of transnational lists has been proposed for all Eu-
ropean citizens to vote together for their representatives, irrespec-
tive of their country of citizenship or vote. However, this proposal 
has had a tough path to pass since it was proposed by President 
Macron. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Ley-
en in her speech to the Parliament announced she wanted to ad-
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dress the issue of transnational lists at the European elections as a 
complementary tool of European democracy.5 All these transitions, 
movements and changes show the fluidity of the political situation 
when it comes to the transnational cooperation among political 
parties in Europe, which is to a considerable extent caused by the 
volatile political situation with the European Union and a wider dis-
satisfaction of the electorate with the traditional parties. It remains 
to be seen what kind of direction these processes will be having in 
the near future thus influencing the very nature of transnational 
party cooperation. 
Final considerations
This paper started from the premise that transnational polit-
ical organisations have been undergoing changes in the scope and 
form of their work in recent decades. First of all, the largest and 
the oldest global one – that of the Socialist International has re-
ceived competition in the form of a new Progressive Alliance. The 
formation of this alliance was predominantly influenced by the Ger-
man Social Democrats, who, in the new framework environment 
created by the European Union, and through the Party of European 
Socialists and networking with other related parties, managed to 
significantly improve the mechanisms of their international activity. 
This, therefore, has had a direct impact on forms of cooperation, 
first and foremost on the European continent, and then more 
widely in other parts of the world. Finally, the expansion of various 
crisis in Europe and changes in attitudes of the electorate regard-
ing the traditional division into centre, left and right has led to key 
changes within the parties themselves, and also affected associa-
tions, that is, regional political groups in Europe.
Given that we are talking about a lively process with numer-
ous political entities, it remains to be seen whether the Socialist In-
ternational and the Progressive Alliance will find common ground 
or whether relations will develop in the direction of increasing di-
vergence. The question also arises as to whether parties of other 
5   Website of the European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_4230 (accessed 2 December 2019)
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
143
political provenance will form some sort of international co-opera-
tion the way the Left does. The EPP is a good example of regional 
activity where people parties have shown that they can act in an or-
ganised and cohesive manner. The question is why this has not 
been applied yet on a global scale.
Also, it remains to be seen whether the European parties 
will move towards an increasing political amalgamation within their 
respective groups or whether we will have more political associa-
tions in the next European Parliament. Of course, this will also be 
linked to further concepts of the development of the European 
Union and the “ multi-speed Union”, i. e. the question of whether 
the European Parliament will continue to strengthen, and thus cre-
ate more need for effective and stronger alliances within groups. 
These are all questions for the future, but we can certainly say that 
Europe has already changed the usual understanding and defini-
tion of international political associations and that we are currently 
in a live political experiment, both with the changes in the function-
ing of the European Parliament and with the ongoing crisis through 
which a number of traditional parties in Europe, especially the left, 
go through.
P
ejović 
144
Bibliography
Bonoli, G. (2004). Martin Powell-Social Democratic Party Policies in Contemporary Eu-
rope, London and New York: Routledge
Cvetićanin, N. (2016). Državništvo modernog doba, Beograd: Arhipelag i Institut društ-
venih nauka
Day, S. (2006). Transnational party political actors: the difficulties of seeking a role and 
significance, EU Studies in Japan, Volume 2006
Della Porta, D. (2013). Can Democracy Be Saved, Malden: Polity Press
Dimitrijević, V., Račić, O. (2011). Međunarodne organizacije, Beograd: Pravni faukultet 
Univerziteta Union i Službeni glasnik
Eckhardt, W. (2016). The First Socialist Schism: Bakunin vs. Marx in the International 
Working Men’s Association, Oakland: PM Press
Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press, Lon-
don: Polity Press
Grugel, J. (1999). Transnational party linkages and democratization in Eastern Europe De-
mocracy without Borders: Transnationalisation and Conditionality in New De-
mocracies, New York: Routledge Ecpr Studies in European Political Science, 10 
Heidar, K. (2000). Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political Parties 
Behind Closed Doors, London and New York: Routledge Ecpr Studies in Euro-
pean Political Science, 13
Hix, S. (1996). The transnational party federations, in John Gaffney (ed.) Political Parties 
and the European Union, London: Routledge
Hix, S., Lord, C. (1997). Political Parties in the European Union, New York: Macmillan Ed-
ucation UK
Hix, S., Noury, A.G., Roland, G. (2007). Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, 
New York: Cambridge University press
Ovey, J. (2002). Between Nation and Europe_ Labour, the SPD and the European Parlia-
ment 1994–1999-VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Opladen 
Padgett, S., Paterson, W. E. (1991) A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe 
(The Postwar World), London and New York: Longman Pub Group
Pejović, A. A. (2018). Variable Reality of the Western Balkans in the Context of the Eu-
ropean Integration.  Politička misao, vol. 55, no. 1, 74-94. 
Pejović, A. A. (2016). Uloga vladavine prava u evropskim politikama, od početaka do 
novog pristupa u pregovaranju za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji. Matica 
Crnogorska, 7-24. 
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
145
Pridham, G., Pridham, P. (2016). Transnational Party Co-operation and European Inte-
gration: The Process Towards Direct Elections, Abingdon-on-Thames: Rout-
ledge
Przeworski, A. (1986). Capitalism and Social Democracy (Studies in Marxism and Social 
Theory), Paris
Ripoll S., Ariadna. (2015). Institutional and Policy Change in the European Parliament: 
Deciding on Freedom, Security and Justice, New York: Palgrave Macmillan UK 
Sartori, G. (2005). Party and Party Systems, Colchester: ecpr Press, University of Oxford
Thomson, S. (2000). The Social Democratic Dilemma: Ideology, Governance and Global-
ization, New York: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Vivekanandan, B. (2016). Global Visions of Olof Palme, Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt: 
International Peace and Security, Co-operation, and Development, Switzerland: 
Palgrave Macmillan
Witkowska, M. (2013). Development of Transnational Participatory Processes in the Eu-
ropean Union as a Way to Prevent the Democratic Deficit: The neo-neofunction-
alist approach, “Studia Europejskie” 
A
b
o
ut the autho
rs 
146
About the authors
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
147
Cvetićanin Neven (e-mail: nevencveticanin@gmail.com) is a 
Senior Research Associate at Institute of Social Sciences in Bel-
grade and President of Institute’s Forum for Strategic Studies. He 
obtained degrees in philosophy, sociology and political sciences. He 
has published several books and dozens scientific articles on politi-
cal ideology, political philosophy/sociology, international relations, 
global analysis, the strategic geopolitical developments in the 21st 
century, politics of Western Balkans, etc. Between 2012-2014 he 
served as member of Serbian parliament – National Assembly and 
was a member of the parliamentary Committee for Education, Sci-
ence and Technological Development, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and the Committee on the Constitution and Legislation. 
Dokmanović Mirjana (e-mail: mirad@eunet.rs) is a Research 
Associate at the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade and member 
of Institute’s Forum for Strategic Studies. Her main fields of exper-
tise are international public law, human rights and gender studies. 
Her main research interests are impact of globalisation on human 
rights and position of vulnerable groups of population, economic 
and social rights, women’s rights and gender equality, transition of 
the former socialist and state economies to capitalist economy and 
the feminist economics. She has published 14 books and more than 
50 papers on these issues. Dr. Dokmanović is member of Centre for 
Legal Research of the Institute of Social Sciences and   two re-
search groups at the Institute; Forum for Strategic Studies and 
Study Group for Gender Equality and Public Policies. She is also a 
deputy editor-in-chief of the scientific journal on victimology and 
human rights Temida. 
Gasmi Gordana (e-mail: gordana.gasmi@gmail.com) is a Re-
search Fellow at the Institute of Comparative Law and Full profes-
sor at the Academy “Dositej”, Belgrade. She has published numer-
ous books, scientific essays and expert papers in the field of 
A
b
o
ut the autho
rs 
148
theory of law, the European law and policies and international law 
in Serbian and English. She is fluent in English and French. She has 
worked extensively with international governmental and non-gov-
ernmental organizations across a wide range of professional activi-
ties, covering research, academic and advisory expert functions. 
She is an active participant in numerous international and domes-
tic scientific conferences. In her capacity of the Council of Europe 
and the UNDP expert, she has held numerous seminars on univer-
sal human rights issues in many countries of Europe and Asia. She 
has extensive professional experience with harmonisation of legis-
lation with the EU Acquis and in related preparatory work for the 
EU accession, including policy implementation in Serbia and in the 
region.
Asia Jane Leigh (e-mail: asiajaneleigh@gmail.com) is mas-
ter’s degree student in politics and international development in 
Milan, Italy, with a Bachelor’s degree in Communication Sciences. 
She is involved in defense and promotion of human rights, working 
as a volunteer for Amnesty International and for the Global Com-
mittee for The Rule of Law. In her free time she enjoys writing and 
has experience in acting and public speaking. In the last year she 
took part in the Millennials project - a political and social think tank 
with the aim of promoting social and political involvement of the 
younger generations.
Maksimović Marijana (e-mail: mmaksimovic@idn.org.rs) is a 
Research Associate at the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade. 
She is a research member of the project team “Modelling the De-
velopment and Integration of Serbia in World Currents in the Light 
of Economic, Social and Political Trends” funded by the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic 
of Serbia. Selected publications: Maksimovic, M. 2004. Human Re-
source Management in International Business, IES, Belgrade; Maksi-
movic, M. 2014. Philosophy of Labour and Management in Japan, 
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade; Maksimovic, M. 2017. “Inter-
national Human Resource Management and Demand for Talent”, 
in: Serbia and the World - Challenges and Temptations, Editor Grk, 
S, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade.
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
149
Novaković Nada (e-mail: novakovic.nada@gmail.com) is a 
Research Associate at the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade. 
Her areas of interest are: social structure, social movements, the 
working class, inequalities, conflicts, unions and strikes, education, 
labour legislation and social policy. Dr Novakovic has published pa-
pers in national and international scientific journals and proceed-
ings. She has also published the following monographs: The decay 
of the working class: the material and social position of the work-
ing class of Yugoslavia from 1960 to 1990; (Dez)integration of the 
working class of the second Yugoslavia, and Workers’ strikes and 
transition in Serbia from 1990 to 2015.
Aleksandar Andrija Pejović (e-mail: aleksandar.andrija@
gmail.com) has gained significant experience in international af-
fairs, European affairs, government initiatives, strategy drafting 
and public administration reform while holding various positions 
such as Minister of European Affairs, Chief Negotiator, State Secre-
tary for European Integration, National Coordinator for the Instru-
ment for Pre-Accession, Ambassador of Montenegro to the EU as 
well as a diplomat at key positions in the Montenegrin MFA. He has 
more than 10 years of leadership experience in a number of gov-
ernment bodies, such as Negotiation Team, National Commission 
for European Integration, College for Negotiations, Rule of Law 
Council, PAR Council, etc. He has been involved in substantial dia-
logues and communication with the EU institutions and Member 
States conducting dialogue and negotiating his country’s path to-
wards membership. He has written a number of articles and he is 
now working on his PhD dissertation at the Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Belgrade. 
Radulescu Andrei (e-mail: andrei.radulescu@btrl.ro) is a Ro-
manian macroeconomist and expert in European economic and 
monetary integration. He has significant experience in top macro-
economic institutions in Romania and Portugal. He graduated in 
Economics in 2001 from the Faculty of International Business and 
Economics in Bucharest, Romania. He holds a Master’s degree in 
Economics (area Fiscal Policy) from the University of Porto, Portu-
gal in 2004. He holds a PhD in International Economics from the 
A
b
o
ut the autho
rs 
150
Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest in 2007 with a degree 
in European Monetary Integration. He completed his postdoctoral 
studies at the Romanian Academy in 2013. He has worked as a fi-
nancial analyst at the Investment Bank of Portugal and currently 
works at the Bank of Transilvania, Romania, as Director of Macro-
economic Research, and as a Senior Research Fellow at the Insti-
tute for World Economy and Macro-Modelling Centre of Romanian 
Academy of Sciences in Bucharest, responsible for the macro-finan-
cial analysis of the global and European economy.
Hon. Roberto Rampi (e-mail: roberto.rampi@senato.it) is an 
Italian philosopher, politician and journalist. He is a former Council-
or for culture and Vice-mayor of his hometown of Vimercate, near 
Milan. He serves a second mandate as a member of the Italian Par-
liament. In 2013 he was elected at the House of Deputies for the 
Democratic Party. In March 2018 he was elected as a Senator and in 
October 2018 he was appointed to be a member of the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Both in his political involve-
ment and private activity, culture is the guiding principle of his 
work, as a pillar of democracy, peace and prosperity, human rights 
and positive relationship among different civilizations and reli-
gions.
Zečević Slobodan (e-mail: szecevic5@gmail.com) graduated 
in Paris at the Law School in Sorbonne (Université Paris I Panthéon 
Sorbonne) specializing in the law of the European Union. He re-
ceived a master’s degree and a PhD at the European University in 
Belgrade with topics from the field of economic regulation of the 
European Union where he was also elected to the title of full pro-
fessor. He also obtained a doctorate of the Faculty of Political Sci-
ences in Belgrade with topic “Evolution of the European Union’s in-
stitutional system.” He is the author of several articles and 
monographs from the economic law and the institutional system of 
the European Union. He held lectures at higher education institu-
tions in Serbia and trained employees in the judiciary. Today he is 
permanently employed as a Full Research Professor at the Institute 
for European Studies in Belgrade.
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
151
CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
341.217:342.8(4-672EU)(082)
316.42(4-672EU)(082)
323(4-12)(082)
    STRATEGIC Streams 2019 : European Elections and the Future 
of Europe / edited by Neven Cvetićanin, Andrei Radulescu, Jovo 
Ateljević. - Belgrade : Institute of social sciences, 2020 
(Beograd : Faculty of Technology and Metallurgy, Research and 
Development Centre of Printing Technology). - 150 str. : 
tabele, graf. prikazi ; 21 cm. - (Series Edited Volumes / 
[Institute of social sciences])
Tiraž 150. - About the authors: str. 147-150. - Napomene i 
bibliografske reference uz radove. - Bibliografija uz svaki rad.
ISBN 978-86-7093-232-6
а) Европска унија -- Изборни истем -- Зборници б) Европска 
унија -- Друштвене прилике -- Зборници в) Југоисточна 
Европа -- Политичке прилике -- Зборници
COBISS.SR-ID 17899273
Graphic design and layout: Milorad Mitić | Print: 150 copies | Printed by: 
Faculty of Technology and Metallurgy, Research and Development Centre 
of Printing Technology
